2021 – Jura – Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (2024)

Geneviève Schamps is a full professor at the Faculty of Law and Criminology, the Faculty of Medicine and Dentistry as well as the Faculty of Public Health of the Catholic University of Louvain. She directs the Center for Medical and Biomedical Law which she founded in 2005 and is responsible for the Health Law Option, as part of the Masters I and II in Law (U.C.L.). She is also a visiting professor at the University of Bordeaux and the Collège Belgique (Royal Academy of Belgium). She is a scientific collaborator at the University of Montreal. For several years, she was a visiting professor at Paris Descartes University and served as a sworn, independent translator into the Dutch language.

She is a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, Letters and Fine Arts of Belgium (Technology and Society Class). She chairs the Federal Commission on Patient Rights and is vice-president of the Belgian Bioethics Advisory Committee. She will chair this Committee during the 2016-2017 academic year. She also chairs the Management Committee of the Medical Accident Fund and is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Medical Accident Compensation Office in Paris, as a qualified person. She chairs the Institutional Reference Group on Bioethics (U.C.L) and is vice-president of the Hospital-Faculty Ethics Commission of the St Luc University Clinics/U.C.L. Geneviève Schamps is also a member of the Scientific Council of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (Lausanne) and of the Research Council of U.C.L. She is co-founder of several international scientific networks, including the International University Network of Bioethics, of which she is vice-president.

She acts as an expert or as president or member of thesis juries in various bodies in Belgium or abroad. She is also called upon to evaluate university research centers abroad and is the promoter of several doctoral theses. She is also part of the editorial board of Belgian or foreign scientific journals, with reading committee. She is a member of the “Sciences of Law and Criminology” Commission of the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

His areas of research or teaching are medical and biomedical law, criminal law, civil liability law, comparative law and bioethics. She directs the Scientific Collection of the Center for Medical and Biomedical Law. His doctoral thesis, defended in 1997, proposes, based on an analysis of the legal systems of seven countries, the establishment of a general principle of no-fault civil liability for victims of endangerment. She won two prizes (the quinquennial Baron E. van Dievoet prize – 1999 – and the quinquennial Prize of the Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Belge – 2001). In addition to her publications, she has given numerous presentations in national or international scientific conferences or congresses in the aforementioned fields.

Doctor juris and degree in notarial law at KU Leuven; Master in Comparative Law, (University of Chicago)

Wife of A. Puelinckx, mother of three children and grandmother of seven grandchildren

Emeritus professor of the law faculty of the University of Antwerp; Visiting professor K.U.L. for the basic course family property law, academic year 1996-97; Lecturer in the postgraduate course in Legacy Planning at the UAMS until 2007; Lecturer in Postgraduate Estate Planning at the VUB until 2012; Guest lectures at the Universities of Nijmegen, Johannesburg and Stellenbosch

48 years of academic activity in family property law, both nationally and internationally, author of some 200 publications in that field, also published in the Netherlands, France and South Africa; Winner of the Triennial Prize of the Antwerp Notary (1989) with her book “Erfrecht”, which in its third edition was included in the Principles of Belgian Private Law series

Repeatedly chaired, rapporteur or speaker at conferences and study days on family property law, including in the Netherlands, France and South Africa; e.g. General Rapporteur of the Conference on “La protection de la famille dans le domaine des successions”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2002; Advisor to the rapporteur for the Senate during the reform of the inheritance law of the surviving spouse (1981) and of the law of descent (1987) and advisor to the Dutch Government Commissioner during the reform of Book 4, new Civil Code (inheritance law); Also subsequently repeated as an advisor in the preparation of bills and bills on inheritance law, also during the major reform planned under the previous legislature

Government delegate of Belgium (1975-1977) in the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, when it drafted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Chairman of the Commission on the Status of Women (1975-1977), advisory committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the preparation of the positions to be taken in that CSW; Member of the “Inheritance Law” working group established by the Council of Europe in 2003; Member of the “Study group for a European Civil Code”, Gratuitous contracts department (2004-2007)

Repeated member of the examination jury of the Permanent Recruitment Secretariat for the recruitment of administrative secretaries-lawyers (1984-1986) and of juries for scientific prizes; Alternate member of the Recruitment Board of Magistrates (1991-1995)

Co-founder and member of the editorial staff of the loose-leaf series of "Erfenissen schenkingen en testamenten", published by Kluwer, Commentary with an overview of case law and legal doctrine; Member of the advisory board of the Tijdschrift voor Notarissen and of Patrimonium Familiare; Member of the Study and Legislation Committee of the Royal Federation of Belgian Notaries; (Honorary) member of the Association for the comparative study of the law of Belgium and the Netherlands (private law department) and preliminary advisor in 1994; Board member of the Center for Professional Development in Law (U. Antwerp) until July 2006; Arbitrator in arbitration tribunals

Frederik Swennen is a full professor at the University of Antwerp, with a research and teaching assignment in (international and comparative) personal and family law and in kinship studies. His research is socially theoretically based and empirically informed and mainly concerns the border areas of the concepts of person and family. He is in particular the author of the manual on personal and family law. An approach in context (Antwerp, Intersentia, 7th edition, 2021). He is a promoter of the FWO Scientific Research Community (2015-2019 and 2020-2024) RETHINKIN_, which covers academic family law practice in Flanders and the Netherlands. Frederik Swennen is dean of the Antwerp Law Faculty (2018-2021 and 2021-2024).

He studied at the University of Antwerp (1991-1996) and the University of Cape Town (1996). From 1996 to 2000, as a candidate for the FWO-Flanders, he prepared a thesis on “Geestesgestoorden in het burgerlijk recht” (supervisor: T. Vansweevelt, Antwerp, Intersentia), which was awarded the first André Primsprijs voor Gezondheidsrecht. In 2000 he became a legal secretary at the Court of Cassation, attached to the Attorney General. He remained part-time at the University of Antwerp as a doctoral assistant in personal and family law with Alfons Heyvaert, whom he succeeded in 2002. Frederik Swennen gave his inaugural lecture in 2003 under the title “Het huwelijk afschaffen?” (Antwerp, Intersentia).

During the 2012-2013 academic year, Frederik Swennen held the TPR Exchange Chair at Utrecht University, where he gave his inaugural lecture as a visiting professor under the title “Er is leven na de dood. Persoonlijkheidsrechten na overlijden” (TPR 2013, 1489-1553). He has also served as a visiting professor or fellow at several other institutions, most recently at Birkbeck, University of London and at the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study. He is a member of the executive committee of the International Society of Family Law and of Family Law in Europe: Academic Network, is Belgian rapporteur for the Commission of European Family Law and is an associate member of the Association Internationale de Droit Comparé.

He is an of counsel lawyer with the Greenille Private Client Team of Deloitte Legal Lawyers (Antwerp Bar).

www.frederikswennen.be

Reinhard Steennot graduated in 1998 with a degree in law from Ghent University. He then started as a full-time doctoral student at the Financial Law Institute of Ghent University, sponsored by the Flanders Scientific Research Fund (FWO). In 2002 he successfully defended his doctoral thesis on the legal aspects of electronic payment systems. The commercial edition of the thesis, entitled “Electronic payment transactions: an application of the classical principles” was awarded the prize for financial law, awarded by the Belgian section of the European Association for Banking and Financial Law.

After obtaining his doctorate, Reinhard Steennot continued to work at the FWO for another year as a post-doctoral researcher. In 2003 he was appointed professor of economic and financial law. He currently teaches commercial and economic law, financial law, consumer protection and private banking law at the law faculty.

Reinhard Steennot's research focuses mainly on private banking law (credits, payments, investment services), consumer protection and contractual aspects of electronic commerce. He is the author of several books and numerous articles in national and international magazines. He is responsible for the Overview of Case Law “Consumer Protection” for Tijdschrift van Privaatrecht. A complete publication list of Reinhard Steennot can be consulted at: https://biblio.ugent.be/person/801001239940.

In addition, Reinhard Steennot has been a member of the Supervisory Board of the Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA) since 2011. He is also chairman of the brc Consumption and a member of the expert panel at Ombudsfin.

After completing his law studies at the University of Antwerp (1979), Wilfried Rauws (Antwerp, June 27, 1956) became an assistant at the University of Antwerp. He obtained the title of doctor of law with a thesis entitled 'Civil law methods of termination of the employment contract' (highest distinction, University Institution Antwerp, 1986) after obtaining a special degree in social law (high distinction, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1981).

After teaching at various higher educational institutions, he is now a full-time professor at the Faculty of Law & Criminology of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and a part-time senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University, where he is responsible for education and research in social law, with an emphasis on labor law. In June 2014, he was elected dean of the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the VUB. He worked as a lawyer in Antwerp for sixteen years at the office of the late J. Van Goethem. He is currently an honorary lawyer and is still a deputy judge in the Labor Court in Antwerp. He teaches trainee lawyers in the Antwerp legal area.

He has published on various social law topics, including labor relations in the education sector. His publications also touch on other domains such as civil law, criminal law and public law. In addition to being a member of the editorial staff of Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht , Rauws is part of the editorial board of Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Recht, Tijdschrift voor Onderwijsrecht en Onderwijsbeleid, Rechtskundig Weekblad and of Tegenspraak.

He is the representative of Belgium in the European network of universities 'the European Labor Law Network' founded by professors B. Waas (Goethe University Frankfurt) and G. Heerma van Voss (Leiden University). He is also a member of a number of associations such as the Belgian Association for Industrial Relations, of which he is currently chairman.

Since 2014, he has been a substitute member of the disciplinary appeal board for public law colleges.

After completing her law studies at Ghent University (2002), the Université de Paris in Ghent (2002-2005). At the same time, she became a practice assistant to Professor Hubert Bocken at Ghent University, in the fields of contract law and extra-contractual liability law (2002-2004). From 2005 to 2011 she worked on a doctoral research project on restitution obligations after annulment or dissolution of agreements, first as an assistant (2005). -2006) and subsequently as an Aspirant at the Flanders Scientific Research Fund (2006-2011). The promoters of this research were professors Hubert Bocken and Annelies Wylleman.

After successfully defending her PhD in 2011, she was a doctoral assistant at Ghent University for two years. During that period she shifted her academic focus from contract law to security law. In 2013 she was appointed as a full-time lecturer at Ghent University, where she is currently active in the fields of security law and legal methodology. She is also coordinator of skills education in the law program at Ghent University.

She is also the author of numerous scientific contributions in the field of contract and security law. Since 2014, she has been a member of the editorial board of the Rechtskundig Weekblad and since 2020 also of the TPR.

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Marcel Storme (Ghent, August 3, 1930 - Ghent, March 30, 2018) is emeritus professor at Ghent University.

He studied law at the University of Ghent as well as in Paris and London and obtained his doctorate at the University of Ghent as a graduate in law with a thesis on “The burden of proof in Belgian private law” (1961). He taught at the Rijksuniversiteit Ghent (later Ghent University) as well as at the UFSIA and the RUCA. In Ghent he was a full professor and mainly taught procedural law and critical study of case law.

He was a senator for the CVP (co-opted) from 1977 to 1981.

He was chairman of the Flemish Association of Lawyers from 1983 to 1996. He is a member and was chairman of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts.

He is president of the International Association of Procedural Law (succeeding Mauro Cappelletti) and of the Interuniversity Center for Judicial Law. He founded a study group, the Commission for the Approximation of Procedural Law in Europe, also called the Storme Commission, which published a report on the harmonization of procedural law.

He is dr. jur. h. c. from Lublin University and honorary professor from Peking University. In 1989 he was admitted as a member of the Academia Europaea.

Full Professor KU Leuven, Visiting Professor of Law Harvard Law School, Professor of Law & Negotiation UCP Lisbon Global School of Law and Tilburg Law School. Lawyer at the Brussels and West Flanders bars.

Faculty of Law
Director Rector Roger Dillemans Family Property Law Institute. Co-director Institute for Contract Law. Co-Director LCN, Leuvens Centrum voor Notariaat. Co-chairman ICBO (Interuniversitair en Interdisciplinair Centrum voor Bouwrecht en Onroerend Goed Leuven-Antwerpen). Honorary director Institute for Property Law.

Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences
Co-chairman LCM, Leuven Center for Collaborative Management.

At Harvard affiliated with PON, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.
Gommaar van Oosterwijck Chair 2003 (VUB); Francqui Chair 2010-2011 (VUB); KBC Chair Family Wealth 2014-2015 (AMS).

Beatrix Vanlerberghe studied law at KU Leuven (1990) and Essex (LL.M. in International Human Rights Law, 1991). In 1993 she obtained the 'Diplôme de Droit International et de Droit Comparé des Droits de l'Homme' from the 'Institut des droits de l'homme' in Strasbourg.

She was admitted to the Brussels Bar in 1991 and subsequently appointed to the bar of the Court of Cassation of Belgium (2012). In 1991, she first joined the law firm Allen & Overy (formerly Loeff, Claeys, Verbeke) and then the law firm Linklaters (formerly De Bandt, Van Hecke & Lagae), where she specialized in cassation work as a 'counsel'. She left this office in 2013 to found the law firm Verbist & Vanlerberghe Omega Law.

In addition, from 1991 to 1999 she was an assistant at KU Leuven in the fields of Judicial Law and Human Rights. She obtained her doctorate in law in 1999 with a thesis on the right to a fair trial and openness in the judiciary. Since 2006, she has taught the subjects “Grondige Studie van het Gerechtelijk Recht”, “Bijzondere Studie van het Bewijsrecht” and “Bijzondere Studie Pleitoefeningen” at the University of Antwerp.

She is the author, co-author, editor and co-editor of numerous books and contributions to magazines on various subjects. She has been a member of the TPR editorial board since 2020.

Matthias Edward Storme (Ghent, July 8, 1959) is a full professor at KU Leuven, where he heads the Institute for Commercial and Insolvency Law. After studying Greek-Latin humanities at the Sint-Barbara College s.J. in Ghent and studied law and philosophy in Antwerp and Leuven (1976-1981), he obtained an M.A. in Philosophy from Yale University (1982) and a PhD in law from KU Leuven (1989) after study periods at the Università degli studi di Bologna (1983-1984) and the Max Planck Institute for International and Australian Private Law in Hamburg (1984- 85).

He has teaching assignments in international commercial law, security and insolvency law, notarial civil and procedural law, contract law, legal philosophy and previously also European procedural law, comparative philosophy and comparative law

He previously taught at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Antwerp and the China University of Politics and Law in Beijing and has given guest lectures at many other universities. Since 1992 he has been part of expert committees preparing a European Civil Code (1992-2002 the Commission on European Contract Law, the so-called Lando Commission; since 1999 the Study Group on a European Civil Code and since 2003 the Acquis communautaire Group.

In the context of the project for a draft Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law (DCFR), he was a member of the 10-member group that provided the final editing of this draft for a European Civil Code (December 2008) which has now become the basis for the Common European Sales Law (CESL, Common European Sales law). He is a founding member of the European Law Institute (established 2011) and member of the Council of the ELI and involved in several ELI projects (common European sales law; European civil procedure; business rescue).

He is co-founder and co-editor-in-chief (with Ewoud Hondius) of the European review of private law / Europäische Zeitschrift für Privatrecht / Revue Européenne de droit private, core editor of Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht and co-director of the journal since 2014.

He is also a lawyer in Ghent (until 2013 in Brussels, where he was former chairman of the Flemish Law Society at the Brussels Bar, and a former member of the Council of the Bar Association of the Dutch Bar Association in Brussels).

Jeroen Delvoie is a (part-time) lecturer at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and a partner at the Eubelius law firm.

Jeroen Delvoie obtained a law degree from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in 1999 and a Master of Laws degree from the University of Chicago (Chicago, USA) in 2000.

He started his professional career as a lawyer at the Brussels bar in 2000 at the Eubelius firm.

From 2004 to 2009 he was a researcher (FWO aspirant and doctoral fellow) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, where he obtained his doctorate in law in 2010 under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ludo Cornelis with a thesis on organ theory in private law (published by Intersentia in 2010). For this work he was awarded the triennial Prix Pierre Coppens of the UCL and the Revue Pratique des Sociétés.

Jeroen Delvoie has been a part-time lecturer at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel since 2012, where he currently teaches the courses Selected Topics of European company and association law and Mergers and acquisitions.

He is also a lawyer at the Brussels bar (partner at Eubelius).

Jeroen Delvoie is mainly academically active in corporate law and contract law. His practice as a lawyer focuses on corporate law and public economic law, in particular public corporate law.

Hubert Bocken became a doctor of law in 1967 at the University of Ghent, where, as a student, he was also chairman of the Kultureel Konvent and the Flemish Law Society. He received his LLM degree from Harvard Law School in 1968; In 1978 he obtained his doctorate in Ghent as Aggregator for higher education in civil law with a thesis on “Het aansprakelijkheidsrecht als sanctie tegen de verstoring van het leefmilieu”.

After working for a few years at the law firm Cleary Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, he worked full-time at the Faculty of Law at Ghent University from 1971 onwards. He was responsible for courses in private law, in particular contract law, comparative law and environmental law, and also held several administrative positions. He was, among other things, chairman of the Department of Civil Law and of the Center for Environmental Law, member of the board of directors of Ghent University and dean for four years. He has been a full professor emeritus since 2009.

He has published on several aspects of contract law, environmental law and comparative law. He was one of the first in Belgium to conduct research on environmental law and environmental liability law. More recently, his academic work focuses on extra-contractual liability law, in particular the causality issue and on compensation outside liability law.

He advised on the preparation of legislation in the field of government liability and environmental law and was a member of EU and UNEP expert groups for environmental law.

He was chairman of the Flemish Council for the Environment, founder and chairman of the Belgian Association for Environmental Law, initiator and chairman of the Interuniversity Commission for the Revision of Environmental Law in the Flemish Region, chairman of the Working Party on Liability and Insurance for Pollution, Products and New Technologies of the Association Internationale du Droit des Assurances. He is a member and since 2009 chairman of the Association for the Comparative Study of Law in Belgium and the Netherlands and since 2010 chairman of the jury of the F. Collin Prize for Law. He is a member of the Royal Flemish Academy for Sciences and Arts of Belgium and has been Director of the Human Sciences Class since 2013.

He received the Frank Boas Scholarship in International Legal Studies (1967), the Environment Foundation Prize (1978), was a laureate of the Travel Scholarship Competition (1982) and the international Elisabeth Haub Prize for Environmental Law (1992) and is an honorary professor at the Bond University Law School (Qld, Aus).

He has been a member of the editorial staff of Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht.

Vincent Sagaert studied Law at Campus Kortrijk and KU Leuven. As an Aspirant of the FWO-Flanders, he wrote a thesis, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Eric Dirix (Insolvency Law, KU Leuven), entitled “Business Subrogation” (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003, 792 p.).

Since October 1, 2004, he has been appointed full-time at KU Leuven and Kulak, where he is responsible for contract law and property law. He also teaches property law (bachelor's and master's) and notarial real estate law at KU Leuven, where he is Director of the Institute for Property Law. Since 2009 he has been Vice Dean at the Faculty of Law. Since October 1, 2002, he has also held a part-time teaching position at the University of Antwerp.

Vincent Sagaert is co-director of Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, editorial board member of the Rechtskundig Weekblad, of the Civil Law Library, of the Journal of Belgian Civil Law, of the Journal of Justices of the Peace, of the Dutch Journal of Civil Law and of European Property Law Journal. He is co-editor of the International Encyclopedia of Property and Trust law. Since 2013, he has been a member of the expert committee of the Fonds Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique.

As part of his doctoral research, he was a visiting researcher at the University of Oxford, College Lady Margareth Hall. He has been a visiting professor several times at the Université du Burundi (2003-2004-2005-2009), with which he also coordinates a university research project. In 2006 he was a visiting professor at the University of Utrecht and since 2010 he has been a Fellow of the South African Research Chair for Property Law (University of Stellenbosch).

With various contributions, he won the A.P.R. Prize (1997-98), the TPR Prize twice (2000 and 2001) and the Ius commune Prize (2001). He was the holder of the TPR Exchange Chair in 2006.

Since 2003 he has also worked as a lawyer at the Brussels Bar. He is part of the Eubelius law firm, where he focuses on real estate law. He was the opening orator of the judicial year at the Brussels Bar (2008) and at the Ypres Bar (2010).

Yves-Henri Leleu is a full professor at the Université de Liège and part-time professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, teaching personal and family law, relationship property law, and legal terminology in Dutch.

He has been a visiting professor at the universities of Nijmegen (T.P.R. chair) and at Paris Panthéon-Assas. He is director of the Interuniversity Center for Comparative Law and member of the editorial committee of several scientific Belgian and foreign journals. He is a member of the Study and Legislation Committee of the Federation of Belgian Notaries and of the Federal Euthanasia Control Committee.

He has published two manuals (Droit des personnes et des familles, Larcier, 2005, 2010; Droit patrimonial des couples, Larcier, 2014), several books and publications in his research fields, and a photographic album (Photogénies, Cefal, 2005).

He has been active in legal practice since 1996 as a consultant, since 2006 as a lawyer, currently at the Liège Bar.

He was born in Libramont on August 2, 1967, married and father of a daughter.

Annelies Wylleman studied law (1986), criminology (1986) and notary law (1993) at the University of Ghent. She obtained her doctorate in law from the same university in 1998 with a thesis on “Onvolwaardige wilsvorming en onbekwaamheid in het materieel en het formeel privaatrecht”. This thesis was awarded the Fernand-Collin Prize (2000) and the Driejaarlijkse Prijs van het Antwerps Notariaat (2001).

Since 1999 until today, she has taught the subject of Notarial Civil Law at the Master of Notarial School in Ghent. From 1999 to 2006, she also taught the course 'Introduction to Private Law' at the Faculty of Law in Ghent, then from 2006 to 2011 the 'In-depth Study in Real Estate Law' and from 2011 to the present the course 'Business law and real security rights'. Since 2003, she has been chairman of the Education Committee of the Master of Notarial Science.

She is a member of the association for the Comparative Study of Law in Belgium and the Netherlands, a member of the editorial staff of Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht, of the General Practical Law Collection and of the Larcier Codes. She is a corresponding member of the Committee for Study and Legislation of the Royal Federation of Belgian Notaries.

Her scientific interest is mainly in sanctions regulations in private law, the issue of representation, property law arrangements in reconstituted families, apartment rights and usufruct.

Annelies Wylleman has always combined her scientific activity with legal practice: she was a lawyer at the bar in Ghent (1986-1993) and has been a notary in Sleidinge since 1999.

The Cour de Cassation, being the Belgian supreme court, has two functions. On the one hand, it supervises and fuels the development of the law by the courts and ensures consistent application of the law; on the other hand it secures legal protection. Especially as regards the first-named function, the Court has a unique role in the Belgian legal system. The Cour de Cassation is also unique in that, in contrast to the other courts, it is guided by the public interest in its application of the law. In order to fulfill its task, the Court is dependent on the private initiative taken by the parties involved in the dispute to bring an appeal before it. Whereas the divergence between the public and the private interests may have caused fewer problems in earlier times, when fewer appeals were lodged with the Court, currently it is generally accepted that the Court is increasingly less able to fulfill its public interest mission. The increase in its workload and in the length of time for processing cases highlight a need for reform.

To that effect, I would propose the adoption of a new case selection mechanism, as a first step towards a major reform of the Cour. Article 1105bis of the Belgian Judicial Code allows the Court to differentiate as regards the human resources allocated to cases, depending on the potential they have for fulfilling the Court’s public interest mission. This would enhance the ability which the Court already has to handle straightforward cases with three, rather than the standard five, judges. Following the example provided by the Court’s French and Dutch counterparts, I would also advocate the introduction of a system which allows the Court to respond to statements of appeal with a standard ground of judgment, where such statements are incapable of causing the appealed decision to be reviewed and do not involve an important point of law. This system could reduce the judges’ workload and highlight the importance of the Court’s public interest mission, without intruding in any significant way on deep-seated considerations of legal protection and access to justice. Together with the introduction of a preliminary jurisdiction to rule on new and important questions of law raised before lower courts, and a renewed interest in the existing cassation procedure in the general interest of the law, the Court’s role in protecting the public interest could be enhanced, without detracting its duty to ensure legal protection in individual cases.

Servitudes must benefit the dominant estate. If there is no benefit, there can be no servitude. This rule applies under Belgian law, but also under French, German and Dutch law. In other words, all these legal systems make the existence of servitudes subject to a utitlity requirement. This, however, is not a purely European phenomenon, since the US law of easem*nts lays down a similar requirement, to wit the “touch and concern” requirement. That requirement does not only display interesting similarities with the European utility requirement in terms of its content and functional application, but has also evolved along surprisingly similar lines. It is these similarities, as well as the differences, between these two requirements that this paper examines in some depth.

Prior to this, however, the author pauses to examine the exact content and meaning of both these requirements. What exactly amounts to a benefit for the dominant estate? And at what point does a covenant “touch and concern” an estate? As regards the benefit requirement, the author considers not only the Belgian law, but also French, German and Dutch law. From this analysis, it emerges that the benefit requirement is interpreted sufficiently flexibly, and that it has even been – at least formally– abolished in the Netherlands.

The author then proceeds to consider extensively the similarities between the utility requirement and the “touch and concern” requirement, examining successively (a) the important part played by both requirements where the relevant covenants are enhanced by means of a droit de suite; (b) their role in protecting the potential acquirers of the estate in question, the actual acquirers of such an estate and society in general, (c) the interaction with the intention requirement displayed by both requirements, and (d) the similarity with which the two requirements have evolved over the years. As regards (d), both the benefit and the “touch and concern” requirements have clearly evolved towards a more flexible interpretation, a phenomenon which the author illustrates by reference to the non-competition clause.

In addition to the similarities, there are also a number of differences between the utility requirement and the “touch and concern” requirement. In the first instance, the requirements in question do not relate to exactly the same types of right, since European servitudes are not identical to American real covenants. Other differences relate to (a) one of the requirements being one-dimensional as to its contents, the other two-dimensional; (b) the precise consequences of the requirements being no longer fulfilled, and (c) the point at which the fulfilment of the requirements is to be assessed.

Having applied both requirements to a number of “problematic” obligations, i.e. the non-competition clause, the developer transfer fee covenant and the covenant not to sue, the author ends this contribution by reflecting on the impact which the abolition of the requirements in question would have on the law of property, and more particularly on the numerus clausus principle. His conclusion is that such abolition would result in the erosion of the numerus clausus principle.

Apart from the economic consequences of the 2008 credit crisis, the prevailing viewpoints regarding the way in which some financial instruments (that might have contributed to the crisis) were traded in unregulated markets have come to realise that greater control, regulation and transparency in trading instruments such as credit default swaps may benefit the market. Some of these elements are referred to in this article, but this is not its main focus, seeking as it does to analyse the nature of credit default swaps against existing and proven legal constructs, as well as their rules and requirements.

A credit default swap, in its simplest form, can be explained as follows. A is the holder of a government bond to the value of €10,000 issued by the Republic of Transylvania and maturing in five years’ time. Until the bond matures, A has to hope and pray that Transylvania will be able to repay the main debt and the relevant interest. As the creditor, A would like to secure his debt and minimise his risks. A credit default swap allows the creditor to do just that – the latter approaches a security provider (normally a financial institution) to provide security against the possible default on the debtor’s part when the debt matures. If the debtor defaults, the risk against which the creditor took out the security has materialised and he is entitled to payment.

The credit default swap thus clearly has similarities with insurance, as well as with aleatory agreements (contracts of chance such as gambling and wagering). This particular aspect is also examined in the light of so-called “contracts of difference”, and even though credit default swaps and other similar financial instruments are now treated as lawful as a result of legislative change, the author finds substantive similarities between contracts of chance, insurance and credit default swaps.

Credit default swaps can also be bought where there is no connection between the purchaser of the swap and the obligation secured by the swap. The credit default swap is thus totally independent of the relevant agreement. This is similar to the position as regards guarantees and standby letters of credit, both being legal constructs meeting the same (or similar) economic objective as a credit default swap.

The use of personal security is characteristic of numerous international transactions. The issuing of a guarantee, standby letter of credit, indemnity, and performance bond are all examples of personal security used to secure performance of a particular transaction – indeed, the same purpose as met by a credit default swap in its classic format.

As regards naked credit default swaps, the object here is not the creation of security, but merely speculation. They have become lawful following changes in legislation, and it is only in such cases that the use of personal security would not have sufficed. When faced with a classic credit default swap, on the other hand, one is for all practical purposes dealing with personal security. The author also draws a comparison between suretyship and a credit default swap, and establishes that even the classic terms of a suretyship agreement, i.e. the beneficium excussionis and the beneficium cedendarum actionum, can in some or other form be found in the credit default swap – the only difference being that the surety is not paid a single penny for undertaking the risk.

The different perspective used in this contribution has highlighted that the purpose for which the credit default swap was initially created could easily have been met using the existing legal notions covering the provision of credit security – personal security in particular would have provided legal certainty. The new legal notion that has been created and is primarily used for the purpose of speculation (credit default swap), is nothing but an aleatory agreement, and the fact that it is now accepted as a valid agreement is merely an attempt by the authorities to bring some order to this notion and is not necessarily consistent with public policy, which has been a shifting concept down the years.

Companies and financial institutions are constantly searching for alternatives to traditional (re)insurance in order to mitigate risks that are very hard or even impossible to insure, such as extreme weather, natural disasters or terrorism. One of those alternatives is the transfer of this risk to capital markets through the creation of securities linked to those risks, such as CAT bonds (CATs).

These CATs are modelled on asset-backed securities – here, risks are pooled in a special purpose vehicle (SPV) by the party who wishes to cover the risk (the sponsor). This SPV finances itself through the issuing of bonds. Normally, an interest rate is agreed upon, and at maturity, investors may redeem their investment. Where, however, a certain event (i.e. the ‘trigger’) occurs, investors will be repaid either not at all or only in part, and the SPV will be used to finance the consequences of the disaster. Such triggers can be linked to the magnitude of the actual loss of the sponsor (indemnity triggers) or to an index related to the loss incurred by the sponsor (index triggers). There are also hybrid forms whereby multiple triggers are combined in one bond (hybrid triggers). Because the bonds are sold, the non-redeemable funds are immediately available to the sponsor.

However, the question arises as to the extent to which those CATs are financial products or insurance transactions. This question is highly relevant – for various reasons the party in question may, or may not, want his/her transaction to be qualified as one of either of these products. However, before formulating any rules on this, analyse the nature of CAT-transactions as a financial product, or insurance product, should be analysed.

Up to this point, this debate has been mainly conducted on the basis of a holistic approach, characterized by a transparent SPV, rather than by regarding the SPV as a separate entity – viewing the transaction as a whole. Under such an approach, the main characteristics that are considered to distinguish insurance products from financial products (such as the insurable interest principle, the indemnity principle, the mutualisation of risks, the valuation of the instrument and the risk allocation) are used as criteria. In most cases, such an analysis seems to exclude qualification as an insurance product. However, in most cases there are several counter-arguments possible, and the arguments in favour are, to say the least, far from solid. In some cases the arguments in favour give themselves rise to other problems.

A basic CAT is structured in a triangular relationship, in which the sponsor and the investors have no direct obligations towards each other because of the SPV that ‘separates’ them. The three parties are the person transferring the risk (sponsor), the SPV (issuer) and the investors. By controlling the shares in the SPV through a trust, they are protected in the event of the sponsor’s insolvency, which guarantees a strict separation between the sponsor and issuer. For this reason it is impossible to have a transparent insight into the SPV, and to regard the issuance of CAT-bonds as a single transaction. If, however, there were a desire to do so by regulation, the SPV articles would need to be taken strongly into consideration in so doing.

In contrast to this holistic analysis, an analysis of the triangular relationship does yield a clear result. In the sponsor/SPV relationship, we have an insurance transaction in the legal, but not in the financial/functional, sense. However, if instead of an SPV one were to use an MPV, this would constitute an insurance transaction in the financial sense. Under the SPV/investors relationship, the object of the agreement would seem to be a financial operation – qualification as a financial instrument appears to be recommended here. Between the sponsor and the investors, there is – from a legal point of view – no contact whatsoever.

This, however, is a very general answer to a question that is highly ad-hoc, given that most CATs are designed on an ad hoc basis as a function of the sponsor’s and the investors’ requirements. This analysis must, therefore be used with care.

1. The central question underlying this contribution is the manner in which compensation for loss resulting from disasters is regulated in Belgium and in The Netherlands. A distinction is drawn between so-called technological disasters, i.e. those marked by human involvement, on the one hand, and natural disasters on the other hand. From a theoretical perspective, the author asks the question as to how any loss resulting from disasters should be compensated in an ideal world. In so doing, he considers not only what should be the optimal level of compensation awarded to victims, but also the question as to how the various compensation mechanisms could provide potential victims with the best possible incentives for preventing such loss. As far as technological disasters are concerned, the author gives pride of place to solutions provided under the law of torts, for the simple reason that such disasters will frequently produce a perpetrator who can also be held liable. As for natural disasters, on the other hand, appropriate solutions should clearly be sought outside the law of torts, precisely because the chances of holding the only possible perpetrator, i.e. the public authorities, liable will frequently be much thinner.

2. As regards technological disasters, the author highlights three aspects which will be crucial in order to guarantee optimal levels of compensation and prevention. Firstly, technological disasters constitute a type of accident for which strict liability appears to be the most appropriate legal remedy. Both for the purpose of guaranteeing compensation for the victims and in order to create incentives for prevention, such strict liability should be combined with a system that guarantees solvency in such a way that the victim will also be able to claim from the perpetrator’s liability insurer. The problem here is that where the claim is brought using the ordinary civil proceedings, it can frequently take a very long time – years in some cases – before the tortfeasor can be definitively found to be liable for compensation. This mere circ*mstance can cause the loss to increase. This is why a strong case can be made, particularly when it comes to disasters, for introducing accelerated proceedings which will attend to the most urgent needs in order to prevent increasing the loss incurred.

3. As for natural disasters, a solution should be sought which is centred around the victim, more particularly through the mechanism of the so-called first-party disaster insurance – such as the insurance which house owners take out against the risk of flooding. Although this type of insurance presents many advantages, being capable of yielding both compensation and incentives for prevention, it nevertheless presents some problems. On the demand side, the problem is that demand for insurance is frequently too low, so that where serious disasters occur, it transpires that only a restricted number of victims had actually taken out insurance. One possible solution could be the introduction of compulsory insurance. On the supply side, the problem is that the losses resulting from disasters can be quite sizeable. This can result in disasters causing losses which are no longer insurable on the ordinary commercial insurance market, and cannot be covered by re-insurance either. This would appear to make out a case for intervention by the public thorities, the latter presenting themselves as the re-insurer of last resort. This type of public intervention is strongly to be preferred to ex-post compensation, under which certain victims are awarded compensation from public funds. Such an approach is inadequate in terms of generating incentives for prevention and serves to restrict demand for insurance. Against this theoretical background, the author considers, first, compensation of loss caused by technological disasters in Belgium and The Netherlands, and, subsequently, compensation of loss caused by natural disasters in Belgium and in the Netherlands.

4. In relation to technological disasters, the author notes that, in Belgium, the required strict liability mechanisms are available in principle. However, the problem here is that they frequently present an ad hoc character, and that they cannot in truth be described as a systematically considered introduction of a strict liability régime. One positive aspect of the Belgian system, however, is that in many cases it imposes an obligation to take out solvency cover – which invariably involves compulsory liability insurance. In addition, the Belgian Law of 13/11/2011 has created a specific set of rules aimed at providing compensation for the victims of technological accidents. Although some details of this law are open to criticism, it presents the all-important characteristics of having in essence created a mechanism which enables compensation to be awarded rapidly on the basis of the law of torts.

5. The law of The Netherlands also provides a number of strict liability systems. However, the “Enschede” and “Volendam” cases show that, where the disasters assume this kind of dimension, it is not so much the liable party who caused the loss who is required to pay the lion’s share of the compensation, but that the largest part of the damages awarded to the victims will be paid from public funds. Even the legislation which was specifically created in order to deal with disasters occurring in The Netherlands, to wit the Law on accommodating Losses resulting from Disasters and Serious Accidents (WTS), has proved unequal to the challenge of generating adequate levels of compensation for major disasters such as Enschede and Volendam. What these cases show in particular is that, in the absence of a system of compulsory insurance, only a very low amount of money was available for compensation from the contracted insurance. It was precisely for this reason that the public authorities provided the lion’s share of the compensation awarded to the victims. In fact, this situation, which shields the private sector from the cost and risk created by its activity, is regarded as undesirable in the Netherlands also, as can be seen from the reports emanating from various committees. Although a number of interesting options have been ventilated by way of solutions, this has yet to result in actual changes in the relevant law.

6. Until 2003, compensation of the loss caused by natural disasters in Belgium was characterised by a patchwork of rules, in which the Disaster Fund (Rampenfonds) played the leading part. In 2003, Belgium introduced compulsory cover for damage caused by flooding which was combined with fire insurance for low-level risks. However, this cover was only intended to apply to properties located in specifically designated flooding areas – and no such designation ever took place. Instead, a new Law of 17/9/2005 was adopted under which, following the French example, additional cover for loss from disasters was made available on (voluntary) fire insurance. This means that Belgium has to a large extent conformed to the system which appears to be the most appropriate from a theoretical viewpoint also, which is to create a system of first party disaster insurance. Thus it is that the part played by the public authorities, via the Disaster Fund, has become extremely marginal.

7. In the Netherlands, no insurance against earthquakes and flooding was, until recently, possible as a result of two binding decisions made by the insurers, and which had come into being in the 1950s. Under this arrangement, the insurers had agreed no longer to cover flooding or earthquakes. Following the floods which occurred in 1992 and 1993, these agreements between the insurers were withdrawn, under pressure from the politicians and from the competition authorities. Since then, a lengthy process of negotiation has taken place between the insurers and the public authorities in the Netherlands, with a view to putting into place a structured set or rules. In so doing, the parties involved have considered both the Belgian and French systems. In spite of the various reports, studies and discussions on the subject, no general flooding insurance has as yet been made available in the Netherlands. Accordingly, whenever the Netherlands suffer flooding, either the WTS will be held to be applicable, or, as is often the case with technological disasters, the public authorities may make available compensation on an ad hoc basis.

8. When comparing the relevant systems in both countries, one notices particularly that, to a certain extent, the Belgian legislation comes closer to the theoretical model than is the case with the Dutch model. Obviously this does not mean that the Belgian lawmakers have systematically sought to achieve a properly structured set of rules on the subject. As far as technological disasters are concerned, the Belgian model, although obviously capable of improvement at all times, presents the advantage of (a) making available a large number of strict liability systems, even though the latter have frequently been introduced on an ad hoc basis, and (b) being combined with compulsory solvency guarantees. The 2011 Law has also added an interesting novel element to the Belgian compensation model by creating a specific accelerated procedure. Obviously it remains to be seen whether this legislation is also capable of living up to its promise in practical terms.

9. In the Netherlands, the victims of technological disasters are – at the risk of exaggeration – dependent on their finding a solvent perpetrator and, in the absence thereof, on any ad hoc funds made available by the public authorities. The Enschede and Volendam disasters have demonstrated that the Dutch model presents the problem that those causing the loss are only exposed to tort liability to a very limited extent, and that the public authorities (and therefore the taxpayer) pay the lion’s share of the bill. In the light of the notion, inspired by legal economics, that those causing loss should be exposed to the social costs caused by their activity, this is not a desirable outcome.

10. As regards the compensation payable for loss caused by natural disasters, the Belgian model also comes closer to the theoretical model than does its Dutch counterpart. In Belgium, the relevant legislation has conformed to the theoretical model by reducing the call on public intervention by phasing out the role of the Disaster Fund and introducing compulsory disaster cover as an addition to the fire insurance policy. It is true that in the Netherlands there is legislation available in the shape of the WTS; however, the latter is seldom applied, which is related to the circ*mstance that losses which are insurable under normal circ*mstances are not eligible for compensation under the WTS. The Netherlands still have no proper system of flooding insurance. This is why the victims of major natural disasters continue to be dependent on the (political) willingness on the part of the public authorities to contribute from public funds. Although there are certain aspects of the Belgian system which are open to criticism, the Belgian model is, all in all, that which comes closest to the theoretical model as regards compensation for both technological and natural disasters.

This contribution examines the future direction which the European harmonisation programme should take in the field of company law. The reason for this is that this programme is due for reassessment in the light of recent case law of the Court of Justice, which is giving the member states less and less scope for imposing their company law on foreign companies. Taking into account the competitive dynamics to which this case law is giving rise (the “European company law market”), the author essentially formulates two proposals.

Firstly, he advocates the adoption of the Fourteenth Company Law Directive, under which the registered office is the exclusive basis for determining which company law regime would apply, and which provides companies with the opportunity to convert to a type of company as regulated by another member state, without loss of legal personality. When issuing this directive, it is essential that the EU lawmakers should have adequate regard for the legal position of the various interested parties who could be affected by such a conversion. This could involve providing dissenting minority shareholders with a right to leave the company, and introducing a right to require security on the part of the creditors.

The second proposal is to abandon the Centre of Main Interest (COMI) principle in the European Insolvency Regulation. Combined with the Fourteenth Company Law Directive, as advocated in this paper, this would ensure that the applicable company law (lex societatis) and the applicable insolvency law (lex concursus) be at all times that of one and the same member state, i.e. that in which the company has its registered office.

These two proposals should remedy various shortcomings in the current system, and create the conditions in which the member states could compete effectively with each other in the field of company law. Thus a way could be found of overcoming the absence of political consensus between the EU member states in relation to the company law harmonisation programme, without harming the legal position of the various company stakeholders.

Private law is not lacking any challenges. The accelerating pace of Europeanisation and globalisation, advances in technology, and a growing awareness that the law should increasingly set its sights on the long term, all raise the question as to what will be the face of the private law of the future. This paper, being the printed version of an address given on the occasion of the author’s acceptance of the 2014 TPR Visiting Chair, attempts to anticipate what the future might bring in this regard. It examines the way in which the part played by the various actors involved in creating the law (legislators, judges, legal scholars and private actors) could change as a result of the internationalisation process. The author also asks the question as to whether the position occupied by the private law itself is being influenced by this internationalisation process and will cause other mechanisms will take over from the law as a regulatory force.

When it comes to the changing role played by the legal actors, the part played by legislators will probably be subject to even greater change as a result of internationalisation. Affected as they have been by the ever-decreasing enthusiasm for the Europeanisation process, EU lawmakers will probably have less and less scope for issuing internal market legislation, whereas at the national level the legislators’ role will be usurped to an even greater extent by the courts. The foregoing does not diminish the case for a fundamental debate on what represents the best possible level of regulation. The question as to “who does what” can only become a more pressing one during the years to come.

The role played by the private law as a regulatory instrument is also bound to change in years to come. The growing gap between the demands of globally-trading business people and the ability – or perhaps inability – on the part of politicians to lay down satisfactory legal rules, has driven traders to resort to alternative means of establishing trust. As a result, there are clear indications that the internationalisation of trade drives traders no longer to place a posteriori reliance on the law should matters go wrong, but are attempting ex ante to avoid the necessity of going to law in the first place. This they do through a process of “self-enforcement” and by acting on the basis of the future partner’s reputation, which has become increasingly available from online sources of information. All this justifies the conclusion that the role of the law in regulating private relations is bound to decrease.

The (Dutch) rule of good faith and fair dealing (redelijkheid en billijkheid) and the (Belgian) objective notion of bona fides are “open” or “vague” standards. There are certain differences between these two notions – yet they largely succeed in achieving their objective. They are capable of supplementing, restricting and interpreting legal transactions. The effect of both these notions depends on the concrete circ*mstances of the case. The influence exerted by these circ*mstances enables a just solution to be achieved in concrete situations where the strict application of the generally applicable law would fail to produce satisfactory results. However, the influence of these circ*mstances also presents a disadvantage, in that it causes legal uncertainty.

Legal certainty can be enhanced by achieving clarity as to the circ*mstances that influence the effect of the open standards. As a result, an adequate comparison between these open standards requires more than merely comparing their possible legal implications –they require a comparison between the circ*mstances that influence these open notions. This paper is focused on the circ*mstances affecting the effects of good faith and fair dealing. The author examines whether these circ*mstances are also a factor in the relevant Belgian statutes. He also examines the extent to which this factor can be compared to the effect produced by the circ*mstances of the case under Dutch law.

The author shows that every factor that influences the effects of the good faith and fair dealing also plays a part in at least one of the effects of the Belgian bona fides rule or any other legal area in the Netherlands which is governed by the rule of reason and fair dealing. The Belgian statures, legal literature and case law provide examples of the influence exerted by every factor that informs the effects of good faith and fair dealing.

The circ*mstances of the case have a similar part to play in both legal systems. These circ*mstances can be approached in various ways. Accordingly, there are cases in which the law, legal literature and case law of the Netherlands and Belgium adopt different approaches. However, when we take a closer look at these factors we can see that in many cases their influence is more or less the same. In both legal systems the circ*mstances of the case tend to produce similar or comparable effects. This should not give rise to any surprise – both the Netherlands and Belgium are two developed Western nations united by a common legal culture, and there are many points of convergence between the two countries Thus it is reasonable to assume that the legal systems in both countries will be largely in agreement on the notions of justice and fairness. The divergences between the Dutch and Belgian systems of law have – even in this area of “open standards” – increased with the introduction of the new Netherlands Civil Code in 1992. However, this paper purports to show that there exists a great deal of consensus as regards the circ*mstances that influence these standards.

Post-contractual obligations are contractual obligations which become or remain effective after the end of the economic operation of the contract. The principles of termination seem to imply that these post-contractual obligations disappear after termination of the contract from which they originate. Their disappearance, however, would mostly result in a suboptimal situation. In this contribution, we have searched for a foundation for the survival of post-contractual obligations after termination.

Firstly, the survival (as well as the disappearance) of post-contractual obligations can result from a statutory provision.

If the fate of the post-contractual obligation after termination is not dealt with in statutory law, it is possible to base its survival on the material partial termination (and not on the temporal partial termination). An analysis of the material scope of termination shows that it only affects the obligation which has been poorly performed, the obligation to provide the counterpart for the obligation which has been poorly performed and all other obligations which, as a result, lose their economic usefulness. The application of this criterion of economic usefulness requires to first determine whether the parties have expressed their view on the economic usefulness of an obligation after termination (subjective application). If not, one should look at what a normal and reasonable party would consider to be economically useful (objective application). The objective application causes the disappearance of all obligations which contribute to the economic operation of the contract, as well as the disappearance of all obligations which lose their economic usefulness because of restitution caused by termination.

Thus, post-contractual obligations can survive after termination if they remain economically useful after termination and restitution caused by termination. The parties can express their view on that matter, for example by inserting express clauses about the fate of their post-contractual obligations after termination, by inserting (in)divisibility clauses, by inserting clauses about partial termination, … If the actual view of the parties cannot be determined, one should assume that postcontractual obligations remain economically useful after termination, since, by definition, they do not contribute to the economic operation of the contract. Some post-contractual obligations, however, lose their economic usefulness because of restitution caused by termination. This is the case for obligations which aim at the return or the destruction of goods which already return to the other party by way of restitution caused by termination. In principle, such post-contractual obligations do not survive after termination. By contrast, post-contractual obligations which aim at the return of goods which do not return to the other party by way of restitution caused by termination, as well as post-contractual obligations which have nothing to do with the return of goods whatsoever, remain economically useful and should survive.

Belgian and French law thus allow for a material partial termination. The expression is, however, deceptive, since it seems to imply that material partial termination is an exception to the normal application of termination. In reality, the survival of post-contractual obligations is precisely due to the normal material scope of termination.

In this paper, the authors conduct a thorough examination of the changes which the new Law on Pledges will, as from its entry into effect, bring about in the rules on retention of title.

The new Law provides a general set of rules in this field by transferring the provision governing retention of title from the Law on Bankruptcy to the Civil Code. Henceforth the security provided can be relied upon in all cases of concurrence. In addition, the new Law expressly stipulates that retention of title can be exercised regardless of the nature of the agreement, which means that also be included in building contracts. In functional terms, the new Law has equated the exercising of retention of title with that of a pledge. One exception to this is that retention of title has not yet been made compulsorily subject to disclosure.

This general examination of the law on retention of title is followed by a comparative analysis of the legal relationship between retention of title and immobilisation by incorporation. The first issue dealt with is the implications of immobilisation for retention of title. The new Law on Pledges stipulates that, in such cases, retention of title continues to apply, but fails to clarify how this continued applicability is to be interpreted. The authors examine the position of the retention of title holder, and reach the conclusion that the most desirable interpretation is that actual reliance on retention of title is allowed where possible. Under this interpretation, Belgian law provides the party that stipulated the retention of title with greater protection than does the law of the Netherlands. This interpretation is also close to the position under French law, a minor difference being that in France, the risk inherent in immobilisation is smaller because the criteria for immobilisation are stricter. The second issue concerns the implications of a retention of title for the immobilisation of an item. Having drawn attention to the position of the South African courts, under which retention of title can prevent the immobilisation of an item, the author points out that this is not possible in either Belgium, the Netherlands or France, in spite of the fact that, in recent years, broader and more subjective criteria for immobilisation have been applied in Belgium and the Netherlands. This confirms that the provision in the Law on Pledges under which retention of title continues to apply after the incorporation of the pledged object is a rational one. What is important here is that there should be disclosure of the ownership of that object. Since the entry into effect of the new Law on Pledges, retention of title remains free from a general duty to disclose – there is, however, an opportunity to have the retention of title registered in the new Register of Pledges. This opportunity is keenly recommended if the adverse effects of incorporation are to be avoided.

The law of torts and human rights have traditionally belonged to two different spheres of the law, the former being traditionally part of the private law and the latter belonging to the public law. In view of the deep divide between the public and the private law which prevailed in the past, these two legal areas interacted not at all or very seldom with each other. However, this has changed. Over the past few decades, it has become increasingly clear that the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights have influenced the private law, and therefore also the law of torts. It is in this context, that this contribution examines how the equality principle as enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 1 of the twelfth protocol to the ECHR affects the distinctness of special liability regimes. The author also examines the influence produced by the right of access to justice as enshrined in article 6 ECHR, and analyses the case law of the French Conseil Constitutionnel with regard to Article 4 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme.

The basic assumption of this article is that liability regimes can currently be assessed by the principle of equality as to their distinctness and their relationship with the general law of civil liability. Indeed, where two different liability regimes apply to similar situations, that amounts to a potential infringement of the equality principle. It might be interesting in this context to consider a situation whereby someone can only receive partial compensation for his loss, whereas another person can receive full compensation in a similar situation because two different liability regimes were applied to their situations. Those who believe that they have suffered discrimination for this reason could consider invoking the equality principle. By so doing, they are in a position to challenge the existence of and the boundaries between the different liability regimes. The author accordingly examines the criteria that apply in this context.

In the first section, the contribution examines the case law of the French Conseil Constitutionnel according to which Article 4 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme is violated where the possibility to receive compensation for a loss, whether general or specific, is excluded.

The second section examines the case law of the Constitutional Court in which it applies the principle of equality to special liability regimes. In so doing, the author discusses the various aspects of the equality test: comparability of the situations in question, legitimate purpose and the proportionality test. As regards the comparability aspect, it is argued that the Constitutional Court takes into account the similarity of the risks under these situations. To assess whether a different treatment seeks to serve a legitimate aim, the Constitutional Court establishes whether there is a special risk involved. In the majority of cases, the Court finds that there is a special risk that the lawmaker could legitimately try to address by applying a special liability regime. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court will check whether the unequal treatment is proportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued. The author argues that there are four criteria that are decisive when applying the proportionality test. These are: the impossibility of receiving compensation for loss, whether general or specific; the presence of a serious or intentional fault, the opportunity to choose freely the use of a specific statute; and the socio-economic position of the parties involved. Apart from these criteria, the article investigates whether a special liability regime can be validated by applying the lex specialis derogat lex generalis rule at a constitutional level.

The third and last section examines the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Here, the article examines not only the case law relating to the principle of equality, but also that on the right of access to justice. In this section, the author demonstrates that this right can be used in a way that is very similar to the approach taken by the case law of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, but that the scope of Article 6 ECHR is more limited than the case law of the Conseil Constitutionnel. With regard to the equality principle, the author argues that there are reasons to believe that, like the Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights applies the test that it is impossible to receive compensation for loss incurred, whether general or specific, and the criterion that a serious or intentional fault was involved.

Loss is a variable phenomenon – the adverse consequences of an event are capable of extending over periods which can be longer or shorter. When assessing loss, it is necessary to compare two positions, i.e. the situation following the tortious event and the situation as it would have been without it – and this seems not possible without having a reference point in time from which to make the assessment. Therefore, to a certain extent, the outcome of the loss assessment can be regarded as a “snapshot”. If the reference point is fixed at a time before adjudication by the court, the question will arise as to what can be, or can still be, the relevance of developments which occur, and information that transpires, subsequently. Under the Dutch law of torts, it is generally accepted that the point in time at which the court adjudicates is that which will be conclusive as far as the loss assessment is concerned. However, there are a number of scenarios under the law of torts which indicate that exceptions to this principle are possible.

Where an ex ante approach is adopted, the loss is assessed as being that which arose at the time of the “initial” loss, i.e. that which was caused at the point in time when the victim’s property is deemed to have been affected by the tortious event. This approach entails that the outcome of the loss assessment will not in itself be influenced by the point in time at which the assessment takes place (i.e. ‘outcome fixation’). The decisive element will be what was to be expected at the point in time at which the loss occurred. The risks and opportunities that existed at that point in time will be factored into the assessment of the loss – as a result, no account is taken of any subsequent events or developments. Thus the size of the loss (and of the compensation for it) will not vary along with any information which transpires subsequently.

The ex ante approach can be recognised when looking at the way in which, in the case of damage caused to property, the resulting reduction of the property’s value is assessed in abstracto, the assumption being that the owner has suffered loss equivalent to the reduction in value of the property involved, prior to and independently of any repairs. This is what is sometimes referred to as “instantaneous loss” – by taking the point in time at which the loss actually occurred as the reference point for measuring the loss of value, any subsequent developments become irrelevant. However, there are circ*mstances in which that precise point in time at which the damage was actually caused cannot be determined – as is the case where a house is reduced in value as a result of subsidence caused by the extraction of natural gas, which is revealed gradually over time. Where we are dealing with the dissolution of a contract of sale, or with the compensation resulting from the failure to perform a specific contractual obligation – here again, one discerns a method of loss assessment in abstracto which can be regarded as a type of time-based fixation. Under the law of expropriation, all losses are assessed by using an ex ante approach, referring to the point in time at which the expropriation occurred, regardless of the point in time at which the loss was determined by the court, and of any developments which may have taken place in the meantime. Therefore, when assessing loss, it is necessary to take a step back in time and to disregard any events and circ*mstances which may have occurred in the meantime.

The ex post approach, on the other hand, is based on the loss history to the extent that this has become known at the time at which the loss is assessed, and regardless of whether the developments in question were foreseeable or not at the point in time at which the tortious event took place. It is this approach that, more than any other, complies with the full compensation principle, as well as with the assumption that loss should be assessed in concreto – here, the “permanent insight” principle is applied in order to be able to assess the loss actually incurred as accurately as possible. That is not to deny that, even where this approach is adopted, it is necessary to make an assessment of the situation which would have occurred had the tortious event not taken place – i.e. the situation which, by definition, did not take place. Where an ex post approach has been adopted, the initially expected loss can be whittled down or, instead, increase; accordingly, the timing of the loss assessment can be crucial in this respect.

An ex post approach can be identified where there is an assessment of loss which extends over a certain period and is incurred in successive stages, as is the case not only with loss of income resulting from injury and other forms of forfeiture of earnings, but also with the costs (recurring or not) which are incurred. Where the loss has already been incurred at the time of assessment, that loss can be determined more precisely ex post; any future loss can, by definition, only be assessed ex ante. When assessing continuous loss from an ex post perspective, there may occur not only events that ‘break the chain’ of causation, but also events and developments on the basis of which the factors which were taken as a basis for the frame of reference need to be adjusted accordingly. During a sufficiently long period between the tortious event and the (definitive) loss assessment, certain facts and circ*mstances may come to light which could not have been anticipated at an earlier point of assessment. Thus time can be both friend and foe for the parties involved. Moreover, the question that needs to be asked at all times is this: what absolute certainty can there be about gradually arising events and circ*mstances in relation to the hypothetical scenario under which the tortious event never happened?

Where continuous loss is assessed and compensated by a single amount of money paid immediately, the period of loss is to a certain extent ‘converted’ into one point in time at which the whole loss is considered to be suffered. Where such capitalisation occurs, the time-related factors by definition play an important part. (The term “capitalisation” in this context should be understood in the sense of the payment of damages for periodic losses being converted into a fixed sum.) Under Dutch law, it is allowed to use a reference date for capitalisation which falls some considerable time before the court decision – which then gives rise to the question as to how intermediate events and developments should be handled during the period between the reference date and the later point in time at which the damages are being awarded. According to the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), the basic principle that the loss must be assessed as much as possible in concreto entails that, when using a reference date for capitalisation in the past, an ex ante approach towards loss assessment should not be adopted.

When assessing non-economic damages, the court is compelled to take all circ*mstances into account, and more particularly the effects of the tortious event on the victim. Therefore, an ex post approach clearly suggests itself for such loss – given that non-economic loss can generally be expected to continue over a period of time. In the Netherlands, non-economic losses are generally being paid by a single amount of money. However, it is not usual to divide this type of continuous loss into several – future – periods in order to calculate it’s value by using the capitalization method. This “arithmetic” method of assessment seems difficult to reconcile with the “rough” manner in which non-economic loss is being assessed in the first place (‘in fairness’).

Loss assessment gives rise to a host of questions which relate to the time elapsing between the tortious event and the compensation awarded for the loss incurred. Between these two points in time lies the moment when the court has to assess the loss. This passage of time affects the court’s assessment of the existence and size of the loss incurred. The relevant legislation provides no firm guidance. Time-related issues are solved by reference to the case law of the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme Court). It is especially this case law which forms the basis for this contribution, which takes as its starting point a study of the notion of “loss”, as well as a number of fundamental principles underlying the law on compensation, more particularly the full compensation requirement and the actual loss assessment principle.

The effect of the passage of time that follows the tortious event gives rise, in the first instance, to the question of the point in time on which the court must focus in order to assess the loss. Under Belgian law, loss assessment is performed at the point in time which is as close as possible to the date on which the loss is effectively rectified. This is normally the time at which the court makes its decision. The date of this decision therefore plays a crucial part.

In addition, various events which occur simultaneously with, or subsequently to, the tortious event are capable of increasing or reducing the loss suffered. The relevant legislation does not specify what are the events which the court needs to take into account. Events are capable of aggravating the loss both before and after the court has made its assessment. In the former case, the extent to which the increased loss is capable of giving rise to compensation is governed by the rules on causation. In the latter case, it is the content and authority of the court’s decision which will be conclusive. As regards the events which occurred after the tortious event, the Supreme Court will apply the rule that these should not be taken into account where they are unrelated to the fault and/or the loss. However, this rule does not invariably provide an acceptable solution, and is consequently not always applied in a consistent way. This is, inter alia, the case in relation to such benefits as are derived from a new relationship engaged in by the partner of a deceased victim, or the benefits accruing to the victim because of the contributions made by third parties, such as material assistance or payments. In the latter case, any pensions awarded to a deceased victim’s partner and not debited to the compensation allocated are a particular source of contention.

The court must determine the compensation that is due both for the loss which had already occurred at the time of the assessment, and for any loss which could still arise in the future. The distinction between past loss and future loss has given rise to different methods of loss assessment. Where it has been ascertained that the victim will continue to incur loss in the future, it is impossible to determine with absolute certainty how such loss will develop. This is why the court will, to a greater or less extent, be compelled to disregard this element of uncertainty. The courts are seeking ways to reconcile this uncertainty with a concrete and precise determination of the amount of compensation to be awarded. The instrument which is most frequently used to this effect is capitalisation. Thus the material loss incurred because of permanent unfitness for work on account of the reduction in the victim’s economic capacity is capitalised on the basis of his/her earnings, even though he/she has not incurred any loss of income and his ability to exercise his profession in the future remains uncertain. Capitalisation is also increasingly used in relation to loss which, until recently, was ineligible for capitalisation, such as non-material loss. The courts have hitherto displayed no consistency in this regard.

In this contribution, the author seeks to establish whether the prohibition of fideicommissa, as featured in the 1804 Code Napoléon, can still be maintained two centuries later. More particularly the author concentrates on fideicommissary donations, which come under the general heading of “transgenerational donations”. The latter are donations whereby the donor requires the beneficiary to retain the donated assets during his lifetime, and to transfer them to a second beneficiary when he dies. Thus the grantor determines the succession of the donated assets over several generations. This retention of control can be very attractive from the point of view of estate planning.

Not every legal system, however, allows transgenerational donations. Thus the Code Napoléon subjected transgenerational donations to an unconditional prohibition as a matter of public policy. This prohibition continues to apply to this day under Belgian law. French legislators, by contrast, decided in 2006 to abolish this prohibition as featured in the Code Napoléon, on the grounds that, inter alia, they wished to give more scope for the donor to exercise his freedom of action. Moreover, there are a number of legal systems under which transgenerational donations have at all times been lawful, as is, for example, the case in South Africa.

This contrast in the treatment of transgenerational donations in the various legal systems casts new light on the question whether a prohibition of transgenerational donations remains tenable in this day and age. The traditional arguments raised in justification of such a prohibition have lost a great deal of their plausibility. Moreover, alternative legal transactions such as the donation of usufruct and of bare ownership, or the fideïcommis de residuo, are incapable of producing the same result. The author therefore concludes that there is no longer any compelling reason for maintaining the prohibition of transgenerational donations, so that the latter should, in this day and age, be fully lawful.

The action in annulment of a company decision with external effect is, for the shareholder, the functional equivalent of that which the revocatory action (actio pauliana) means for the creditor. Both types of action have the same purpose, i.e. to police the manner in which powers held over property in which the creditor has a financial interest are used. Moreover, both actions have a similar effect, in that any transaction which adversely affects the financial interests concerned will be neutralised. The difference resides in the conditions under which the action can be brought. The revocatory action is one which can be brought directly against the fraudulent transaction concerned. It is precisely because shareholders are prevented from bringing such direct actions that the action in annulment makes it possible to challenge the disputed transaction by challenging the decision on which that transaction was based (and which, by definition, has external effect).

However, there remain some significant differences between the revocatory action and the action in annulment, both as regards the sanction attached to them and the conditions in which they can be exercised. Most of these differences can be explained by comparing and contrasting the claim vested in a creditor (fixed claim) with that which is vested in the shareholder (variable claim). However, this does not explain why evidence of complicity on the part of the third party involved is required for a successful revocatory action – at least when dealing with a transaction for valuable consideration. The rationale behind this requirement is to protect third parties who can be credited with a legitimate belief in the appearance created by the debtor.

By describing the consequences of the annulment of a decision with external effect for third parties as an issue concerning the broader question as to the which legal acts are attributable to the company, the author makes it clear that the third party will also be protected against the annulment of the underlying company decision. As is the case with revocatory actions, this protection will only cease to apply where complicity in the disputed act can be attributed to the third party. This parallel between the revocatory action and the action in annulment of decisions with external effect has enabled us to conclude that a decision which had already been carried out in relation to a third party while being taken with power of representation, may only be annulled after evidence of bad faith has been supplied. The fact that the revocatory action requires no evidence of bad faith in relation to transactions without consideration does not contradict this. Merely having infringed the restriction to acts for profit can be invoked against third parties regardless of whether this was done in good or bad faith, given that we are dealing here with a statutory restriction of the power of representation (although this does not mean that the ‘but de lucre’ is still required to have this function). The essential point is that the revocatory action and the action in annulment of decisions with external effect are both functionally equivalent processes. In that case, the degree of protection enjoyed by the defendant third party should also be equivalent in both cases. Just as the revocatory action is a powerful tool in the creditor’s hands against collusion between his debtor and any third party, the action in annulment of decisions with external effect represents for the shareholder in cases of bad faith of a third party an effective action against decisions (carried out) of his debtor.

In spite of the absence of empirical data, the general context tells us that an increasing number of litigants are going to court without a lawyer (i.e. acting pro se). There are two explanations for this phenomenon. On the one hand, going to law has in recent years become considerably more expensive as a result of, inter alia, lawyers having been made subject to VAT and the new system of court registration fees. On the other hand, the legal aid sector has been coming under heavy financial pressure, and access to lawyers operating free of charge has become increasingly restricted. This means that an increasing number of people are in danger of falling between two stools, in that they are too wealthy to be able to claim free legal assistance, but not wealthy enough to afford a lawyer.

This paper examines the way in which the Belgian law of civil procedure treats lawyerless litigants, and the extent to which such treatment meets the standard set by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. Does the law in question provide pro se litigants with sufficient support, or are the latter faced with needless obstacles in their quest for legal equality?

In Part One, the author locates the problem in the context of the right to a fair trial as contained in Article 6(1) ECHR. Here, two aspects of this right come to the fore – the right to access to justice, and the right to equality of arms. The member states are free to decide the way in which effective access to the courts is to be achieved. To this extent, maintaining an adequate legal aid system and facilitating pro se litigation are communicating vessels in that, as legal aid is reduced, so the member states need to increase their concern for the position of the lawyerless litigant.

Part Two deals with certain aspects of the Belgian law of civil procedure which have a direct impact on pro se litigants. The author deals successively with the rule prohibiting the judiciary from giving legal advice; possible legal representation by non-lawyers; the court’s power to prevent oral pleadings; the formalities required of court submissions, and the proactive role the judge is allowed to play.

In Part Three, the author casts his eyes abroad. He examines the way in which lawyerless litigants are treated in the Netherlands and in England & Wales. There is also inspiration to be found in the European law of civil procedure. This applies in particular to the European Payment and Small Claims Regulations, given that these were expressly adopted with the pro se litigant in mind.

The general picture painted by the analysis featured above allows the conclusion that the position of the lawyerless litigant in Belgium is not that unsatisfactory after all. Its law of civil procedure contains a number of support structures which, with due pragmatic flexibility, are applied to the lawyerless litigant’s benefit. Before the lower courts, the pro se litigant receives even greater levels of support. However, this does not mean we can afford to be complacent here. At a time when the rules on court procedure are constantly being adjusted, with efficiency being the key word, care must be taken that the pro se litigant does not silently disappear between the cogwheels of the judicial system.

All-sums retention of title entails extending the effect of retention of title in order to guarantee claims other than those which are inherent in the delivery of the item sold, i.e. the claim for payment of the sale price and its attendant charges. Such all-sums retention of title is not valid under current Belgian or French law, the latter systems requiring a specific link between the item supplied and the guaranteed claim. However, both English and German law accept that such an extension of retention of title can be valid. In the Netherlands, the applicable legislation has already extended the scope of guaranteed claims beyond payment of the sale price – claims arising from work performed or from defective performance of the agreement also fall within their ambit. A number of Dutch authors are of the opinion that all-sums retention of title is accepted as a general rule, but this view is not without challenge.

General recognition of all-sums retention of title would give suppliers the additional opportunity to guarantee future claims arising under a long-term trading relationship. The same degree of priority as that provided by ordinary retention of title would apply by extension to other claims. In this contribution, the author examines the possibility of creating an all-sums retention of title under Belgian law in the light of the new Law on Pledges, and highlights the policy choices which would be needed for this purpose. In so doing, the extended retention of title would be confined to claims which remain linked to the creditor in his capacity of supplier. Thus the overriding priority provided by retention of title would not be available to any claim whatsoever. In addition, the author advocates that the ability to plead allsums retention of title be made dependent on its entry in the Register of Pledges. Finally, a limit would be imposed on the continued reliance on retention of title by the supplier – as from the moment when no further claims were extant against the buyer, the latter would become the definite owner of the item sold, and the all-sums retention of title would no longer apply. It is not desirable that the seller of an item should, at a later stage, once again be able to rely on his retention of title for a new claim. Provided that these conditions are met, all-sums retention of title should be capable of legal recognition.

Transport is both the lifeblood of e-commerce and its Achilles heel. Whilst being able to have goods ordered online delivered to one’s home represents a major competitive advantage for e-commerce, it nevertheless carries many risks. In the course of delivery, packages are sometimes damaged, lost or arrive late. By Directive 2011/83/EU, the EU has made it compulsory for the webshop to bear the risk of any damage or loss. The risk only passes to the consumer at the moment when physical possession is acquired by him/her. In addition, the consumer has the right to terminate the agreement in the event of late delivery. In this article, the author seeks to establish to what extent this Directive exposes the webshop to liability. In principle, the webshop will not perform the carriage of the goods itself, but will avail itself of a parcel delivery service. Assuming that the webshop is able to recover the cost of the damage from the carrier, the impact of the Directive on liability imposed by it on the webshop will remain limited. The laws relating to transport and to consumer protection are to a large extent mandatory, which only provides the webshop with limited scope for contractual variation of the statutory rules on liability.

These statutory rules do not in many respects appear to be capable of neutralizing the risk imposed on the webshop, so that the latter will to a significant extent itself bear the risk of damage incurred in the course of carriage. This is more particularly the result of the relevant procedural rules, the rules which govern the liability of the carrier, and those that relate to the extent of the compensation which the webshop is capable of claiming from the carrier. Moreover, the complex logistics involved in parcel delivery will ensure that, because of the specific structure of transport law, there could arise some uncertainty as to which rules are applicable.

The first cause of a liability exposure for the webshops lies in the different notification periods. Whereas the webshop is obliged to notify the carrier of any damage immediately (in the event of visible damage) or within a week (in the event of invisible damage) in order to enjoy the benefit of the presumption of liability vested in the carrier, the consumer/buyer has two months as from the time at which the fault is discovered. Moreover, any damage which arose during the first six months is deemed to have been present at the time of purchase. Accordingly, the burden of proof will be on the webshop under both these agreements where the damage has not been notified immediately by the consumer.

Moreover, the rules governing the carrier’s liability are also capable of exposing the webshop to liability on several counts. Thus the consumer shall, where no time limits for delivery had been expressly agreed, be able to terminate the agreement even before the webshop had the opportunity to claim compensation against the carrier on account of late delivery. In addition, the consumer may enforce his/her right of withdrawal in the event of late delivery. Since the consumer is not obliged to give reasons for his/her withdrawal, it will be virtually impossible for the webshop to provide evidence that the withdrawal was caused by the late delivery, and that the latter must therefore be regarded as loss caused by late delivery. Where the goods are unloaded on the access area, especially that of third parties, may under certain conditions cause the compulsory period during which the carrier is held liable to end, even where the goods have not been physically delivered to the consumer. As a result, the webshop will continue to bear the risk under the contract of sale, what could cause a liability exposure to the webshop if damage occurs before the moment the consumer takes the physical possession of the goods. Finally, the rule in relation to all the three causes of damage is that, whilst the carrier may rely on the grounds for exemption, this option is not open to the webshop in relation to the consumer. The importance of the last-named difference must, however, be put into perspective, given the fact that a force majeure defence is seldom accepted by courts.

The restrictions on the recoverable damage by the webshop represent the third major factor causing its exposure to liability. In the event of loss and late delivery, compensation shall be restricted to physical damage, which means that any other type of damage incurred by the webshop will not be considered. Even more important, and more particularly in relation to electronic consumer goods, are the limits to the compensation. Under CMR, compensation is limited to +/- €10.5 per kilogramme, which frequently amounts to a de facto exemption. In the event of late delivery, the situation is even more problematic, given that in such cases compensation is limited to the freight. Although full compensation remains possible in cause of (a fault equivalent to) wilful misconduct, the prospects of success for such claim are very limited, at least in Belgium and The Netherlands.

Finally, it would appear that the precise extent to which webshops are being exposed to liability is difficult to predict with precision, given that different transport regimes are potentially applicable. Parcel delivery frequently involves agreements combining several different means of transport or leaving the method of transport unspecified. As different regimes exist per mode of transportation, in such circ*mstances it will not be certain which rules shall apply. In addition, the relevant international treaties are subject to divergent interpretations, which can also have a significant impact on compensation levels. Since the various treaties governing transport do not allow the parties to stipulate which law shall apply exclusively, this means that here too, the parties in question will, when concluding the agreement, not be able to anticipate which interpretation shall prevail.

Accordingly, the risk incurred for any damage caused during parcel delivery is to a very considerable extent incumbent on the webshop. Although the various international transport agreements provide a number of mechanisms which enable this exposure to liability to be restricted by contract, the limited awareness of any risk by the webshop, or even a large measure of indifference towards risk on the part of the latter, will ensure that such mechanisms will hardly ever be used. Self-insurance may not pose a problem for a major webshop, but could have a considerable impact on the smaller operators. It is therefore recommended that appropriate legislation be adopted in this area. Moreover, if the webshop is able to pass the relevant compensation or costs onto the carrier, this increases the chances that he/she will adopt a more accommodating attitude in response to any claim by the consumer based on damage incurred in the course of carriage.

Action by the public authorities is traditionally associated with unilateral decisionmaking of an individual or regulatory nature. However, this view of intervention by the public authorities is essentially divorced from reality. In addition to exercising such power, the public authorities are, with increasing frequency, using private law instruments in order to serve the public interest. This paper will not concern itself with the various reasons for this development, but concentrates on the legal issues it raises. This is because such practices confront the lawmakers and the courts with a considerable challenge. What are the limits within which the authorities may make use of the private law, and what are the rules which govern these private transactions – should they be governed by the private law, or should rules of public law apply? The authors revisit the old dividing line between public and private law, and examine the way in which the rules and principles that apply on both sides serve the public interest.

The question whether the public authorities are allowed to use private law instruments in order to achieve their objectives to serve the general public or to organise a public service has traditionally been answered in Belgium by reference to the “two track” doctrine (tweewegenleer). According to this approach, the public authorities are in principle free to serve the public interest by resorting to private law rather than using their special prerogatives. However, they are only allowed to take the private law route whilst observing the limits set by essential public law principles, such as the principles of speciality, legality and good administration, as well as the legislation governing the public services. It is clear that, under Belgian law, this issue cannot be dissociated from the question as to which law shall apply.

Where the public authorities make use of contractual instruments, these contracts shall in principle be governed by private law. However, this assumption is not carried to its ultimate conclusion. The undiluted theory that the agreements concluded by the public authorities are governed exclusively by private law is at odds with reality. Even in the absence of legislation that causes the agreement to depart from private law, the specific nature of the legal relationship in question will regularly cause the courts to treat it – at least in part – as regulatory action, more particularly where it concerns the performance of a public service. The willingness to do so contrasts sharply with the inadequate legal framework which is available to the courts for this purpose.

Nevertheless, in many cases public law corrections will not be necessary in order to serve the public and other interests. The same result can often be achieved by adopting a private law approach and by relying on general principles of private law. Highly instructive in this regard is the De Leener and Ballon decision, in which the Council of State (the Belgian Supreme Administrative Court) indicated its inclination not to exclude the thesis that the provisions of the Civil Code governing the performance of contracts are the expression of the overarching reasonableness principle that is common to public and private law.

Accordingly, rather than focusing blindly on the contrast between private and public law, it seems more constructive to concentrate on their similarities and the manner in which they complement each other. As the public authorities become increasingly conscious in applying private law in order to serve the public interest, so the need for corrective mitigation based on the public law diminishes. Instead, public and private law interact as communicating vessels in this regard, as the yin and yang of our legal system.

Subjective rights can be divided into two major categories, i.e. claim rights (proprietary rights, intellectual rights, rights to performance from a debtor and personality rights) on the one hand, and powers on the other hand. Powers (Dutch literature uses the term “wilsrechten” as well as “bevoegdheden”) give their holder the authority to change, discontinue or create a certain legal situation unilaterally (by performing a unilateral legal act). Exercising such a power automatically causes the relevant legal consequences to take effect, without reliance on any action on the part of the party whose legal position could be influenced by it. In other words, the third party in question will be subjected to the legal consequences of the powers exercised as a matter of course. Or, to put it yet another way, the holder of a power is entitled to impose the relevant legal consequences – i.e. changing a legal position – on third parties. This is where powers differ from the traditional category of claim rights (proprietary or creditors’ rights). This is because claim rights assume the existence of a legal obligation on the part of a debtor or of a third party, which means that non-compliance of such a legal obligation will at all times frustrate the rights of the holder of the claim right.

From the author’s analysis, it emerges that the number of subjective rights capable of being described as powers is particularly large. One need only consider, for example, the right of option, the right of first refusal, a contracting party’s right to decide, powers of attorney, the right unilaterally to terminate or dissolve an agreement, the ius agendi, shareholders’ voting rights, the right to accept or reject an inheritance, the right to enforce, confirm or waive a subjective right, etc. In many cases these rights do not arise independently, but are combined with other subjective rights/claim rights.

Powers may arise on the basis of substantive legislation, of an agreement, or of a court decision. They are exercised through a unilateral legal act, which may be subject to communication or receipt. The holder of a power is, moreover, free to exercise, or to refrain from exercising, the power in question – he/she cannot be compelled to do so. Because the legal consequences of a power take effect automatically and without any intervention from the party made subject to that power, considerations of legal certainty dictate that the exercising of a power be unconditional, irrevocable and indivisible. As is the case with claim rights, the exercising of powers is subject to the rule prohibiting the misuse of rights – the holder of a power may not exercise it in a way which clearly exceeds the normal way of exercising it. Powers may be forfeited by transfer, waiver or through the extinction of a time limit.

Prompted by two Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie) decisions concerning the nullity of excessive competition clauses in ordinary contracts (Cass. 23/1/2015 and Cass. 25/6/2015), this paper examines the scope of contractual nullity in this context. In particular, the key question is the following – what are the factors and rules which determine whether, and if so to what extent, a legal act which is vitiated by a ground of nullity remains capable of producing certain legal consequences? In his endeavour to answer this question, the author compares the current Belgian solution with those which are normally applied in present-day German, Dutch, Spanish and Italian law.

In the second chapter, the author discusses the applicable Belgian law in this field. Because the issue under review is constantly analysed on the basis of the notions of “partial nullity”, “conversion” and “reduction”, these three concepts play a central part in assessing this current state of the law. As regards these three notions, the author clarifies (a) whether they are accepted under Belgian law, (b) what is their legal basis, (c) what are the criteria which determine the conditions in which they may be applied, and (d) what are the consequences of the appropriate use of these concepts.

The current state of the law as described in the previous paragraph is subjected to critical assessment in the next chapter. The author argues that partial nullity, reduction and conversion must all be accepted by the relevant Belgian law and that they have their basis in the favor negotii principle, i.e. the principle which aims to maintain the contractual relationship. The criteria applied can, according to the author, be refined further by making use of, inter alia, a number of subtle distinctions which can be found in the German law. These German positions, moreover, show that the Belgian literature on the subject wrongly fails to give any attention to the burden of proof question, which – as is indeed the case in other legal areas – is of crucial importance.

This analysis of the current state of the law indicates that the current Belgian approach is insufficiently precise in substantive terms, and is deficient in structural clarity. This is why, in Chapter Four, the author proposes an alternative approach. To this end, he takes as his starting point two leading principles in this field, to wit proportionality and favour negotii. He takes the view that the former provides an answer to the question whether legal act is null and void at all because of a rule infringement. If the conclusion is that this is indeed the case, the supplementary question arises whether the legal act can still have legal consequences in spite of its nullity – a question which is answered by reference to the favour negotii principle. Having provided a brief overview and made a legislative proposal, the author explains the reasoning to be followed on a step-by-step basis and illustrated by examples.

The author concludes this paper by applying the proposed approach to the two Supreme Court decisions which prompted this contribution, and examines whether the disputed competition clauses could still remain operational.

The law on unfair terms provides two individual and curative remedies on which the consumer can rely in order to extricate him/herself from unfair terms in contracts with a business undertaking. On the one hand, there is the individual, court-imposed sanction in the strict sense, i.e. nullity/voidance (in Belgium); on the other hand, there is the rule which stipulates that, where there is doubt about the meaning of a term in a consumer contract, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.

The introduction of the individual, court-imposed sanction has produced a major impact on the Belgian legal order. Although the implementing provisions make reference to nullity (voidance), there currently appears to be general acceptance that the EU law-based sanction cannot simply be classified under the traditional, national categories. This is a consequence of the sizeable amount of case law produced by the Court of Justice on this subject. The Court is defining the scope and substance of this sanction with increasing levels of precision. It would appear that this sanction is being attributed a certain functional and social side aim, a dissuasive effect. In pursuing that effect, the Court seemingly uses the image of an uninformed consumer as a benchmark. Therefore perhaps it is desirable to abandon the national approaches and to work towards a unitory EU sanction (‘erasure’) for unfair terms?

Many aspects of this remedy have already been examined by the Court. However, a number of significant issues remain unsolved, including first and foremost the role of the domestic law that applies between parties where no other arrangements have been concluded.

In addition, the terms contained in consumer contracts must be drafted in plain, intelligible language, and where any doubt arises as to their meaning, the interpretation which is the most favourable to the consumer should prevail. For many years, the European dimension of the transparency requirement was mired in total obscurity. However, a number of surprising Court of Justice judgments now seem to indicate a trend towards an extremely broad interpretation. At all events, contract terms should be drafted transparently, in such a way as to enable ‘the average consumer’ to foresee the economic consequences which derive from them, and thus to have more information at his/her disposal in order to decide whether he/ she wishes to be bound by the contract. In spite of this, there remains a great deal of uncertainty on the subject. Thus, for example, it remains unclear how a lack of transparency in the contract should be sanctioned – even though it has been argued that a deficiency in transparency should automatically be regarded as being unfair.

Finally, the interpretatio consumptori plurimum favorens principle appears to be a rarely used ‘remedy’ (intended in a broad sense) that may apply to unfair contract terms. Unlike the individual, curative court-imposed sanction, i.e. nullity/voidance, this interpretation rule has no functional aim. It therefore remains to be seen to what extent the European case law on the former sanction will be applicable by analogy. As regards the question as to which consumer is to be seen as the benchmark for the most favourable interpretation, it would appear that this should be the concrete consumer who is actually a party to the dispute, having been thoroughly informed by the court as to his/her legal position.

The notion of “parenthood” as it applies in the civil law of Belgium is not defined as such. On the basis of the role played by this institution in society, it is defined in Chapter 1 of this paper as “the acquisition, exercise and loss of all such rights and obligations as are held over children by certain persons, in particular their relatives”.

Belgian family law organises parenthood by dividing it into two distinct container categories, i.e. filiation and adoption. Within these categories, all the functions associated with parenthood are awarded to two parents on an indivisible and exclusive basis. However, both filiation and adoption are experiencing heavy pressure from the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which are thoroughly analysed in this contribution, more particularly in Chapters II and III. Clearly, the Constitutional Court is seeking to abandon the straitjacket in which the current legislation imprisons parenthood, and to move towards a system based on the weighing up of the concrete interests involved. This approach goes hand in hand with the way in which parenthood has evolved from a solid status relationship towards a more fluid set of personal ties.

In this contribution, the author defends the proposition that this represents a positive development, and that the law needs to adjust accordingly. Thus the courts will be in a better position to give prophylactic and positive support to the vulnerable entity that is the family, with the interest of the child being the main consideration.

On this basis, the author proposes that a new chapter, entitled Parenthood, be inserted in the Civil Code. Parenthood would be acquired as a package deal based on a parenthood project, acquired through natural procreation, medically supervised reproduction (including commercial surrogacy) or adoption. This could serve to avoid the problematic process of balancing the biological issues and social reality, and at the same time to mitigate the mater semper certa est rule.

In addition to advancing this proposal based on parenthood as a package deal, the author also highlights the fragmented regulation by law of other important relationships between child and adult, which only covers some of the functions of parenthood. In the first instance, paternity could be made transparent through the creation of a paternity register in addition to a parenthood register. The law could also give some recognition to those parties who bring up or educate the child, by conferring parental authority on persons other than those involved in the parenthood project. Such persons could also have certain financial responsibilities imposed on them.

The necessarily pluralistic approach towards parenthood outlined above will result in parenthood being fully dissociated from the partner relationship between the parents – even in relation to the pater is est rule – when it comes to divorce or stipulating the conditions for adoption. The necessarily complementary approach inherent in these proposals means that the new forms of parenthood need not exclude their previous incarnation, but complement the latter through a system of multiple parenthood.

It is only by approaching parenthood from a position beyond the currently accepted assumptions that the necessary reforms can be contemplated. This contribution merely provides a multidisciplinary starting point for this endeavour.

Post-crisis European legislation has penetrated the member states’ legal orders even more deeply than was the case previously. This also has implications for private law at the national level. One could go even further and state that recently-enacted European financial law has impacted all the traditional areas and key concepts of private law.

Thus it emerges from recent CJEU decisions that the Court’s interpretation of the notion of “agreement” is different from that which is currently applied in the private law of the Netherlands. Contrary to the approach adopted under Dutch law, the CJEU has recently ruled that the relationship between the issuing institution and the bond holder is no longer that of an agreement.

As regards the concept of “tort”, there has in the meantime arisen a whole range of European laws, all of which more or less explicitly encroach on the field of the national law of torts. In the case of the Regulation on Rating Agencies (CRA III) and the Regulation on Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPS), even the basis for a tort claim is regulated at the European level. With other European instruments that effect will make itself felt through the effectiveness principle, even though it would appear that, to a large extent, the domestic law of torts remains capable of operating independently. Nevertheless, the substantive rules governing the domestic law of torts increasingly bear the stamp of European legislation.

The key concept of “ownership” has also felt the impact of European financial law. The introduction of Article 7:55 in the Civil Code of the Netherlands shows that the implications of the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) for fiduciary transfers of ownership and therefore also the law of property had not been fully understood. Under Belgian law, the implementation of FCD led to the recognition of fiduciary transfers of ownership, which has restricted the rights of the acquirer in property law terms. Thus European financial law has caused a situation whereby the key concept of “ownership” under private law is no longer automatically “the most absolute” or indivisible right.

European financial law has also resulted in two key concepts of the Dutch law of debt recovery, to wit the indivisible nature of assets and the paritas creditorum principle, no longer applying in their absolute form. The Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR), the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS), and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) have led to the introduction of new separations of assets in the Act on Book-Entry Securities and the Act on Financial Supervision. In addition, the implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the Law on Bankruptcies has rendered the paritas creditorum rule, in a formal sense, redundant.

It can be expected that the effects of European financial law on the domestic private law will not end as of today. A less coherent, but more harmonised, domestic private law of European origin is, and will be, its outcome. Thus we will see the “incoherent united”.

Assessing additional compensation for contract rescission is a subject which has become an increasingly prominent item on the scholarly agenda in recent years. There is no provision in the Civil Code which regulates how far any such compensation should extend. Nevertheless, ten years ago, the Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie) clearly ruled that any additional compensation should serve to put the creditor into the position he/she would have been in if the debtor had met his/her obligations.

This issue reveals a clear fault line throughout western Europe. In Portugal and Switzerland, rescission compensation extends to compensating the so-called reliance interest. As a result, some Belgian authors have adopted the view that, carrying this theory to its logical conclusion, the defaulting contracting party has no obligation whatsoever to provide compensation for the performance interest. According to this view, the requirement that contractual rescission by itself should seek to place the contracting parties in the position occupied prior to the conclusion of the contract affects the extent of any complementary compensation payable. Compensating the reliance interest thus serves to restore the pre-contractual situation sought, which is the object of compensating the direct impact of rescission. On the basis of this conceptual requirement that the main remedy should be consistent with the additional remedy, payment of the complementary compensation by itself would enable the defaulting contracting party to place the disadvantaged party in the position he/she would have occupied if the agreement had never been concluded in the first place.

This theory, however, has a significant impact on the size of the compensation which is claimable by the disadvantaged party. It has, moreover, ominous implications for a number of fundamental principles of the law of contracts, including the binding nature of the contract and the legal certainty requirement which underlies it. More particularly, rescission does not amount to negating the existence of a contractual relationship. Nor does it affect the basic rules of contract, but merely impacts the contractual obligations. Its retroactive effect provides a technical explanation for the restitutions involved, but has no implications for any complementary compensation. Also, rescission differs fundamentally from voidance, so that there is no need to draw comparisons between the complementary compensation involved in each case. In addition, the legitimate expectations of the contracting parties are deserving of protection, and rescission should not be regarded as an erroneous choice on the part of the disadvantages party, since in many cases it represents an imposed choice.

The conclusion therefore has to be that, without a shadow of a doubt, even in the case of rescission, compensation for non-performance is intended to place the disadvantaged party in the position he/she would have occupied had the contract been performed. Accordingly, the Belgian Supreme Court should be extremely wary of allowing itself to be influenced by the highly dubious Swiss/Portuguese school of thought. The Belgian lawmaker would do well to endorse the position adopted by the Supreme Court by including in the Civil Code a rule making the performance interest capable of compensation in the event of contract rescission.

Efficient judicial proceedings require careful and rational forethought from claimants, before initiating court proceedings; and, afterwards, litigants who apply the rules of procedure correctly. Failure to comply with these requirements is, in certain cases, sanctioned in procedural terms by law, but does not invariably – or to the extent necessary – serve to redress the loss incurred. This is why it is vital to have available a financial mechanism that is capable of effectively sanctioning disruptive and obstructive practices in litigation. In this contribution, the author concludes that the existing framework of rules is inadequate, and proposes a new formula which is attuned to the specific nature of court proceedings and enables effective action to be taken against such disruptive and obstructive practices.

The starting point for this contribution is a recent change in legislation that allows winning parties to be ordered to pay costs where they have caused unnecessary expense by negligence or design. The author demonstrates that this reform has added no benefit whatsoever, given that the legislation in question continues to cleave to the error of substantive law requirement, which was already applicable before the legislation was adjusted.

Relying on in-depth analysis in Dutch legal literature, the author advocates the introduction of a new rule – the prohibition of disruptive practices in litigation. Every decision to initiate court proceedings (litigation decision) and every action committed during court proceedings (pendente lite practices) should be assessed against four criteria: time, cost, quality of outcome and procedural benefit. Where the additional time or expense caused by the practices in question is not reasonably expected to lead to a better outcome and/or improved procedural benefit, or where such a better outcome and/or improved procedural benefit could also have been reached through less burdensome practices, this will constitute a disruptive practice in litigation. Such practices cause loss to the other party (micro-procedural detriment) and/or damages the conduct of court proceedings (macro-procedural detriment). Where the loss or damage cannot be redressed by means of procedural sanctions, or by such means alone, it will be necessary to resort to financial redress. An examination of the currently applicable rules on redress (Article 1382 Civil Code and Article 780b Judicial Code) indicates that neither of these remedies is adequately attuned to the specific nature of civil court proceedings. There is therefore a need for an alternative which is geared to the characteristic features of civil court proceedings.

In order to achieve this, the author proceeds in three stages. Firstly, he describes the objective of his proposal as loss redress and prevention. Secondly, he examines how this goal can be achieved in the light of the procedural context. In so doing, the author examines, thoroughly and purposively, the question of who shall be bound to pay for any loss caused by micro-procedural or macro-procedural detriment, how such loss is to be assessed, and who shall be entitled to receive any compensation thus awarded. Various authorities and recent laws are relied on in order to achieve loss prevention, as well as loss compensation. Thirdly, the author focuses on the way in which the proposal should be operated smoothly, without falling into the “trial within a trial” trap. Finally, the author makes a concrete proposal for an amendment to Article 780b Judicial Code. According to the author, the proposed rule guarantees an effective, and at least improved, method of acting against disruptive and obstructive practices in litigation.

Empirical studies have shown that in some cases the victims of a tort will seek, in addition to damages, recognition of the unlawful action committed by the tortfeasor, and of the emotional injury this has caused. This is why they will seek an expression of sympathy and apology in addition to monetary compensation. This is especially so in cases where the victim’s identity has been affected, or where his/her reputation or personal integrity in society in general, in public life or in a particular community has been damaged (e.g. where the result has been discrimination, unlawful dismissal, or a breach of certain personality rights). In such cases, an apology will have three purposes: redress (of emotional damage), recognition (of victimhood and suffering) and signalisation (of unacceptable conduct, shared values and rehabilitative effect).

Because of its potentially healing effect, some legal systems enable the courts to order the tortfeasor to make apology. This is because empirical studies have demonstrated that even non-voluntary apology is capable of meeting the three purposes mentioned above. In some countries, the right to enforce apology is laid down as a general remedy in tort – as is the case in China – or imposed as a remedy for specific torts (as is the case under the laws of discrimination in certain South African provinces and Australian states). In other jurisdictions, such as Switzerland, it is the courts that have recognised the right to order apology, even though there has been no legislation which lays down this opportunity. In other jurisdictions still, where the right to order apology is accepted by neither legislation nor the courts – as is the case in The Netherlands – a growing number of authors are advocating this remedy. All these legal systems regard the ordering of apology as a form of equitable relief for emotional injury. It is no coincidence that it is the common law jurisdictions which, departing from their traditionally pecuniary approach towards legal redress, have expressly embodied apology as a legal remedy in appropriate legislation, and have accordingly led the field in developing this type of legal redress for others to follow.

Under Belgian law, the right to enforce apology is neither laid down by legislation nor applied by the courts. Nevertheless, enforcement of apology could also be qualified as a form of equitable relief for emotional injury under Articles 1382-1383 of the Belgian Civil Code. The argument that is frequently raised against this is that a tortfeasor who is compelled to apologise against his/her will has had his/her right to freedom of expression breached. However, this argument has been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights. Enforcement of apology is capable of meeting the test of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to make a proper assessment in such cases, the courts must engage in an additional weighing of interests which is not directly based on the law of torts and reaches a good deal further than the ordinary test laid down for abuse of law. This is because the court must judge whether the apology applied for by way of redress is, given the circ*mstances of the case, relevant, necessary and proportionate. The conditions to be met for the award of compensation for the commission of a tort are therefore necessary, but not sufficient in this case.

The court may determine the substance of the apology to be made (precise wording – formulation made freely or to be agreed between the parties) or to specify its formalities (place, time and length of publication, or bilaterally). It may also combine this with other remedies (equitable or pecuniary relief), on condition that the integrality principle is observed, and, where appropriate, may order apology subject to penalty payments. However, this will not be of much avail if in the meantime too long a period has elapsed, if the apology would merely intensify of prolong the conflict, or if the tortfeasor continues to deny his/her unlawful act even though it has been confirmed by law.

This contribution is the printed version of an address held on 31/3/2017 on the occasion of the acceptance of the TPR Annual Rotating Chair for 2016-2017 at the University of Utrecht.

The judicial machinery is currently in the doldrums. Three symptoms have been highlighted as a basis for this paper – (a) the negative image conveyed by the judiciary, (b) the haunting judicial backlog spectre, and (c) the truculence displayed by certain players on the judicial scene. The traditional medicine for this malady has been to adjust and update the rules of civil procedure. Although such changes in the law have some merits, and are inspired by noble objectives, they fail to provide us with any structural solutions. The same applies to a variety of other alternative medications, such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Although it remains necessary to stimulate, optimise and facilitate such alternatives, the successes they reap remain on a limited scale.

But these are the old techniques. Recent years have witnessed the rise of certain new technologies – a rise that can be inserted into a new paradigm. The new divide is between alternative or optional methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as such on the one hand, and the quality they provide on the other hand. The key questions are how these old and new technologies can be made to operate at their most optimal and efficient level, and how they could and should interconnect and interact.

Citing a number of examples, the author examines two new techniques, i.e. consumer dispute resolution (CDR) and regulatory redress, i.e. redress offered or encouraged by public invigilators and regulators.

The judicial machinery and those who decide its policies should explore these new possibilities, and above all emphasise the need for the interconnection, interaction and integration between these various models. The author illustrates this by several examples – the preliminary ruling technique, the devolution of civil claims by the criminal courts, actions for declaratory judgments or injunctions, feedback loops between ADR bodies and their supervisory authorities, conferring judicial standing on supervisory bodies, and the new Belgian procedure for the collection of undisputed civil claims (payment orders).

Equally essential is the creation of an overarching conceptual framework. Guiding and general principles must be used as beacons in order to guarantee the quality of these old and new technologies.

This contribution concludes with a case study on mass harm. In addition to private class actions, extra-judicial and alternative avenues can also be highlighted here.

Bitcoin was conceived as a replacement for banking payments, and is based on the so-called blockchain technology. This technique makes it possible, on a decentralised and secured basis, to make anonymous payments which are stored in a decentralised database. The technique involved should ensure that its administration, i.e. the database in question, is incapable of being tampered with. Various applications of this technique have been proposed, such as replacing the Land Registry by a blockchain. Smart contracts are another example of this trend. These agreements are based on the notion that computers are also capable of tackling more complex forms of conditional transactions. Because a bitcoin-like system is capable of effecting payment via the blockchain automatically where certain conditions have been met, this provides an opportunity for ensuring performance. In addition, it has been suggested that, because the blockchain cannot be located in any specific country or computer, and therefore is difficult to control by legal – or any other – mechanisms, transactions based on smart contracts constituted a system which operated outside the law. The law was incapable of controlling it, so that the code governing smart contracts has taken the place of the relevant legal rules.

The practice of smart contracts has raised a number of legal issues, such as their jurisdiction and the law to which they are subject, as well as issues of contractual interpretation and liability.

However, practice in this area has turned out to be less radical than has been claimed. It has transpired that there are, in fact, various means by which smart contracts can be challenged. Thus when it comes to important transactions, the parties involved may agree to apply different rules which will make an undesired contract inoperable. Also, smart contracts are not used exclusively as a comprehensive alternative to ordinary contracts, but are also used as part of the mechanisms for performing an ordinary framework contract.

Apart from this, smart contracts also give rise to a number of questions in relation to performance. The law of contracts contains many rules which are conducive to fair outcomes – whether or not by agreement between the parties concerned, and taking into account the facts underlying the case. It is difficult to formulate such decision-making processes in the shape of rules which are capable of being performed by smart contracts. It would seem that the use of smart contracts can cause the loss of certain types of legal protection (such as the right to suspend performance, or to claim compensation). Nevertheless, smart contracts can, in practice, constitute a sensible solution – such as in the case of long-distance agreements under which it would be too unwieldy or expensive to provide authentic legal protection for the consumers affected.

Finally, the formalisation which is necessary in order to include legal rules in smart contracts can be a rational exercise which may produce an insight into the essential structure of the law of contracts.

The trust as an institution that has developed in the common law and in some of the mixed legal systems (such as South Africa, Scotland and Quebec) is characterised by its pervasiveness in a wide range of personal and commercial contexts. This means that the trust in its true form can be employed in a wide range of contexts and for a variety of purposes, thus displaying what has been described as its “chameleon-like” quality. This contrasts with the trust in its “diluted” form (as frequently encountered in Continental Europe), which features some trust-like properties, but lacks the flexibility typically associated with the common-law trust as described above.

It is argued that the flexibility of the trust in its true form is facilitated by, inter alia, the flexibility in the notion of ownership in the law of trusts. In relation to the South African trust model, this phenomenon is illustrated in at least three specific areas of trust law. The first concerns the basic principle that, in civilian or mixed legal systems, the trust is not based on split ownership between the trustee and the trust beneficiary, but on the notion that the trustee owns assets in two separate estates (or patrimonies), i.e. the trust estate and the trustee’s personal estate. Ownership in these two estates is treated in a remarkably flexible fashion – thus, for example, it enables the courts to craft new remedies in instances of so-called trust abuse. The second area concerns the very basic question as to where ownership must be vested in a trust. Here, South African law recognises a very peculiar trust type – the so-called bewind trust – under which ownership is vested not in the trustee, but in the trust beneficiary. This shift of ownership towards the trust beneficiary contributes to the flexibility of the trust institution and facilitates the use of the trust in new areas. The third area deals with the type of joint ownership that exists among co-trustees in a trust where there is more that one trustee (which is normally the case). In South Africa, the traditional forms of co-ownership do not explain the automatic transfer of ownership to co-trustees in the event of, for example, the death of one of the trustees. Research has shown that South African law has in this context probably accommodated the English law concept of joint tenancy, with its corollary of the rule of survivorship. This would explain what happens among co-trustees in the circ*mstances described and it once again illustrates the ability of the trust system to depart from established norms as far as ownership concepts are concerned.

It nevertheless remains a challenge to explain the flexibility in the concept of ownership in the law of trusts. In South Africa, this is sometimes done by attaching certain labels to the trustee’s ownership, such as “bare ownership”, “ex officio ownership” or even “legal ownership”. Other attempts have focused on the concept of “fiduciary ownership”, unpacking it in the context of trusts. However, an extremely useful insight has been that provided by those authors who have argued that the common law has been able to accommodate the trust in its “true” form because of its “anti-conceptual” approach to property or, put differently, “its power to break fundamental rules of the legal system within which it operates”. It is argued that South African law has shown the capacity to do exactly this with regard to its treatment of ownership in the law of trusts. This capacity has probably been facilitated by the fact that the English common-law trust was initially received into South African law, but later transformed in a pragmatic (and typically common-law) case-by-case fashion to align itself with well-known civilian institutions already recognised in the system.

This contribution provides in the first instance a thorough overview of the grounds for termination with relative effect. The author examines the following grounds for termination with relative effect in this context: relinquishment, amicable termination, termination with notice, confusion, forced termination on grounds of misuse of powers, termination based on a change in circ*mstances (for building rights and land leases under Dutch law) and, finally, termination for breach of contract.

As regards the latter (which is an extraordinary ground for termination) the author, on the basis of recent doctrine (but contrary to traditional theory), defends the position that this ground definitely has relative effect, and as such constitutes an exception to the rule in Article 74 HypW (Law on Mortgages and Re-mortgages). In support of this thesis he advances a number of arguments – e.g. the fact that amicable termination is also deemed merely to have relative effect, or the argument based on Article 28 HypW. However, for termination for breach of contract to have relative effect, it is a requirement that the third-party recipient (a) was unaware of the breach of contract in question, whether as a matter of fact or by a marginal note in the application for termination (Article 3 HypW of Article 28 HypW), and (b) was not himself the cause of the breach.

Secondly, this paper focuses attention on the relative effect theory by devising a new explanatory model for the latter. Firstly, the author shows that the traditional explanatory model for this relative effect theory, based on the right of disposal (or its absence) on the part of the usufructuary, holder of building rights or land-leaseholder is coming under increasing challenge. This is why he proposes an alternative explanatory model which is based on the theory of protection of acquirers in good faith; in so doing, the author takes an in-depth look at the bona fides requirement and relates it to the two principles on which protection of third party acquirers is based. Thus he demonstrates that our legal order in fact acknowledges a “hidden” rule of third-party protection in connection with the acquisition of real property. The author then examines this discovery in the light of the two explanatory models referred to, and notes that both these models approach the same phenomenon from a different vantage point, whilst at the same time reinforcing each other. Taken together, both models enable a better understanding of the relative effect of certain grounds for termination. Finally, the author demonstrates that this alternative explanatory model is also valid when viewed in the comparative context of French and Dutch law.

In commercial lease contracts, as a rule, parties freely determine the rental price when concluding the contract. However, under certain circ*mstances, a party to a commercial lease contract may request the court to impose a new rental price, both in the course of the performance of the lease contract and upon renewal of the commercial lease. In that case, the legislator requires the court to decide “in equity” on the new rental price.

In order to find out how courts (should) make use of this power to decide “in equity”, the authors first conducted an in-depth analysis of the parliamentary proceedings relating to the legislation on commercial leases, in order to discover the lawmaker’s precise intention. This analysis shows that the legislator’s references to equity were merely intended as an ultimate resort, viz. where no appropriate points of comparison are available to assess the normal rental value.

The authors then conducted an empirical analysis which sought to discover whether, in practice, the courts use their equity powers in line with the lawmaker’s intention as discovered in the analysis of the parliamentary works.

This empirical analysis was performed in two stages. First, the authors examined all the cases brought before, and decided by, the five district courts of Ghent, between 2010 and 2016. They then interviewed the three experts who were commissioned by these court to submit their findings on the value of the leased property in these cases.

The number of cases where the district courts were called upon to decide on a new rental price, was revealed to be very small. Also, among the cases which did actually result in a decision on the rental price, only one was decided on equitable grounds. This finding is consistent with the relevant parliamentary proceedings which indicate that equity is merely intended for disputes in which exceptional circ*mstances prevail.

The analysis conducted by the authors is, essentially, exploratory. Accordingly, the general conclusions drawn from their findings, need to be assessed against a broader sample of court decisions. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the decisions of other district courts on this matter will be similar to those made by the Ghent district courts.

An election held in 2009 crowned Henri De Page (1894-1969), who wrote the authoritative Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, as the greatest-ever Belgian legal scholar. In sharp contrast to the laurels heaped on De Page stands the image of François Laurent (1810-1887), whose Principes was the seminal text for the Belgian private law until the publication of De Page’s Traité. Laurent’s image has been tarnished by the excessive regard he had for the text of the Code civil and by his rabid anti-clericalism. However, the only way to obtain a true picture of De Page’s writings is to examine Laurent’s work more thoroughly.

Laurent’s perception of the private law emerges, not from his Principes, which bound him to the format of a commentary to the Code civil, but from his own draft proposal for a new Civil Code for Belgium. For this project, Laurent had a free hand and in many respects this Avant-projet confirmed Laurent’s image as a hater of Catholics. His anti-clericalism is one of the reasons why his proposal was never converted into law. However, there is another side to this story. In his proposal, Laurent also showed concern for the well-being of the working classes at the expense of the bourgeoisie which then dominated the Belgian Parliament. In addition, his family law proposals were 100 years ahead of his time as regards women’s rights, which was also a hard pill to swallow by the politicians of the day. The nation’s judges also had reason to come out against Laurent. Although portrayed as a slavish worshipper of the statute law who paid no heed to the case law, it appears that Laurent had a first-class knowledge of the latter and for that reason subjected it to intense criticism. He was especially critical of the authority exercised by the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme Court). That he cannot in any way be pigeon-holed as a slave to exegesis whose scope was restricted to the French Code civil is also clear from his extensive knowledge of foreign law. Accordingly, whilst some criticism may rightly be levelled at him for his heedless pursuit of his ideological agenda, one should at the same time find some admiration for his progressive views, his critical approach towards the courts, and the attention he paid to foreign law.

When Henri De Page’s Traité appeared, it was quick to knock Laurent’s Principes off its pedestal. However, the success enjoyed by this work does not in any way mean that it was lacking in ideological underpinning. That much can be gauged from the various forewords to the Traité and from the author’s works on legal theory and legal philosophy. He opposed Laurent’s exegetic methods, of which he drew a very negative picture. As an alternative, he advocated an approach based on sociological legal positivism, under which the courts would base the law on social realities. In truth, however, it emerged that it was the case law, rather than society, which was De Page’s legal source. In this regard, De Page adopted a less critical stance than did Laurent, and defended the prudent approach adopted by the Belgian courts. This assessment of the courts was consistent with De Page’s political views. He regarded the courts as protectors of the bourgeoisie against a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and was opposed to any excessive protection of the weaker in society. The success enjoyed by De Page’s work was not unrelated to the tributes he paid to the courts, in particular the Hof van Cassatie. Another factor that played a part was his membership of the Standing Committee of the Council for Legislation (Bestendig Comité van de Raad voor Wetgeving), which brought him into regular contact with the highest judges in the country. De Page’s differences with Laurent were not restricted to his approach towards the courts. Thus, in contrast with Laurent, De Page had but little knowledge of foreign languages, which was a considerable handicap for his endeavours in comparative law. (The fact that De Page had no German also allows us to clear him from any unwarranted accusations of sympathising with the German occupier during World War II.) The contrast between Laurent and De Page expresses itself at its sharpest in the field of family law. De Page is in favour of maintaining the existing order, as can be seen from his defence of the rules discriminating against extra-marital children. He favoured the subordinate position of married women, but was ultimately compelled to adjust his position once the law had abolished the husband’s marital authority, although he left no-one in any doubt that he had preferred matters to remain as they were in this regard.

Even though the comparison drawn in this paper is confined to two, albeit highly eminent, personalities, the question can be asked whether it could possibly reveal a more general trend. In other areas, such as the commercial law, it is possible to note that the Belgian law of the 19th century was at times more creative than it was during most of the 20th. Exactly how representative Laurent and De Page were is an issue remains a challenging task for legal historians; at all events, it is clear that the time is ripe for a reassessment of the Belgian private law following Napoleon. This may be all the more necessary if the proposed new Civil Code shows itself capable of closing the current chapter in the history of the Belgian private law which started in 1804.

The starting point of this contribution is that there is some confusion and dissatisfaction about the fact that consumers can rely on certain sales remedies more easily than is the case with other remedies available in the EU and US. This preference for one remedy over the other causes a so-called hierarchy to arise between the remedies: a remedy that is more readily available is given a higher status in the hierarchy than is the case for the others. A hierarchy entails that some remedies cannot be easily relied upon, which could give rise to frustration. In the US, damages are the preferred remedy owing to the irreparable injury rule whereas in the EU there is a strong preference for remedies oriented towards performance, such as replacement and repair.

On the one hand, the irreparable injury rule – preferring damages over specific performance – has created a substantial body of literature in the US which examines the strengths and weaknesses of this rule. It is a fact that it has attracted the attention of specialist authors on law and economics and legal philosophers – and more recently, behaviorists have also expressed an interest in this topic. One particular author has even announced the “death of the irreparable injury rule”; the latter, however, continues to apply in US common law of contracts and in the UCC (albeit in a mitigated form).

On the other hand, many authors in the EU, as well the EU legislature, strongly believe in the virtues of specific performance. The contractual obligation must in the first instance be met by performing the contract itself. This preference has led to the introduction of a strict hierarchy of remedies in EU consumer sales regulation, in which repair and replacement are a right conferred not only on the consumer but also on the seller. The fact that the consumer also has to respect this hierarchy of remedies could give rise to inadequate consumer protection, since it does not sufficiently take account of the consumer’s weaker position.

Because both systems – i.e. those in the US and the EU – contain imperfections, the author of this contribution proposes a free choice between the available consumer sale remedies. This would entail that the consumer could choose between termination, price reduction, damages and specific performance. Only where such a choice clearly conflicted with the choice that any reasonable and careful consumer would have made, could the court intervene and propose a different remedy.

It is widely known that European legislation has, in the course of the past few decades, considerably strengthened the rights of the consumer. This contribution examines the role which the Court of Justice has played in this particular field. The author notes that the Court has developed its own policy on this subject which has made an important contribution to the protection of the consumer. In so doing, the Court has been guided by a realistic notion of the position of consumers. It starts from the premiss that the consumer is in a weaker position and is not always aware of his rights. Although it is possible to argue, from a theoretical point of view, that the Court of Justice has, in some cases, gone too far in its interpretation of the rights and obligations of the consumer and of the businesses of traders, a more pragmatic view enables one to draw the conclusion that the Court, through its case law, seeks to achieve objectives which European legislation was unable to realise. It should nevertheless be emphasised that the Court reserves this special protection for the consumer in the strictest sense of the word, and refuses to accept that those who act for professional purposes find themselves in the same position as those who act for professional purposes, but outside their area of expertise.

Below, the author restricts himself to a number of conclusions which illustrate the role played by the Court in the field of consumer protection:

The Court has regularly interpreted the rules of consumer law in such a way as to enable the consumer to exercise the rights conferred on him effectively, without in so doing losing sight of the legitimate interests of the business world. The result is a consumer-friendly, yet at all times balanced, interpretation of the rules on consumer sales and the right to cancellation. Only when it comes to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive does the Court appear to have neglected the legitimate interests of advertisers in its interpretation.

• The domestic courts are obliged to raise the rules of consumer law ipso jure where they are in possession of the necessary data and to apply them, unless the consumer expressly waives these rules after having been informed of their possible applicability – and subject to protecting the rights of the defence. In creating this obligation on the part of the domestic courts, the CJEU relies on the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. By its broad interpretation of these requirements and its applicability in every type of judicial proceeding, the Court, even though it continues to observe procedural autonomy as a basic principle, is in fact harmonizing the law of procedure in consumer disputes – something which European legislation has not been able to achieve.

• Applying the rules on unfair contract terms should have a deterrent effect, which means that an unfair contract term cannot be mitigated, not even voluntarily by the business in question, and that, once such a term has been annulled, there is no longer any scope for applying rules of supplementary law which are not to the consumer’s advantage. This serves to penalise those businesses which use unfair contract terms, since they will thus benefit less that if there had been no unfair term at all.

• Passengers suffering long delays in flights have been put in the same position as passengers of delayed flights who have been offered an alternative flight, so that they too have a right to compensation (unless the delay has been caused by extraordinary circ*mstances which could not have been reasonably avoided). It is worth noting that the Court has reached this conclusion after having actively sought out an unclear clause in the Directive in order subsequently to interpret it in compliance with the principle of equality.

The transparency requirement stipulated in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is an important factor in protecting the consumer against unfair terms and conditions. Under Article 5 of this Directive, in case of contracts where terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. The transparency requirement also plays an important part in relation to core contract terms – under Article 4(2), assessment of the unfair nature of the terms relates neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, nor to the adequacy of its price and remuneration as against the goods or services supplied in exchange, but only in so far as these terms are worded in plain intelligible language.

However, the effect of this transparency requirement in the member states has been highly unequal, in terms of both its application and effectiveness. The defective regulation of this requirement in the Directive has definitely been a major contributory factor here. It is true that the Court of Justice has, through its interpretation, considerably clarified the vague provisions of the Directive in recent years. Nevertheless, both the legal certainty and effectiveness of this requirement would benefit considerably from a number of adjustments. Some of the proposed adjustments consist in the codification of the case law developed by the Court of Justice.

To clarify the definition and content of this requirement is a matter of absolute necessity. In the first instance, the wording of the Directive – and not only its recitals – should make it clear that the transparency requirement also involves the opportunity to be informed of the terms and conditions of an agreement prior to its conclusion. Another adjustment could consist in specifying that the words “plain and intelligible” should also allow “the average consumer to foresee the economic consequences of the term for him”. This would merely amount to codifying the Court’s case law. It could also be made clear that, as is the case in other EU instruments such as the Data Protection Regulation, the information provided must be concise, communicated in an easily accessible manner, and worded in clear and plain language. In an international context, this also entails that the language in which the general terms and conditions are communicated to the consumer must be the same as that in which the consumer was approached.

These clarifications will not solve everything, and specific regulation will still be needed for specific types of agreement. In addition, however, even if clarified in the manner described above the transparency requirement will remain a general rule which will not guarantee legal certainty in every case. Neither the existing numerical tests aimed at expressing the intelligibility and complexity of a rule, nor its detailed regulation as is applied in certain foreign jurisdictions, currently provide adequate guarantees that the consumer will effectively read and understand the general terms and conditions. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn from the methods applied in linguistics, and there is evidence that general terms and conditions which are worded more simply are definitely capable of making them more intelligible. We therefore deem it extremely useful to lay down detailed guidelines for formulating simpler general terms and conditions, without making such directions mandatory law.

Furthermore, transparency will never, by itself, be sufficient to provide the consumer with adequate protection against unfair contract terms. In many cases, the consumer will not take the trouble to read the general terms and conditions. The lack of transparency is one of the main reasons for this, but not the only or decisive one. Substantive review of contract terms should therefore definitely be maintained, and, in addition, more thorough requirements should be imposed for exempting core terms and conditions from such review. This should only be the case where such key terms and conditions have been brought to the consumer’s attention in a standardised frame or in a similar prominent manner. This would make it easier for the consumer to retrieve such essential information that is excluded from substantive review. At the same time, this would provide a practical way of drawing the distinction between core contract terms and other terms. In the United Kingdom, the relevant legislation has been adjusted along these lines. We would also advocate a rule whereby, in the event of any dispute or doubt regarding the transparency of a term, the court or the administrative authority could place the burden of proof on the business in question. In such cases it would be for the business to prove that such terms and conditions are sufficiently plain and intelligible for the average consumer belonging to the target group in question, i.e. the average consumer who concludes such agreements. Guidelines could be developed which contain directions as to how such empirical proof can be provided. The standard used could be similar to the “average consumer” test as applied by the Court of Justice. However, we would also favour interpreting this “average consumer” criterion as an empirically-based, rather than as a purely normative, test. Under this test, a contractual clause would become intelligible where the majority of a target group of consumers is in a position to understand it correctly – in the words of the Court of Justice, in a position to evaluate the economic consequences which derive from it. This ability to place the burden of proof on the business will also create an incentive to limit the number of contractual terms in the standardised frame.

Finally, the sanction for an infringement of the transparency requirement should be specified more clearly in the Directive. Here too, codifying the case law of the Court of Justice can provide the necessary degree of legal certainty. Not only is there the rule that the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail; in addition, transparency is also a factor to be taken into account when assessing the fairness of a term. Where there is an lack of transparency, this can be sufficient to prompt the conclusion that the term in question is unfair, without making this an automatism. It should also be stated clearly that transparency cannot constitute a defence or make unequal terms fair.

The available legal literature on the installation of wind turbines frequently focuses on developments in the law relating to energy on the one hand, and in the administrative law on the other – i.e. policy objectives, licencing and appeal procedures, etc. However, the private law dimension is also an element which is not to be underestimated when it comes to establishing the legal framework for wind energy projects. However, legal areas such as the law of property or the law of obligations remain – unjustifiably – under valued in relation to the installation and operation of wind turbines.

This contribution is the result of a legal analysis of the various stages involved in the installation of wind turbines. In so doing, the author has combined various research methods. Interviews with experts and a qualitative analysis of the relevant documents have brought to light several key legal issues which have been either neglected or merely treated as a marginal issue in the existing legal literature.

In this regard, we should consider the various obstacles involved in obtaining the various rights that relate to the use of land belonging to third parties in order to be able to build both the wind turbines and the related infrastructure. Both at the pre-contractual stage and when it comes to obtaining the necessary property rights (building rights, easem*nts) even the most minor detail is crucial. Each clause has constantly to be re-examined in the light of, and geared to, inter alia, the parties involved and the defining features of the project. Agreements regarding the fees paid for, and the expiry of, the contracted user rights represent a mere fraction of the issues which frequently give rise to discussion. The various “intervening” parties, such as tenant farmers and suppliers of credit, are capable of causing even greater difficulties when it comes to obtaining the necessary user rights. The right to use wind, and accusations of “wind theft”, also represent an increasingly relevant factor.

The author makes it clear that the interaction between energy law, administrative law and private law is capable of rendering the legal framework for the operation of wind energy projects a highly complex matter. In order to reconcile the disparate – and at times even contradictory – interests of the various parties involved, an exercise in balancing these interests is necessary at each stage of the installation of wind turbines and wind turbine parks. Such an exercise does not appear to be devoid of complication and will involve the expenditure of a good deal of time and energy. Whereas the process of developing of wind turbines is currently quicker and more straightforward than was the case 20 years ago, the same cannot be said in legal terms – at least not in every case.

With the increase in climate change, the finite nature of fossil fuels, and the growing inequality in the (Western) world, as well as the commitments entered into by the nations of this world in the context of the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, is it time to revalue our law of property – i.e. inject it with new values? Because of this question, the urgent need to heed the issue of sustainability is greater than ever. The laws relating to things provide the building blocks on the basis of which we mould our society – which is why they are eminently suitable for enabling us to mould a sustainable society.

Revaluing our property law requires the insight that this law was created on the basis of a liberal and neo-liberal philosophical and economic mindset. In this context, we need to consider the earthquakes caused by the extraction of gas in Groningen, and the mortgage loans granted to customers of whom it is clear from the outset that they will not be able to pay their debt.

By opting for another philosophical basis, property law can embark on a new pathway which is focused not only on growth, but also on the use of our resources for the benefit of ourselves and of the generations that follow us. A new theoretical framework is needed on the basis of which the circular economy and the shared economy could operate, and on the basis of which new, innovative and especially sustainable projects can be shaped. Here, we can consider not only the collective installation of windmill parks, but also the sustainable creation and sharing of goods – whether by using existing sharing platforms or by some other means.

There are currently already many initiatives which are based on the sustainable use of things. These initiatives avail themselves of the existing rules of property law. The car sharing firm Cambio, but also the communal purchase and installation of solar panels, are examples of this. These types of initiatives, as well as the problems they encounter – such as the property rules on accession – are receiving increasing attention in legal literature. At the same time, there is a lack of an all-embracing theory capable of systematically shaping a continuous system of coherent and sustainable solutions. The development of a sustainable system of property law requires a set of rules on the basis of which problems are capable of being solved – i.e. an algorithm – by which a solid sustainability requirement could be introduced in the law relating to property and under which the rules of private and of public law could be combined in order to develop the law further. On the basis of this algorithm we will be able to decide how we are to interpret our current rules, and whether our rules can continue to apply in their present form. Such an algorithm could also be used in order to create new property rules. Accordingly, our entire system of legislation relating to things and property rights, including the relevant restricted property rights, and our rules of procedure must be re-evaluated for this purpose.

The notion of achieving sustainability by pouring all the relevant rules into the mould of service provision contracts is not the right way to go about this. Revaluing them, i.e. integrating new values into our system – in this case general well-being – by creating a relevant obligation under property law, brings the law relating to goods to the forefront. Thus we all have a duty to think about how we handle our possessions – such as, for example, our houses. Thus we can provide the building blocks that will enable us to work together in creating a sustainable economy in which, in addition to general well-being, economic growth for everybody and the continued development of new initiatives occupy a central place.

In order to stimulate the enforcement of competition law by means of private law, the Economic Law Code has, for the purpose of implementing Directive 2014/104/ EU, incorporated a number of rules on compensation claims, which include a number of specific provisions on time limitation.

Regarding the limitation of non-contractual compensation claims for infringements of anti-trust law which were started or occurred before the new legislation entered into effect, the author of this paper informs us that, as matters stand at present, account must be taken of a complex interaction between (1) the rules on limitation laid down in Article 2262bis, §1, paras. (2) and (3) of the Civil Code, (2) the Constitutional Court decision of March 10, 2016, and (3) the new rules on limitation which result from the implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU, being Articles XVII.90 and XVII.91 of the aforementioned Code.

Bearing in mind this three-way conundrum, the author adopts a step-by-step approach in order to determine whether a non-contractual compensation claim for infringement of anti-trust law which was started or instituted before the new legislation entered into effect, i.e. 22 June 2017, is time-barred or not.

It also emerges from this contribution that problems could arise in relation to the limitation of claims when it comes to determining the joint and several liability of the members of a trust arrangement. Traditionally, it has been accepted that limitation in time is a “common” defence and is therefore capable of being relied upon by all the jointly and severally liable parties. This could produce the – undesirable – consequence that, where such limitation has been determined for each member of the trust arrangement individually and has entered into effect for one of these members only (e.g. because that one member had failed to lodge an appeal against the decision of the competition law authority) the other members would also be allowed to rely on time limitation. However, the author, assisted by a comparative glance at other legal systems, demonstrates that, when it comes to joint and several liability in the passive sense, time limitation conceived as a common defence need not be regarded as the most sacred of cows …

Environmental servitudes or land charges constitute a limited patrimonial right, which may not necessarily be a “servitude” within the meaning of Article 637 of the Civil Code, but nevertheless imposes certain obligations on the owner of the servient tenement in the interests of environmental protection. Examples of these are orders prohibiting the removal of valuable plants, hedges or woods, banning the use of certain harmful products, or imposing an obligation to engage in biological farming. This contribution examines in detail the extent to which environmental servitudes are capable of definition, why they are appropriate legal devices, which legal forms they could take, and what factors need to be taken into account should the lawmaking authorities wish to embed environmental servitudes in the existing body of legislation.

The first reason why environmental servitudes are appropriate legal devices is that they are private law instruments, thus making it possible to circumvent any restrictions imposed by the public law. This is particularly relevant for private individuals who normally are unable to avail themselves of public law instruments, but are free to use those in the private law sphere. Private individuals are thus better able to serve their own needs and desires without being hamstrung by the vicissitudes of political priorities. The public authorities will also find them a useful legal device, because, being private law instruments, they are in principle consensual – which makes it unlikely that they will be challenged before the administrative courts – and are not subject to the restrictions resulting from the legality principle (which could restrict the use of public law servitudes). The use of a patrimonial right rather than a personal right is inspired by (a) the broader opportunities to rely on a limited patrimonial right against any legal successors or third parties, and (b) the more solid protection of patrimonial rights which it provides against any insolvency on the part of the person on whom the servitude is imposed.

Environmental servitudes can assume various legal forms. The rights which provide usage and enjoyment of property, such as the right of usufruct, and the various security interests in property are not suitable legal formats for environmental servitudes, since they deprive the owner of the full use and enjoyment of his land (rights of usage and enjoyment) – whereas the object of the exercise is merely to have him act in accordance with environmental policy objectives – or restrict themselves to securing the performance of obligations (security interests in property). Certain foreign legal systems, as well as the extremely scarce Belgian case law on the subject, indicate that frequent use is made of ordinary servitudes, of patrimonial rights which are similar to servitudes, of ground rents (i.e. patrimonial rights which impose a positive obligation on the owner of the servient tenement) and of patrimonial rights sui generis. Under Belgian law, ground rents no longer exist as patrimonial rights, there are no patrimonial rights similar to servitudes, and the numerus clausus which applies to these rights makes it impossible to give sui generis patrimonial rights a lawful basis. The only legal form which could be used to accommodate environmental servitudes is the ordinary servitude as defined in Article 637 Civil Code. However, this gives rise to a number of problems: (a) there is a need for a dominant tenement which (b) must benefit directly and immediately from the servitude, and (c) no positive major obligations may be imposed on the servient tenement. Therefore, environmental servitudes can only be used on this legal basis if these three requirements are met, which means that their scope will be considerably restricted. This type of restriction appears to be undesirable, given that the importance of a healthy environment for man and society requires that the former be protected as effectively as possible.

Naturally, the lawmaking authorities may embed environmental servitudes expressly in legislation in order to avoid these problems. However, in so doing they will need to ponder a number of issues. One of these would be the legal form this would take. The most straightforward solution would be to create a limited patrimonial right, which could be modelled on an existing patrimonial right in order to minimise the number of new rules to be enacted. However, it could ultimately be desirable to create a new and more general category of limited patrimonial rights, which reduces the risk of discrimination. However, the danger with this approach would be that it could produce undesirable side effects. Other examples of the issues that would need to be resolved are the maximum duration of environmental servitudes – given that the environment exists for eternity, it would appear appropriate for these servitudes to have eternal effect – and the question of who would be entitled to institute claims for the protection of these servitudes.

Technological advances in the recording and reproduction of vocal fragments represent one of the main factors that have caused a flourishing contractual practice to develop during the past few decades concerning the voice. Professional voice actors “dub” foreign language films, record audiobooks or lend their voice to cartoon characters or all manner of software applications (e.g. navigation systems, digital assistants such as Apple’s Siri, etc.). In addition, people in the public eye who are recognisable because of the characteristic sound of their voice recommend commercial products in radio commercials. However, the important part played by the voice in commercial law terms has led to a number of abuses which take the form of, inter alia, secret recordings, misleading voice distortions and parasitic imitations. In spite of this, the author notes that the legal framework that regulates use of the voice in a commercial context has hitherto attracted but scant attention in the legal literature. This contribution seeks to provide an overview of the existing civil law rules providing protection which are dependent on the concrete use of the voice, and at the same time to discuss the applicable rules and the conditions for their application. In so doing, the author raises the question whether there is such a thing as the “right to one’s voice” which would protect the individual’s personality through his/her voice, regardless of the content of the spoken pronouncements. Although there are currently a number of authors who regard this type of subjective right as an established right, and include it in the broad category of personality rights, they frequently do so without any previous critical and fundamental analysis. With this contribution, it is intended to remedy this glaring omission through a comparative study of the relevant Belgian, French, Dutch and Swiss laws.

In Chapter One, the voice is treated as a medium of content. This means that, firstly, the voice can be protected indirectly to the extent that it gives expression to a person’s creative mind through the oral interpretation of an authored work. In view of the need to protect the interests of those artists who use their voice for both advertising purposes and by way of entertainment, particular attention is given to the associated rights which apply to them. However, there are several types of voice usage which, because of the restrictive conditions for the application of the relevant rules, fall outside the scope of such protection – such as non-artistic interpretations (e.g. the use of a neutral voice when recording sounds for voice-activated technology) or imitations of the voice (and not of the protected performance itself). Secondly, the voice can, as a medium of content, convey private information, or enable the listener to identify the voice owner within his private sphere. In such cases, the person in question may derive his protection from his right to privacy, and have unlawful use of the voice penalised on that basis.

In Chapter Two, the author examines the legal rules that apply where the voice is merely used as a patrimonial right. In some rare cases – which concern mainly the use of misleading voice imitations – unlawful use of the voice is penalised as an unfair commercial practice. Here, the protection provided seeks to safeguard not so much the person or his work per se, but the assets of a business that holds property rights to a voice or its recording. Trade mark law is also capable of restricting the use of another person’s voice, but here, the scope of the protection given is limited to such vocal sequences as have been specifically registered as trade marks.

In Chapter Three, the author asserts that the voice is an aspect of one’s personality which is just as characteristic of any person as is his visual image or name. He adds that effective protection of the voice is only possible where the voice is also treated as an integral personality trait. Copyright, the right to privacy and other personality rights have their uses for the purpose of restraining commercial misuse, but do not appear capable of providing protection against certain types of unlawful reproduction and voice imitation. From the recent case law on this subject, it emerges that this is the reason for the ever-increasing number of cases where the law is applied to voice usage. In terms of the conditions for its application, and the manner in which infringements are penalised, the right to one’s voice displays many similarities with other personality rights, whilst nevertheless constituting a protective set of rules in its own right.

This contribution examines the extent to which the currently applicable Belgian private law is capable of accommodating digital products. The author decided to centre his analysis around three crucial and topical subject areas – liens on, and the attachment of, digital data; electronic contracting and signing in relation to real estate agreements, and the tort liability for loss caused by robots.

As regards liens on, and the attachment of, digital data, the author firstly finds that, under the law as it applies today, the main focus must at all times be on the data carrier. Digital data not being goods, they cannot themselves be the subject-matter of an attachment or lien. The paper then proceeds to demonstrate that the two possible “loopholes” that would enable digital data to be made subject to an attachment or a lien, i.e. by applying these two mechanisms to the data carrier, or to a right someone has in relation to digital data, do not constitute fully adequate alternatives. Thirdly, the article highlights a number of issues that deserve particular attention, including the importance of the exclusivity factor when dealing with certain types of data, and the issues that law-making authorities will need to take into account if and when they decide to make it possible to subject digital data to liens and attachments.

The conclusion drawn from the second part of this contribution is that mutual consent concerning a sale of real estate that is reached electronically is capable of being signed, and that private sale agreements may also be signed electronically, but that notarial deeds cannot, for practical reasons, as yet be drawn up and signed digitally. Accordingly, in order to be able to rely in good faith on the sale of real estate against third parties, a notarial deed on paper remains necessary.

The third and final part of this paper demonstrates that the law relating to contractual liability is better equipped to accommodate (to various degrees) self-acting digital products than is tort liability. Here, the rules on contractual liability will enable the liable party to be identified just as reliably as would be the case in relation to the use of any other product. If the desired outcome is not reached, or if the necessary steps to achieve this outcome have not been taken, the contractual party will be held liable, regardless of whether it was that party’s own act or omission, or that of a robot, which caused this to happen. The rules on tort liability, on the other hand, are centred largely around fault-based actions, and around a comparison between a thing that causes loss and a model that represents the norm. As self-driving cars become increasingly self-acting, fault-based liability will increasingly fold into the background, and the emphasis will very much come to rest on omission-based liability, the scope for which will, however, remain restricted, because cars of this type will leave the “driver” but few opportunities to intervene. As regards object-based liability, finding the appropriate model that fits the norm, or finding the most justifiable safety expectations as a standard of comparison for a loss-causing self-driving car will become a difficult task.

This contribution examines the private law issues which arise from the digitalisation process and from digital products.

In the first instance, the author analyses the technique and legal status of electronic signatures. Here, the principles on which safe electronic communication is based play a crucial part. These principles concern the issues of identification and authentication (i.e. the assertion of an identity and its reliable verification), integrity (ensuring that an electronic message remains unchanged), confidentiality (ensuring that an electronic message remains secret) and irrefutability (avoiding any unjustified denial that a message has been compiled, sent or received).

The author asserts that electronic signatures differ as to their nature from handwritten signatures. Where a handwritten signature has been put to a private instrument, the approach is based on bona fides. This is because the signatory can simply and firmly deny that he/she made that signature. Where this occurs, the burden of proof rests with the party seeking to rely on that instrument. The bona fides under this principle consists in an assumption that the placing of a signature shall not be unjustifiably denied. Electronic signatures, on the other hand, are subject to a riskbased approach – in many cases, they only produce the same legal consequences as handwritten signatures if they are sufficiently reliable. This reliability principle is subject to a risk analysis. In performing this analysis, the risk of unjustified denial will need to be mitigated. This serves to give substance to the irrefutability principle.

The author further discusses the status of digital products. Digital items such as databases and software currently appear to be incapable of governance by the law relating to goods. When it comes to disputes involving databases, the courts should give greater consideration to the law on data protection. In relation to software, the copy principle cannot be sustained in a digital environment.

Finally, the author examines self-acting systems. The current rules governing the creation of agreements still appear to be adequate in order to regard a person contractually bound where such a system enters into operation. The existing rules on statute-based tort liability also appear still to be equal to the task.

The principal challenge set by comparative legal research is that the researcher must find a way of handling “foreign” law. This means becoming acquainted with a body of law in which you essentially received no training, which as a discipline is alien to your way of thinking, and which has specific institutions and principles, unspoken codes and commercial practices, as well as its own history, ideology and self-image. This should be done in a manner which is understandable not only to those whose thinking is located within the legal systems concerned, but also to outsiders. Moreover, this must involve more than merely “mapping” the various differences and similarities between various legal systems. Because much of the available material regarding legal method has remained stuck at the theoretical level, its practical relevance appears to be but minimal. It is here that the most profitable endeavours can be made, and the most important object of this paper is to provide a guide for the effective performance of comparative legal research. This has been done by, inter alia, building a research structure or objective in the form of a step-by step plan.

In this regard a number of more specific questions and challenges of methodology also arise. How does one formulate a research question? Which legal systems does one wish to involve in one’s comparative research? Where can there be said to exist comparability, and what will be the role played by the tertium comparationis? To what extent does an analysis of foreign law differ from actual comparative research? What is the meaning of the neutrality principle when it comes to comparative legal research?

When we consider and study the object and structure of comparative legal research, as well as the methodological issues that may arise in this regard, we are automatically also confronted with a number of fundamental questions as to what we need to regard as legal sources, and as to the disciplinary identity of legal research. Given that the various approaches towards this question have a considerable influence on the manner in which the object of the research is performed, and on the manner in which research develops, these questions are examined separately – as is the question as to what is actually the specific nature of comparative law.

The expectation from all of the above is that the interaction between structure (research objective), practice and theory can provide an insight into the actual performance of comparative legal research.

The arrival of self-driving motor vehicles arouses expectations of a major upheaval in the manner in which vehicle damage claims will be settled. When penetrating the inner sanctums of tort liability law, the interested lawyer will hear voices asserting that product liability is ready and primed to take over the baton of fault-based liability as the standard mechanism for settling compensation claims. However, if we consider product liability law in its current state, one cannot deny that the latter is in itself insufficiently up-to-date for the purpose of adequately regulating this innovative type of vehicle and any torts that may arise from it. Accordingly, the author of this paper formulates a number of proposals aimed at readying product liability for the arrival of self-driving motor vehicles. However, given the major role which self-driving vehicles are about to assume in society, their introduction also provides an excellent opportunity to reassess certain aspects of product liability in general. Thus product liability will not only have a part to play in the introduction of self-driving motor vehicles – the latter will also be of considerable use for the development of the law of torts in general and product liability in particular.

The first issue to arise in this regard concerns the relevant software. To this day, uncertainty persists as to whether software in itself – independently of its carrier – constitutes a product within the meaning of product liability. However, this can definitely be said to be the case, so that where the defective operation of any software the victim will be able to engage not only the liability of the end producer of the self-driving motor vehicle, but also that of the manufacturer of the deficient software.

The second – and possibly most important – problem in this area resides in the fundamental incompatibility of the “consumer expectations” test with innovative products such as self-driving motor vehicles. The lack of clarity and certainty to which this situation gives rise is a major impediment to their introduction – this is the so-called chilling effect. In order to redirect the focus towards the product itself, so as to provide both the producer and the consumer with a greater degree of certainty as to the existence or non-existence of product deficiency, it would appear advisable to adopt the “risk/utility” approach instead. Such a difference in approach is less momentous than it might seem at first sight, given that both the courts and the leading authors have been known to apply risk/utility criteria when applying the “consumer expectations” test.

Thirdly, the scope of the material damage which is capable of attracting compensation should be extended to cover material damage beyond the private sphere. It would also appear desirable to abolish the franchise deductible in any future legislation on this subject. If product liability is to assume the role assigned to it by the inner sanctum voices referred to earlier, there must be available a sufficiently broad range of loss types capable of compensation, without the victims being compelled, as they are currently required, to claim under a different set of compensation. In addition, a comprehensive exercise in harmonising the rules on compensable loss is highly desirable, in view of the cross-frontier nature of torts involving self-driving motor vehicles on the one hand, and the aims of the EU Product Liability Directive on the other.

The laws governing the right of recovery, which is capable of applying as between the producer claimed against and any jointly liable producers, would also benefit from regulation at the European level. Failing this, there is the danger that producers will relocate to member states whose rules on the right of recovery best serves their interests – an outcome which is also inconsistent with the aims and objectives of the Directive.

Finally, the ten-year expiry period also presents several problems when it comes to the introduction of self-driving motor vehicles. More specifically, this expiry period is difficult to reconcile with the inevitable software updates, or with the fact that self-driving motor vehicles are themselves capable of developing certain practices. Serious consideration should therefore be given to abolishing this expiry period.

It is important to consider these proposed adjustments together, rather than separately. Whereas one particular proposal will result in the balance shifting slightly towards the producer, another will serve to restore the balance. If either of the parties involved in this legal relationship, i.e. the producer or the (potential) victim, acquires the impression that the rules on product liability are too heavily weighted in the interests of the other party, a certain chilling effect will undoubtedly be the result. Given the certainty that self-driving motor vehicles will lead to a more efficient and safer use of our roads, this is an outcome that must be avoided at all cost.

In this contribution, the central issue is the following: “In whose interest should the administrators of a company/estate act”? This question may at first appear to deal with two separate issues, but is conceived by the author as a single inquiry. Companies experiencing financial difficulties and those in good financial health have this in common – they will be administered by a body or person, where appropriate in the form of a trustee. Accordingly, both company law and insolvency law will be faced with the same question. The dichotomy reflected in the question on which this paper is based concerns, in essence, a company’s financial situation. The author accordingly seeks answers in the legal and legal/economic theories that govern both company law and the rules on insolvency.

In Part One (nos. 4-13), the author concludes that the existing legal theories fall short of providing an appropriate and complete answer to the question posed in this paper. The basic principles governing the company interest and the estate interest – both in the broad and relatively narrow sense – currently find themselves in a state of flux. In addition, the courts and legal authors are frequently at odds with each other on this subject.

In Part Two (nos. 14-53), the author actually seeks to solve the conundrum and in so doing consults the existing legal and economic theories relating to business units and insolvency procedures. In his search for an adequate answer, he examines successively the transaction cost theory (nos. 18-19), the contract theory (nos. 20- 21), the property rights theory (nos. 22-25), the agent/principal theory (nos. 26-31), the law & finance literature (nos. 32-37), the team production theory applied to business units (nos. 38-39), the creditors’ bargain theory (nos. 40-44), the broad contract theory (nos. 46-47), the “dirty, complex, elastic and interconnected view of bankruptcy” (nos. 48-49), the team production theory applied to insolvencies (nos. 50-51) and the explicit value approach (nos. 52-53).

In Part Three, the author, on the basis of the contract and property rights theories, combined with valuable insights obtained from other theories, takes a normative approach under which the company/estate should be administered in the interest of the residual economic property rights holders (no. 55). For financially healthy companies, these holders are, in principle, the shareholders (including the creditors as “future shareholders”); in the case of companies experiencing financial difficulties, they are the creditors (including the shareholders as structurally secondary creditors). Thus the company and estate interest acquires a dynamic dimension. For this approach, the author finds authority in a positive economic analysis of the current reforms of Belgian company and insolvency law (no. 56). In so doing, the author concedes that the administration of a company or estate should be monitored by the residual economic property rights holders, unless the expenses incurred by the principal are, in essence, disproportionately high. Here, we are dealing with a cost/ benefit assessment between the increased principal costs and the reduced agent costs.

It is generally accepted that there is a fundamental difference between acquisitive and extinctive prescription, the implication being that the authors of the Napoleonic Civil Code erred by dealing with them under one and the same heading. Recently, the authors Frédéric Zenati-Castaing and Stephanie Fournier have attempted to disable this assumption, maintaining as they do that extinctive prescription is a variant on acquisitive prescription. This enables the debtor to acquire the obligation owed by him through acquisitive prescription – after which the obligation is extinguished through merger of debts. Our contribution examines this challenge to the prevailing assumptions.

In historical terms, it does appear that there has been a tendency to regard extinctive and acquisitive prescription as one and the same concept (absolute monism), as was, for example, the case under the customary law of Paris. However, even at that time this had not prevented a number of authors, such as Pothier, from making a clear distinction between extinctive and acquisitive prescription.

The text of the Napoleonic Civil Code also supports the notion that extinctive and acquisitive prescription amount to the same concept. However, if we take note of the intention displayed by the drafters of the Code, the position becomes much less clear. There are a number of unambiguous statements which establish a difference between extinctive and acquisitive prescription.

A comparative examination of the requirements for, and implications of, extinctive and acquisitive prescription also indicates that there are fundamental differences between both these concepts. Thus possession is only a requirement under acquisitive prescription, as has been confirmed by the Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie), even though what could be described as “negative” possession can also play a relevant – although in most cases limited – part when it comes to the extinctive prescription of certain limited property rights. In terms of the effect of both types of prescription, it is only acquisitive prescription that has acquisition of ownership as its outcome.

Nevertheless, it would appear that both extinctive and acquisitive extinction entail that a right – being a legal situation – is, during a certain amount of time, countered by a factual situation, after which the factual situation becomes consolidated. As a result, both these concepts belong to one and the same legal category (conceptual monism). This is comparable to the relationship between sale and lease – both concepts are fundamentally different, but fall within the scope of agreements; consequently, there are a number of rules which apply to both these concepts.

The conclusion to be derived from the foregoing is that there is indeed a fundamental difference between extinctive and acquisitive prescription. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that they present no similarities, given that the element they have in common is the lapsing of time. Indeed, there are a number of other rules which are common to both these types of prescription.

The principle of majority decision-making in companies creates the risk of the majority shareholders enriching themselves at the company’s expense. The requirement of good faith which governs the performance of contracts goes some way towards mitigating the agency issues that potentially arise from this situation. The exact nature of the conduct which this requirement imposes on the shareholder is qualified by whatever status is attributed to his/her voting rights. On the one hand, these rights could be qualified as functional, as are those enjoyed by the company directors. On these terms, the shareholders are required to act in the interest of the company if they are not to be found guilty of misuse of powers. However, these voting powers could also be regarded as being quasi-discretionary, as is the case with the owners’ powers. If this approach applies, shareholders are not bound to act in the company’s interest, but are merely required to refrain from abusing their right. The distinction between these two conceptions is particularly marked where any conflict of interest arises between the majority shareholders and the company itself. Only where a functional concept of voting right applies does an obligation arise to subordinate the shareholders’ individual interest to that of the company – i.e. that which the author of this paper describes as the “duty of loyalty”.

By analogy with the fiduciary obligations imposed under the common law jurisdictions, various functional powers arise where the ownership of an asset is split by separating title or control from the economic or financial interest. The shareholders entrust control over their contribution to the company organs, whilst all the time retaining its economic or equitable ownership. This entails that the powers held by the general meeting of shareholders are, in principle, functional. This is because the shareholders are merely the beneficiaries of the company’s assets as a group, whereas the decisions are made by shareholder majority. However, the general meeting is unable to act in the company’s interest if its members, who play a part in the decision-making process, do not themselves act in the company’s interest. Accordingly, the shareholders’ voting rights are definitely rights that are functional and must be exercised in the company’s interest.

Where the shareholders refrain from exercising their voting rights in the company’s interest, they are guilty of misuse of powers. The traditional view has been that, in this area, the courts should apply the “highly deferential standard of review” test. This entails that the courts should not assess the decision in question on its suitability or acuity. Any review of a decision as to whether it constitutes misuse of powers can only be based on a procedural test, with the court assessing whether or not the shareholders acted rationally and subjectively in good faith. In essence, this creates a quasi irrebuttable presumption that the decision in question serves the company’s interests. However, such an assumption is untenable where there exists a conflict of interest between the majority shareholder and the company. Where a conflict of interest arises, the court will also need to assess whether the majority shareholder acted loyally, i.e. whether he subordinated his interest to that of the company. The test used by the courts should not be the highly deferential standard of review, because loyalty, just as much as rationality and acting in good faith, is a criterion by which the courts may test the shareholders’ actions, whether fully or not.

Having concluded an agreement, a contracting party may, as a result of a change in circ*mstances, experience difficulties in performing his contractual obligation. Such changes in circ*mstances could take the form of a financial and economic crisis, a fierce storm, or a ban on exports. Force majeure and hardship (which, for the purpose of the contribution, includes the English doctrine of frustration of purpose) are the two doctrines which come to the fore where difficulties of this nature arise which are beyond that party’s control. Both these doctrines are used in order to remedy a situation whereby the party owing the obligation experiences difficulties in performing it because circ*mstances changed after he had concluded the agreement. However, the Belgian substantive law only allows such a party to plead force majeure. In principle, hardship has no place in the Belgian substantive law.

Force majeure and hardship have many common requirements. In each case, it is necessary for an extraordinary change of circ*mstances to have occurred after the conclusion of a contract, on the understanding that this change was not attributable to the party owing. The change in circ*mstances will not be attributable to the party owing if the latter was unable to foresee the change at the moment of concluding the agreement or to avoid the change. In addition, it is required that the party owing had not agreed to assume the risk of the change in circ*mstances.

However, there is one requirement which is deemed to constitute the essential difference between force majeure and hardship – the impossibility requirement which characterises force majeure is said to differ from the serious impediment requirement on which hardship is based. The party owing may only plead force majeure where he can demonstrate that it is impossible for him to perform the obligation. The established view is that it is insufficient for the party owing to have experienced serious difficulties in performing his obligation – in such cases no specific remedy would be available to that party under the ordinary law, given that, in principle, hardship has no place in the current Belgian law.

In this contribution, the author examines this one requirement which is said to represent the essential difference between force majeure and hardship. A key question that arises under this essential point of difference is whether the situation of the party for whom the change in circ*mstances has made it impossible to perform his obligation is truly different from that of a party who experiences serious difficulty in performing his obligation as a result of a change in circ*mstances.

As regards force majeure, an extensive analysis of the Belgian case law on force majeure, coupled with a brief survey of the French, German and English approach towards this question, shows that it is deemed impossible for a party to perform his obligation where it is clearly unreasonable to require him to perform it subject to this change in circ*mstances. The party owing cannot therefore be bound to make a clearly greater effort to perform his obligation than the effort which is expected of a normally diligent person experiencing the same concrete circ*mstances.

Under the doctrine of hardship, there is a turning point as from which performing the obligation becomes not merely difficult, but seriously difficult for the party owing. From a comparative study of this question, it emerges that bona fides (good faith) is a suitable criterion for determining the stage at which this turning point has been reached. Therefore, the party owing will be deemed to experience serious difficulties in performing his obligation where the other contracting party would clearly be acting unreasonably by requiring the party owing to perform his obligation subject to this change in circ*mstances. The party owing is accordingly deemed to experience serious difficulty in performing his obligation where he is required to make a clearly greater effort to perform his obligation than the effort which is expected of a normally diligent person experiencing the same concrete circ*mstances.

Consequently, the author can conclude that the essential difference between force majeure and hardship has no basis in reality. The situation of the party owing for whom it is impossible to perform his obligations is not actually any different from that of the party owing who experiences serious difficulty in performing his obligation. Therefore, the party owing will be able to plead force majeure where he is required to make a clearly greater effort to perform his obligation than the effort which is expected of a normally diligent person experiencing the same concrete circ*mstances. This criterion applies equally to the three types of impossibility (material, legal or moral impossibility) and to the situations which have traditionally been reserved for hardship (including the frustration of purpose doctrine). This criterion will also come into play where the party owing is faced with a serious distortion in the relative values of the mutual obligations as agreed between the contracting parties when concluding the agreement, and where the party owing no longer can fulfil the objective he sought to achieve with the agreement and which the other contracting party has in a certain sense made his own.

The general conclusion necessarily to be drawn from the foregoing is that force majeure and hardship apply to the same situations. Where there is no difference in the requirements to be fulfilled, both doctrines will apply to the same situations. Accordingly, those situations which have traditionally been reserved for the doctrine of hardship can also be brought within the scope of force majeure. From this contribution, the concrete conclusion arises that Belgian law does not need the notion of hardship as distinct from force majeure.

It is possible to assess the Belgian law on court-ordered restructuring, as laid down in the 2009 Law on Business Continuity and in Part XX of the Business Law Code (Wet Continuiteit Ondernemingen – WCO), from a historical viewpoint. Many of the relevant rules continue to be conditioned by the historical link with bankruptcy and suspension of payments, as a favour bestowed on the unfortunate debtor. That much is clear from the limited involvement of the creditors in the procedure for court-ordered restructuring.

In the course of the 19th century, provision was made for short-term postponements of payments. Initially, this was a favour conferred by the public authorities – over which the creditors had no control. The rationale behind it was that the suspension of payments was largely a monolithic concept, which meant that there was no need for any debate on the substance of this measure. Another factor was the narrow, business-oriented interpretation of this concept. As from 1851, suspension of payments (sursis de paiement) became dependent on approval by the majority of creditors representing 75 per cent of the total volume of debts owing. Thus, the suspension of payments became more closely associated with bankruptcy. However, even after business restructuring not associated with bankruptcy was made possible in 1883 – in the shape of composition (concordat préventif) – the right to initiate and determine the contents of the agreement reached remained with the debtor. Admittedly, the creditors had the right to consult each other on the proposed agreement, and provision was made for some mediation by the delegated judge. However, these measures, which represented a recognition, to a certain degree, of the unique nature of the restructuring procedure, disappeared in 1946. In 1997, they were partially reintegrated in the Law on Composition (Wet Gerechtelijk Akkoord – WGA); however, the 2009 Business Law Code opted for a strict “open portal” approach and repealed them once again. Here, a distrustful attitude towards any creditor-led procedure combined with the lingering implicit notion, referred to above, of the need for temporary protection for the debtor – however undifferentiated this may be. Since then, the debtor has enjoyed a virtually exclusive right to initiate and determine the terms of the restructuring programme, which can merely be approved or rejected. All this is inconsistent with the intrinsic nature of the law relating to restructuring, which is based on the principle of co-operation as well as an assumption of a thorough assessment of the interests of all the parties involved, with a view to enabling the business that finds itself in difficulties to survive.

In addition, the limited degree to which the restructuring plans are subject to assessment is a consequence of the notion, mentioned above, of a restructuring programme subject to little differentiation and of a narrow, business-oriented approach. There is also the historical link with the rules on bankruptcy, over which the commercial courts had little control. On this issue, the Belgian law relating to business restructuring as it applied during the 19th, 20th and 21st century was very much based on the bankruptcy law model. Admittedly the 1997 WGA made provision for a business-oriented analysis, by the courts, of the relevant application and restructuring plan. This measure was, again, excluded from the WCO. Even though the laws regarding restructuring are currently regarded as the exception, rather than the rules, to the ordinary rules on this subject in the applicable private and procedural law, this is the reason for the subsistence of the statutory restrictions which are a historical legacy of the law on bankruptcies. However, some business-oriented oversight of the contents of restructuring plans remains necessary in order to meet the objectives of the rules governing the restructuring procedure, which is to enable the revival of the business in question.

In 1921, the Brussels lawyer Georges Marcotty wrote: “Fatalement, la guerre engendre de multiples conflits dans tous les domaines du droit, procès en matière de successions, procès en matière d’absence, d’état civil, d’assurances, de marchés de fourniture, d’exécution de contrats de tous genres” (Inevitably, war will bring about many developments in all areas of the law – especially in the procedural rules affecting succession, proceedings in absentia, the civil registration authority, insurance, public procurement, and the performance of all types of contract). The First World War had a distinct effect on the Belgian private law, which had experienced but few radical changes since the country’s independence in 1830.

In the field of legal history, the commemoration of World War I has revived interest in the question of Belgium’s neutrality, and recent years have witnessed the publi- cation of detailed studies on the penalisation of Flemish “activism” (i.e. ideological connivance with the German occupier), martial courts, and other related issues of criminal law. Unlike the situation in Belgium’s neighbours, the private law implications of World War I received but minimal attention in this country. This general overview seeks to provide any researchers in this area with some possible avenues to explore in this field, and to provide them with a starting point.

The main theme of this contribution concerns the various measures taken by both the Belgian authorities and the occupying forces, and their implications for our private law, both during and after the War. To put it briefly – how did World War I affect the Belgian private law?

In 1920, the Journal des Tribunaux shed some light on this subject in an anon- ymous contribution entitled “Justice ou Liberté?”. In so doing, the author was making a fervent case for tenancy laws which were more “equitable” – i.e. fairer in social terms. Did this notion of social fairness express itself in other proposals in the Belgian private law? For an answer to this question, the author refers to the legislation which can be found in the laws as published in their official organs (i.e., for Belgium, the Belgisch Staatsblad, for the German occupiers, the Verordnungs- blätter). These sources are supplemented by information derived from the parlia- mentary proceedings and the legal literature of the day. This contribution taking the form of an overview, the legislation in question has not been assessed against its application. However, the author firmly concludes that World War I released the private law from the freedom principle and broke, once and for all, with the notion of the “watchman state”.

Following an overview of the legal patchwork that Belgian law undoubtedly was during the Occupation – given that three legal systems governed Belgian territo- ry at that time – this contribution focuses on the organisational and procedural changes brought about by the Occupation. Both the German and the Belgian au- thorities issued rules which were aimed at enabling the law to take its course as far as possible. The author deals successively with the laws governing damages, the general law of contracts, the law of landlord and tenant, family law, property law and – albeit briefly – company law. Each section specifies the subject areas which could give rise to a new and in-depth inquiry capable of further investigation.

World War I was much less a watershed than a turning point in the Belgian pri- vate law. Such changes as were implemented were implemented following this world conflict, such as the rule allowing single-judge proceedings, had already featured on the political agenda for some considerable time. Moreover, the public intervention which has occurred since the start of the 20th century ruptured the strict summa divisio between the public and the private law. The law increasingly protected both the general interest and the mutual interest of its citizens. Freedom gave way to solidarity, and the “nightwatchman state” which prevailed during the 19th century disappeared with the Armistice.

In order to avoid being trapped between the Central Powers and the allied armies, the Kingdom of The Netherlands adhered strictly to its neutral stance during World War 1. Although this enabled this country to exempt itself from the battlefield, the War definitely left its mark on its social and economic relations. This paper essentially deals with the direct and indirect impact produced by the Great War on the Dutch law of contracts.

The first direct consequence was felt almost immediately following the events of 28 July 1914. The legal framework for these direct consequences, such as the crip- pling of trade, financial transactions and food supplies, proved to be unequal to the situation. The result took the form of rapid interventions in the free market on the part of the authorities, which meant suspending stockmarket activity and extensive regulation of banking and currency activity.

Another aspect of the Great War which had important implications for the law of contracts concerned a public limited liability company called NV Nederlandse Overzee Trustmaatschappij (NOT). In September 1914, a major network of con- tractual obligations was set up which was nurtured by NOT. The latter developed a network of contracts aimed at underpinning the Dutch Government’s neutrality in its trading policy. Allowing a private corporation to take the lead in regulating import and export trading activity gave rise to some astute arrangements between the English Admiralty and the German Empire – given that the economy of the Netherlands was dependent on both. The system of “consents” which NOT ap- plied to imports and exports was a trading system which was based entirely on self-regulation, and therefore on the law of contracts and which was capable of distinguishing between qualified smuggling and the free exchange of goods. Later during the War the part played by the law of contracts became redundant, and the business of importing and exporting became increasingly problematic.

Another element which played a part in this matter was the question of “force majeure”. Because of the rapidly rising prices of goods and of their conveyance, the notion of “force majeure” in the law of contracts came under increasing pres- sure. Since the introduction of the Civil Code in 1838, no international conflict as disruptive as WW1 proved to be had arisen. So to a certain extent World War 1 served as a “stress test” for the continuity of the essential principles of the law of contracts, such as force majeure and frustration. It would appear that, during the early stages of the War, no attempt was made at finding an accommodation with pressured debtors – pleas of force majeure were seldom acknowledged. Nor did the legal authors of that time display much sympathy towards debtors who were faced with increasing cost prices. The narrative that prevailed was that they resorted to force majeure in order to be released from their obligations and subsequently to conclude agreements on much more favourable terms. Their pleas were met with little sympathy. However, as the War continued to rage, some changes were made. It is true that debtors who entered into obligations in the full knowledge that they were doing so in wartime conditions were frequently held to risk acceptance. Nev-ertheless, some lower courts were prepared to issue rulings which were prepared to make concessions to unexpected circ*mstances. These cautious developments encouraged two lines of argument, i.e. (1) the debate as to whether force majeure accommodated both objective and subjective impossibility (i.e both impossibilitas and difficultas), and (2) whether unforeseen circ*mstances could give rise to re- scission or adjustment of the contract in question. During, and immediately after, the Great War neither of these lines of argument were settled by the courts, but did feature in the legal literature at that time. The Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) remained quite reticent on this issue – in 1926 it ruled that a display of bona fides was unable to detract from a contractual obligation once undertaken, even in the light of the fundamental change in values which followed the War. In 1931, the Supreme Court continued this strict approach with the “Mark is Mark” decision, in which it held that, in relation to debts expressed in money, the nominality principle could not be set aside, not even in times of hyper-inflation. However, a number of legal authors took issue with this approach, and the lower courts frequently ploughed their own furrow. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to regard World War 1 as one of the factors which explain the eventual introduction of the “unforeseen circ*mstances” doctrine, and the subsequent advance made by the bona fides principle. At the same time, the decisions made by the Supreme Court at the time could to a certain extent be regarded as an expression of The Netherlands’ policy of neutrality.

An analysis of the events and developments of the day indicates that such dogmas as the freedom to contract and the free market died once and for all during the Great War, even in a neutral country such as The Netherlands. It is certainly the case that, in the longer term, when it looked as if the War was going to rage for much longer than many had expected, the compulsory distribution of goods and services, and the extensive intervention in contracts and market regulation to which it gave rise became a matter of necessity. Accordingly, World War 1 can justly be regarded as the definitive end of the laissez-faire principle in the law of contracts.

Since 2007, Belgian law includes legislation enabling transsexuals to change their sex registered in the Civil Status Registry (CSR), before the relevant CSR official. Until 1/1/2018, this was only possible under strict medical conditions, which included evidence of sterilisation. The Law of 25/6/2017 has vastly improved the legal position of transgender persons. The Belgian Government considered that its obligations under international human rights law impelled it to introduce a system based on the principle of self-determination. The Law of 18/6/2018 modernised and digitalised the CSR, as a result of which the specific civil certificates changing registered sex, renewing a change of registered sex, and annulling a change of registered sex are no longer drafted on paper and kept in traditional files, but are drawn up and kept in an electronic databank.

In Belgium, legal gender recognition is effected by means of a procedure that takes place before the CSR official and is conducted over two stages, including a compulsory waiting period. The interested party shall, in the first instance, make a submission in writing that, for some considerable time, they have been convinced that the sex registered in their birth certificate no longer conforms to their lived gender identity, and that they desire the legal consequences of a change of their registered sex. During the applicant’s first appearance in person, the relevant CSR official draws their attention to the irrevocable nature, in principle, of such change, gives them an information brochure, and provides them with details of transgender organisations. The Public Prosecutor’s Office may issue a negative opinion regarding the desired change of registered sex as being contrary to public order – which will be based almost exclusively on fraud (including identity fraud). Where the Public Prosecutor’s Office issues such a negative opinion, the CSR official must refuse to effect the relevant change of registered sex. In order to reduce injudicious applications, there is a compulsory waiting period, from three to six months, between the applicant’s first and second appearances, during which the latter must submit a written statement affirming their initial intention and proving their awareness of the consequences thereof. Only once this has been completed the change of registered sex may be formally adjusted.

Where the CSR official refuses to effect the change, the applicant may appeal to the Family Court. When it comes to minors, the applicant must be aged 16 or over and requires confirmation by a child-and-youth psychiatrist that the minor in question has sufficient powers of discernment for their continued conviction that their sex registered at birth does not conform to their lived gender identity. In so doing, the minor must be assisted by both parents or a legal representative. Where such parents or legal representative refuse to provide the required assistance, the minor in question may request authorisation from the Family Court to make the relevant application, assisted by an ad-hoc guardian.

Where the application is contrary to public order, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is obliged to apply for annulment of the change in question.

In principle, any change of registered sex is irrevocable. However, the relevant legislation makes it possible to ‘return’ to the sex registered at birth via a procedure conducted before the Family Court, on production of evidence of exceptional circ*mstances, which, in light of the preparatory Parliamentary proceedings and the information brochure, are open to the widest possible interpretation. Any change in the transgender applicant’s first name(s) is also effected by the CSR official by means of a statement made in good faith which is attached to the application, no medical conditions being required. Transgender persons have the right to amend their first names in return for a concessionary fee, amounting to a maximum of 10 per cent of the municipal charge which may, but is not compulsory, be levied. Minors may apply for a first-name change from the age of 12 onwards.

Belgian law has specific rules governing the filiation of transgender persons. Transmen who bear children become mothers. The filiation of transwomen who, by natural childbirth or medical intervention, have created children is determined by applying the rules governing paternity by analogy, but on condition that the transwoman in question is mentioned as co-mother. In all other cases it is the new gender that shall be determinative.

Belgian law also makes provision for specific rules which protect transgender privacy, by restricting the category of persons having the right to obtain copies of the relevant entries, and by restricted access to certificate changing registered sex through the electronic database of the CSR.

In spite of all these progressive changes, the Belgian Constitutional Court has annulled a number of sections of the Law of 25/6/2017, following a request by three LGBT interest groups. This was effected by its judgment of 19/6/2019, at a time when the contents of the annulled provisions had already been incorporated into other Articles – as yet unchallenged – of the Civil Code (CC). The basic provision, which is the former Article 62bis CC (now Article 135(1) thereof) has been annulled in that this provision contains a lacuna, to the extent that it makes it impossible for persons having a non-binary identity to change their registered sex in light of their actual gender identity. The Court also annulled (a) the irrevocable nature – in principle – of the change of registered sex, (b) the judicial “return procedure” before the Family Court, and (c) the rule that first-name change subject to a concessionary fee and motivated by gender incongruence, may only be granted once.

Out of respect for the fundamental rights of gender fluid persons, the author advocates that not only the annulled contents of the relevant Civil Code provisions be deleted, but also that measures be adopted which go further than such amending legislation – in that it adds one or more gender categories to the binary categories currently in existence, both for the purposes of gender registration at birth and in the context of any subsequent change. This should be followed by the final step – the removal of any sex or gender identity from one’s personal civil status.

Intellectual property rights have the particular characteristic that they are non-rivalrous items of property, which means that they are capable of being used simultaneously in the same manner by more than one person. Thus many persons can read or print the same book, several firms are capable of using the same brand name, more than one entrepreneur can apply the same industrial process. This particular characteristic has prompted many legal authors and courts to conclude that acquisitive prescription of intellectual property rights is impossible to achieve, more particularly because any such prescription would at all times be ambiguous. This paper seeks to establish whether in fact this supposition is correct, as it could give rise to doubt.

This starting point makes it possible to examine how the non-rivalrous nature of goods could influence the law of property. This is because the latter is based on the assumption that goods are, in principle, rivalrous – in that all material goods, and many non-material ones, are rivalrous. As a result, acquisitive prescription appears to be a highly suitable vehicle for this characteristic, based as it is, to a large extent, on a factual situation, i.e. possession, which is perfectly capable of adjustment (more particularly in the shape of dual possession, under which two equal rights can apply at the same time) and not being dependent on such instruments as public records which could be capable of diminishing the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property rights.

It would seem that, in principle, there is nothing to prevent acquisitive prescription from applying here. The current law does not prohibit acquisitive prescription of intellectual property rights – except in relation to immaterial rights, which, however, have no impact on property rights. Non-material property is capable of possession. Moreover, the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property rights has an impact only where there is a case of dual possession, which can only apply where there is more than one possessor. Accordingly, the argument that the possession of intellectual property rights is an ambiguous proposition has no validity whatsoever.

The non-rivalrous nature of intellectual property rights is not by itself insurmountable either. It would appear that, in several respects, the law has taken this into account and provides ways of weakening the exclusive nature of intellectual property rights. It therefore requires no leap of the imagination for the same considerations to apply in relation to acquisitive prescription where there is dual possession and, therefore, two parties are in possession of the same intellectual property rights – without them being joint owners or possessors.

The finding that property law has many gaps which can be rectified by means of the law of contracts forms the basis of this article. This is illustrated by means of several issues concerning real obligations, or obligations related to property rights, such as the maintenance of property subject to an easem*nt and the periodic payments owed by the holder of a building right.

The first part of this article analyses several deficiencies in the law of property which are rarely debated in Belgian legal circles, but in respect of which Dutch law is at a more developed stage. The regulation of property rights is discussed, in particular the question if and to what extent rights, obligations and powers agreed upon by parties which create a right relating to a property come within the scope of the law of property and thus become part of the relevant property rights. In addition, the legal effects of the transfer and forfeiture of a property right are not adequately regulated by legislation. It is, for instance, unclear if and to what extent the transferor of a property right remains liable for the obligations connected to the property right after the transfer has been effected. Dutch legislation contains statutory provisions for specific property rights and the Belgian Reform of Property Law introduces provisions aimed at determining the effects of both the transfer and forfeiture of a property right.

The second part of the article concerns the question of how parties creating or transferring a property right can as effectively and comprehensively as possible regulate their legal position, bearing in mind the deficiencies mention above. Even where statutory regulation applies, the parties may wish to depart from it, in which case the permissive or mandatory nature of the statutory regulation must be checked. This article demonstrates that the parties have many opportunities to regulate property law by means of one or more contracts. In some cases, this contractual regulation can even confer quasi-proprietary status on merely personal provisions, such as a perpetual clause and a restriction of the power to dispose of the property and/or property right.

Belgium’s law of obligations is based on the principle of contractual freedom. This principle guarantees the freedom on the part of the parties to determine the terms of their agreements themselves. The traditional justification for this principle has been that each party is placed on an equal footing and is therefore capable of protecting its own interests. However, where one of the parties to an agreement appears to be in a weaker bargaining position than the other, corrections are desirable. In such cases, legislation can be adopted that seeks to create a level playing field for all parties – more particularly by means of rules which protect the contracting parties against boilerplate terms and conditions. For the first time in Belgium, the Act of 4/4/2019 has laid down rules aimed at protecting businesses against unfair contractual terms in business-to-business (B2B) transactions. These new rules complement existing legislation on unfair terms in business-to-consumer (B2C) agreements, but depart from its substance. The lawmaker has justified the extension of B2C protection rules to B2B situations, arguing that unequal bargaining positions also arise where the parties act as part of their professional activity, so that they too require protection. This paper examines the areas in which the new B2B legislation is capable of restricting freedom of action, and to what extent the additional protection provided undermines legal certainty. In so doing, the authors examine the legislation’s rationales, and analytically compare Belgian law to the law in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy.

The first striking aspect of the new Belgian legislation, is that its potential for restricting freedom of action is greater than is the case in the neighbouring countries. This results from the broader scope, in personal and material terms, of the Belgian rules, as they cover virtually every type of contractual term, be it individually negotiated or not (except for key terms to the extent that they are clear and comprehensible), in all types of agreement (excluding financial service agreements) and between all categories of businesses – big or small.

In particular, the promulgation of a “grey list” of terms and conditions that are rebuttably deemed to be unlawful, may well lead to a far-reaching restriction of the parties’ freedom to determine the terms of their agreement. That list covers a number of contractual terms which frequently arise in practice, including disclaimer clauses and clauses on unilateral changes. Moreover, the list also includes two provisions construed so broadly that they essentially introduce additional fairness tests with general scopes of applications. One of these two provisions targets clauses that “inappropriately restrict” the rights of the other party in the event of contractual default. The other targets clauses by which a party “transfers an economic risk” without consideration. Neither of these grey-list restrictions apply as such to B2B agreements in the analysed foreign legal orders.

The introduction of the grey list will leave businesses with difficult strategic choices. Either they opt for legal certainty and refrain from using clauses that may correspond to one of the provisions in the grey list, or they do not refrain from doing so. In the latter case, they risk that courts will subsequently rule that these clauses are void, in lack of sound arguments to rebut the presumed unfairness. Pending the first relevant court decisions relating to this legislation, businesses’ choices will determine the actual scale of impact the new legislation will have on private parties’ freedom of action. More businesses opting for legal certainty, will mean a more significant impact. If, by contrast, businesses are prepared to take the risk, the resulting impact will be rather limited in the short term. In any case, businesses will inevitably always run the risk that their terms, other than key clauses, are found unlawful because they create a significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and obligations.

In the longer term, the judiciary’s approach will be decisive for the impact that these rules will have on private parties’ freedom of action. This is true for the impact of both the grey list as the general prohibition on unfair terms. During the parliamentary stages leading to this new piece of legislation, the drafters frequently stressed that the new B2B Act was not intended to undermine the principle of contractual freedom (intended term: freedom of action). However, any legislation regulating unfair terms will as such restrict the freedom to determine the terms of agreements. Hence, probably the repeated reference to the principle of contractual freedom is to be read as a plea for courts to exercise restraint when applying the new B2B rules. Yet, it remains to be seen whether courts will indeed look for guidance in the travaux préparatoires when interpreting the new legislation. Such an approach is definitely not to be expected in instances where the actual wording of the B2B Act is not reflecting the statements made during the parliamentary stages, which is often the case.

Legal uncertainty is not the only potential consequence the new B2B Act will produce. Indeed, the new act also leaves a lot of questions unanswered with regard to the private-law remedies to unfair terms. Thus, businesses will face an additional issue when they face the aforementioned choice between legal certainty and freedom of action: they will be unable to assess the probable impact when a court upholds the unfairness of one of their terms. If, on the one hand, courts have the power to limit or convert unfair terms so that they are no longer unfair, finding clauses unfair will have relatively limited consequences. Yet if courts, by contrast, may not limit or adapt terms, then they will be compelled to declare all unfair terms null and void. In the latter scenario, the private-law remedy will have a considerably greater impact for a lot of types of contractual terms. In short, if the new B2B Act’s remedy allows courts to limit or convert unfair terms into legitimate clauses, then businesses will probably be more inclined to take the risk of using “edgy” clauses. Hence, if courts have the power to limit and convert terms, the result will probably be more legal certainty and less erosion of the contractual freedom of action.

Save if the new B2B Act is modified or if courts adopt an extremely restrained approach when the legislation enters into effect, the new B2B legislation will cause a great deal of legal uncertainty and will significantly undermine private parties’ freedom of action. What is more, the scope of the new rules is construed so broadly that, in the end, the common law of contracts will no longer fully apply to agreements between businesses. This is highly remarkable, as B2B agreements make out the largest share of agreements concluded on a daily basis. All of this means that the mandatory rules in the Economic Law Code will largely replace a number of fundamental rules laid down in the 1804 Civil Code and in the proposals for a New Civil Code. None of the examined foreign legal order go as far the Belgian legislator in their search for protection of weak contracting parties. Hence, it is very doubtful whether the aim of protecting businesses in weaker bargaining positions, i.e. new B2B Act’s rationale, can indeed justify the Act’s consequences.

In principle, when bankruptcy proceedings are opened, this does not in any way affect any executory contracts to which the bankrupt in question is a party. Executory contracts can be defined as those (a) which have yet to be completed in their entirety, both by the bankrupt and by any other party to the agreement at the time when the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, and (b) under which the bankrupt in question is obliged to meet his/her obligations in order to be able to claim performance of such obligations as have yet to be performed by the other contracting party. The usefulness of this definition, however, only comes into its own when the Bankruptcy Trustee assumes the obligations under this agreement. Where this is not the case, it is of no relevance whether the agreement in question remains executory. This is because the Bankrupty Trustee will need to reach a decision in relation to all the obligations which had yet to be performed in their entirety by the bankrupt. It is in this respect that it is preferable, from the point of view of precision, to use the term “existing obligations” rather than “executory contracts”.

First of all, the Bankruptcy Trustee may prefer to assume the executory contract, as a result of which the obligations resulting from it will be regarded as administrative expenses. However, any decision by the Bankruptcy Trustee to assume the executory contract will not invariably be one that achieves effective results. Any individual creditor will be able to seek termination of an executory contract based on the debtor’s failure to perform prior to the opening of the bankruptcy proceedings. In this respect, those upholding both the Belgian and American law on this subject steadfastly adhere to the ordinary laws of property and contract. However, under the laws of France, the Netherlands and Germany, any decision made by the Bankruptcy Trustee will, to a certain extent, be protected against the individual creditor’s right of termination. On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Trustee may decide to reject an executory contract. Any such decision is incapable of producing consequences other than defective performance on the bankrupt’s part before bankruptcy proceedings are commenced. In this respect, the law on bankruptcy does not depart from the ordinary laws of property and contract. However, bankruptcy proceedings will increase the risk that such failure of performance will occur because the individual creditor has no right to claim performance in kind from the Bankruptcy Trustee.

The Bankruptcy Trustee’s power to assume or reject is restricted in two ways. First of all, any opening of bankruptcy proceedings results in the termination of any agreements entered into on a personal basis in relation to the bankrupt. The author is of the view that the way in which this rule is formulated is too broad. It finds no support even from a comparative perspective. The only exception to this objection could be in relation to those agreements based on personal considerations in the strict sense of the term, i.e. those that make it impossible for the receiver to render the bankrupt’s obligations incapable of performance. Secondly, agreements concluded between individual creditors and bankrupts may contain a clause which determines that the agreement in question shall terminate at the time at which bankruptcy proceedings are commenced. Such clauses are lawful and enforceable under Belgian law. However, when we consider this issue comparatively we discover a tendency towards prohibiting such termination clauses.

Two decisions by the Belgian Supreme Court, made in 2004 and 2008, have slightly extended the range of options available to the Bankruptcy Trustee. The latter now has the right to terminate the relevant agreement where it is necessary to do so for the purpose of liquidating the bankruptcy estate. This right of termination has now been incorporated in Article XX.139(1) of the BLC. This gives the Bankruptcy Trustee the option to (1) frustrate such obligations as are immune to a non-performance order, (2) free an asset from any personal rights which are capable of being raised against the estate in question, and (3) enhance the financial position of the bankruptcy estate. This unilateral right to terminate is an application of the paritas creditorum principle. It also – just as is the case with the provisions with respect to transaction avoidance – extends the recovery rights at the disposal of the joint creditors. In comparative terms, this kind of solution can only be found in the relevant French law. Under the other legal systems examined, the Bankruptcy Trustee has no rights of termination that depart from the ordinary rules relating to bankruptcy. Under German law, however, the Bankruptcy Trustee may achieve this outcome by deciding to reject the bankrupt party’s existing obligations. There are also US court decisions which support this theory. However, many American authors deny the Bankruptcy Trustee the right to terminate obligations unilaterally – and the Supreme Court has applied this doctrine. The Dutch law on this subject not only lacks such unilateral termination rights, but, in addition, restricts the effectiveness of any decision to reject in relation to passive obligations.

Servitisation – the process whereby value is created by added services to products – is currently very much in the ascendant. Various product-service-systems (PSS) have entered the marketplace, not only in the B2B area but also increasingly in the B2C field. This paper examines whether Belgian law provides the consumer with adequate protection against servitisation and PSS agreements.

In the introduction, the authors examine the three essential types of PSS agreements – those that are product-oriented, use-oriented and result-oriented – and seek economic, legal and policy-based explanations for the breakthrough achieved by servitisation and PSS agreements. These new business models definitely provide opportunities for businesses and customers, even though they present a number of obstacles in terms of behavioural economics. Servitisation and PSS agreements can also be seen as part of a transition towards a more circular economy. However, servitisation and PSS agreements are not by themselves more environmentally friendly than the traditional model based on the single sale of products.

An analysis of the current Belgian legislative framework for the three different types of PSS agreements – product-oriented, use-oriented and result-oriented – constitutes the core of this paper. Both the contractual aspect and the application of the general rules of obligations and consumer law are dealt with. The thread running through this paper is that, under PSS agreements, the consumer enjoys less protection than is the case under a traditional contract of sale on the basis of which he becomes the owner of the item sold.

The Belgian law of contracts provides a considerably lower level of protection in the case of services (hire and contracting for work) when compared with the protection enjoyed under consumer contracts. Thus servitisation in its sharpest form creates a more favourable legal context for the PSS supplier, one in which the relevant law one in which the relevant law is almost entirely of an auxiliary and non-binding nature. Accordingly, the role played by the ordinary rules of consumer law as a counterweight becomes all the more important.

When PSS contracts are entered into, the consumer is, at least in theory, protected by the many existing information requirements which result from the ordinary rules of consumer law. However, the high degree of complexity presented by price setting mechanisms, as well as the considerable degree of variation that exists between the various rights and obligations of the consumer in such agreements, make it difficult to provide the consumer with adequate information in the absence of a uniform and mandatory set of rules. Also, in many cases the “green” nature of PSS agreements is not communicated effectively. Consumer credit law appears to provide little by way of protection when it comes to PSS contracts.

Once a PSS agreement has been entered into, consumer protection comes mainly from the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and its implementing legislation. However, this remains essentially a negative protection mechanism, which prohibits and renders void unfairly weighted terms and conditions, but fails to guarantee minimum levels of rights and remedies for the benefit of the PSS consumer.

When examining the rules governing use under use and result-oriented PSS agreements on the basis of additional contractual rules on hire and contracting for work, we learn that the consumer finds himself in a much less solid position than would be the case if he buys the product and thus becomes its owner.

This paper also examines a number of aspects which relate to the law of property as well as the rules relating to security rights and to the right to suspend performance. In the case of product-oriented PSS agreements, the consumer finds himself in the traditional and strong legal position as owner and holder of the product. However, the supplier will be able to strengthen his position by the insertion of a retention of title clause. Possessory liens could also act as a corrective factor of which only the supplier is capable of availing himself. Both parties could rely on a plea of non-performance. On the other hand, under use-oriented and result-oriented PSS contracts the consumer enjoys but a weak fundamental position as a retainer who does not enjoy the advantages of possession protection or acquisitive prescription. As matters stand at present, these agreements also lack any minimal level of social protection benefiting the consumer who, using this type of agreement, will purchase a considerable quantity of goods which could be crucial to his daily existence and which can be reclaimed by the supplier on termination. However, awarding a right of use without transfer of ownership also creates risks for the supplier, because he loses physical control over his property. Both the plea of non-performance and the right to possessory lien will, for this type of servitisation model, be to the consumer’s advantage. Much appears to depend on the actual type of PSS agreement and on its possible terms and conditions, which once again emphasises the importance of the general rules of consumer law.

An examination of the differences between contracts of sale and contracts for services, in terms of conformity and quality, confirms the lower level of consumer protection which prevails here. There is as yet no uniform and mandatory set of minimal rights relating to services and remedies where PSS suppliers fail to meet their obligations. It is true that the restricted Belgian rules on hire and contracting for work give us some points of reference in addition to the general law of obligations, but provides but little protection and is, moreover, not invariably adjusted to take account of PSS agreements.

This paper concludes with an overview of various possible solutions, including standardising services, standard agreements and new auxiliary or mandatory rules of contract law for PSS agreements.

It appears that the current state of the private law, including consumer law, has been built around ownership and contracts of sale. This paper further demonstrates that, in many respects, the consumer’s position under B2C PSS agreements is weaker than is the case for consumer sales agreements. However, this paper also shows that there are several possible ways of responding to these consequences of servitisation. Regarding the most desirable way of achieving this, and on the question whether this should be done at the national or at the European level, there will be differences of opinion. This is why the most compelling issue to arise here is that a start should be made with serious reflection and debate on this issue.

Servitisation is the trend whereby traders are increasingly offering services in addition to, or instead of, products. In recent years, the various consumer markets have witnessed a clear increase in such services – for example, with cycling-exchange firms such as the Dutch, and in the field of home accessories such as washing and coffee machines. This consultation paper examines the question as to what servitisation means in terms of protecting the consumer in his/her contractual relations with service providers. Here, the emphasis is on traditional consumer contracts, i.e. agreements where the offeror acts on behalf of a business or profession, whereas the buyer (i.e. the consumer) does not act in this capacity. In addition, the author examines the protection enjoyed by consumers in relation to a number of issues – more particularly in the law of contracts and torts – where they conclude services contracts with other private parties via an online platform.

The author concludes that there are certain aspects of consumer protection which will continue to suffer inadequate guarantees if the trend towards the provision of services and away from purchasing is to continue. Thus, for example, the transparency of contractual terms and conditions is, in the case of servitisation, frequently less satisfactory than is the case under contracts of sale because, inter alia, services contracts are much more diversified. In addition, this sector is not covered by objective quality standards as is the case with contracts of sale, and is subject to considerable uncertainty as regards the availability of remedies. More generally, it has been noted that servitisation is capable of increasing social inequalities. Whereas articulate, well-informed and wealthy consumers are able to enjoy the benefits of servitisation, including those offered by the online economy, this trend could make the economic position of the less wealthy and more vulnerable consumers even weaker. These conclusions call for a reappraisal of consumer protection as it is regulated under the current rules of private law.

In the civilian tradition reference is at times made to fairness or equity in determining whether a person who has been enriched at the expense of another should be obliged to return the enrichment. The aim here is to examine the relationship between the concepts of enrichment and fairness more closely. The focus is especially on the South African law of unjustified enrichment, which essentially consists of a variety of uncodified civil-law actions aimed at returning enrichment. To aid an understanding of the role of fairness in awarding these actions, historical and comparative perspectives are adopted, which hopefully may be of interest to a broader private-law audience.

The choice of topic is partly motivated by recent debates on the foundations of unjustified enrichment as a source of duties of restitution and on the role that fairness play could in this context. South African law has not traditionally paid much attention to these questions, but it has been argued more recently that fairness deserves greater recognition in our law of unjustified enrichment. The role of fairness in awarding restitution is also relevant in the context of other legal systems, because uncertainty about this role could possibly support arguments that the notion of unjustified or unjust enrichment is too vague to warrant recognition as an independent branch of law or source of obligations. Finally, in some systems, such as Dutch law, significant concern exists that courts sometimes treat a general enrichment action as an equitable action and that they do not properly limit its field of application.

Unfortunately, the basis for and consequences of views on the role of fairness in imposing duties of restitution, especially in the context of the law of unjustified enrichment, are often not articulated clearly. Fairness has indeed often featured in the civilian tradition when awarding remedies which are aimed at restitution and in some systems are brought home under enrichment law. The argument here is that if this practice is viewed more closely, it becomes apparent that references to fairness only fulfil a limited number of functions.

First, fairness was never the basis for a general judicial discretion to order restitution according to the facts of the case. Such a drastic discretion may be warranted in other areas of the law in exceptional cases where awarding a remedy is so complex and unpredictable that it is not susceptible to regulation by way of specific rules. However, this justification does not apply to the modern South African law of unjustified enrichment, which contains detailed provisions on the giving up of gains. At best, there are specific exceptional cases where courts enjoy a limited discretion to award restitution, for example when transfers made in fulfilment of illegal agreements are reclaimed, or where enrichment is imposed on another. But such limited, defined discretions are found across the legal system.

Secondly, fairness traditionally fulfils the function of catalyst for the development of new rules. However, while references to the demands of fairness may historically have been useful to promote legal development, they are of secondary importance in modern South African law. To justify a legal development it appears to be much more important to identify and weigh up relevant policy considerations, than to refer to vague and contradictory notions of fairness, or to other values like Ubuntu or good faith.

Finally, references to fairness in the law of unjustified enrichment could simply serve to explain or justify why the law at times requires that a benefit must be returned. It has been appreciated since Roman times that in certain cases it would be unfair for a person to be enriched at the expense of another. However, these references to fairness do not shed much light on why only some cases of enrichment at the expense of another give rise to a duty of restitution. The law of unjustified enrichment is not more based on fairness than other areas of law such as the law of contract or the law of delict or tort. Ultimately, the explanation or justification that the law of unjustified enrichment promotes corrective justice may be more illuminating, especially when it is necessary to delineate its boundaries with other fields of law.

The owner who has had an item stolen and subsequently succeeds in relocating it will normally not find it in the hands of the thief. In most cases, the stolen item will be held by a buyer who had acquired it unsuspectingly. Can the theft victim expect such an innocent buyer to return the item without demur, in spite of the price the latter himself paid for it? Returning the item is difficult for the buyer to stomach, given that it is normally impossible for the latter subsequently to recover the price he paid for the item from the person who sold it to him. This is because thieves and receivers of stolen goods are mostly insolvent at the time, or simply vanish into thin air as soon as they have done their deed. Restitution, therefore, does not solve the issues resulting from theft – all it does is to transfer the problem from the theft victim to the bona fide buyer. It is precisely for this reason that the conflict between the theft victim and the bona fide buyer of stolen moveable property is described as a true legal dilemma in the available literature. Neither of these parties did anything wrong, and therefore it would appear that both the theft victim and the buyer may lay claim to the item in question. In order to examine the complexities of this dilemma fully and in depth, the author of this paper provides in the first instance a thorough analysis of the solution advanced by the Belgian law of property. From this analysis it emerges that in most cases the interests of the bona fide buyer tend to take precedence – indeed, under the relevant Belgian law the original owner will, more often than not, find it impossible to recover the item from the bona fide buyer.

Given that the conflict between theft victims and bona fide buyers is classed as a legal dilemma, there is little prospect that the solution advanced by the relevant Belgian law will enjoy total and universal support and approval. This is why the author has analysed this problem from a comparative perspective. We can thus align the results of this comparative analysis and note that, among the western systems of property law, there is a chasm between those which tend to favour the interests of the bona fide buyer, and those which give precedence to protecting the original owner. These comparative data also indicate that this difference of preference coincides with the divide between the so-called civil law and common law jurisdictions.

Having thus examined and explained the buyer/owner dilemma under the ordinary law of property from a comparative perspective, this contribution pays particular attention to the specific situation where the stolen property qualifies as an item of cultural heritage. This prompts the question whether this fact alters the conclusions drawn from the author’s analysis of the ordinary law of property on this subject. This is because cultural goods differ to a certain extent from other types of personalty in view of their uniqueness, their frequently irreplaceable nature, and the special significance they present not only for their owner, but also for society at large. This is one of the reasons why it would appear that, in the course of the past few decades, quite a few countries have included in their laws on moveable property provisions imposing far-reaching obligations to effect restitution in relation to objets d’art and cultural goods. Accordingly, the balance struck between the victim of theft and the bona fide buyer, which this contribution describes in general terms, will frequently assume a different form when it comes to stolen objets d’art and cultural goods. The author accordingly argues that the gap in the law of property between the Continental-European and the Anglo-American jurisdictions regarding the return of stolen cultural goods is much less significant than is the case for other types of moveable property.

In support of this contention, the author draws attention to four developments in the law relating to property of cultural value. In the first instance, he explains that the free movement of the most valuable cultural goods has, in several ContinentalEuropean jurisdictions, been restricted as a result of national measures adopted for the protection of objects of cultural heritage. Thus, all the civil law countries examined in this contribution have placed limits on the ways in which protected goods can be taken out of the country’s territory. In addition, the law relating to cultural goods is also subject to private law restrictions on movement in several Continental-European jurisdictions. Specific laws on cultural property confer on objets d’art a status that renders them incapable of prescription and/or even of commercialisation. As a result, the ordinary rules of property law regarding a non domino acquisition or acquisition by prescription will not apply to their fullest extent, which considerably weakens the buyer’s position.

The laws on state property, which in many Continental-European countries govern public assets, affect the ordinary rules of property when it comes to solving the buyer/ owner dilemma. This is because they protect the public authority which has been the victim of theft against restitution – at the bona fide buyer’s expense. Given that a considerable number of cultural goods have been purloined from publicly-owed collections, the prevailing law on state property spectacularly enhances the chances of successful claim for the restitution of stolen cultural items. Thus it is that the law on state property reduces the gap, described above, in the law of property when it comes to solving the buyer/owner dilemma.

Various initiatives aimed at restitution, based on considerations of human rights, have drawn the solutions proffered by the civil law and common law jurisdictions even more closely together. International agreements concerning cultural goods plundered during the Holocaust have, in several jurisdictions, been translated into additional means of obtaining restitution. These mechanisms, based on alternative dispute resolution, concerning cultural goods plundered during the Holocaust have – once again mainly in the civil law countries – proved to be significant for the purpose of solving the buyer/owner dilemma. This prompts the conclusion that these measures have also served to close the gap even more between the owner-friendly common law and the buyer-friendly civil law jurisdictions.

Finally, this contribution highlights the impact produced by a number of international and supranational rules on cultural goods, such as the European rules on restitution based on the combined effect of the so-called Cultural Goods Regulation and the Restitution Directive. The latter ensures that valuable cultural objects from an EU member state enjoy a special status in the law of property within the EU. Where a buyer/owner dilemma arises in respect of this type of cultural objects, the latter will in most cases need to be returned, which once again weakens the position of the bona fide buyer and causes the continental-European jurisdictions to continue to gain traction against the prevailing Anglo-American models.

In essence, the 1970 UNESCO Convention seeks to achieve the same level of international enforceability of national rules relating to cultural objects, albeit on a global scale, in order thus to strengthen the campaign against the illegal trade in works of art. In countries such as Switzerland, The Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Austria, which have already proceeded to ratify and, accordingly, to implement the UNESCO Convention, there now applies an effective obligation to return such cultural goods as circulate illegally in contravention of the UNESCO Convention. Thus the aforementioned Continental-European countries once again serve to undermine the protection of the buyer – which is so characteristic of their ordinary law of property.

Although Belgium also ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2009, it has yet to take any practical steps to incorporate it in its law of property. The author accordingly – makes a plea to that effect, not only so that this country can comply with the international commitment it has made, but also, and especially, on the basis of his conviction that this will provide a further spur towards finding common law and civil law solutions to the buyer/owner dilemma.

This contribution examines the limits of party autonomy when it comes to the law of property. The traditional theory is that property law is governed by public policy, whereas the law of obligations constitutes permissive law. On the basis of this analysis, the author concludes that the law of property and the law of obligations are drawing nearer to each other, and are doing so at several levels.

The traditional justifications for the closed nature of property law (the so-called numerus clausus principle), i.e. historical developments and the economics of the law, are open to criticism. At the very least they lead to a more nuanced perception of the traditional split between personal and property rights. The historical explanation for the closed system, namely that it represented a reaction against the Ancien Régime, should, on closer examination, be subject to considerable qualification. The reasons advanced to justify the numerus clausus principle which are based on legal economics can to a considerable extent be countered by the introduction of an effective system of open access and scrutiny of property rights.

However, in relation to the party autonomy principle, certain differences exist as between the various property rights themselves. More particularly, there is a difference in party autonomy between the rules governing the rights of use and enjoyment of property on the one hand, and those governing security interests on the other hand. As regards the rights to use, there is a great deal of overlap not only between the property rights to use among themselves, but also between property and personal rights. By varying the terms of the contracts in question, a lessee can, under certain circ*mstances, acquire more leverage than a usufructuary, or holder of a long lease right or building right. Moreover, lease agreements are frequently effective against bona fide third parties without requiring publicity in the land register, which is not the case in relation to property rights of use. The exclusivity principle merely plays a very minor part when it comes to defining the limits of property rights and of any party autonomy involved. Both personal and property rights are capable of conferring rights of exclusivity. At the same time, however, the extent of such exclusivity is capable of variation. The author draws up an external and internal exclusivity matrix on the one hand, and an objective and subjective exclusivity matrix on the other hand. The result, however, is a finding that the summa divisio between property and personal rights is at best one of degree and not one of substance.

In relation to security interests, the parties are confined to a more restrictive straitjacket, for here, consideration needs to be given to the circ*mstance that exceptions to the principle of creditor equality are subject to strict interpretation. However, even when it comes to security interests, it is possible to see an opening – as witness the increasingly positive approach taken in relation to the fiduciary ownership of security interests as a result of, inter alia, certain changes made in the statute law.

The Draft Law Amending the Law of Property, which aims to rewrite Book II of the Civil Code, reflects this development. This Draft Law continues to apply the Typenzwang principle at its strictest, but restricts the essential features of those property rights which are not capable of contractual variation.

Instead of a centrifugal model, under which the relevant restrictions are imposed when it comes to the splitting up of property rights, we would advocate a centripetal model under which the areas which have been split off are reintegrated into the law of property at the point where they in danger of causing economic harm. In other words, the author advocates a less rigid approach when it comes to creating property rights. However, where it would no longer be possible to justify the creation of these property rights from an economic point of view, this splitting off of ownership rights should, logically, be done away with. The reintegration of full ownership rights should be facilitated. In other words – the ex ante approach should be replaced by an ex post approach.

The law of property is normally regarded as a legal area which is almost exclusively subject to rules of mandatory law and leaves very little scope for party autonomy. It takes but little encouragement for the law of property and the law of contracts to appear as polar opposites. This paper goes a long way towards putting this picture into some perspective – at least in relation to the law of the Netherlands. It is true that the law of property and the law of contracts are kept strictly separate (Decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court of 3/3/1905). However, this is not to deny that the courts are given the necessary scope – of which they have availed themselves in key decisions – to accept solutions in cases involving the law of property which may not be rooted in the relevant legislation in so many words, but are fully capable of insertion in the relevant legislation and fully consistent with decisions which are fully in compliance with this legislation (Decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court of 30/1/1959). The Netherlands law of property is not insensitive to the demands which the law makes of our society, or to the part it plays in it, and has frequently displayed its flexibility in this regard.

It is almost feels like pushing at an open door to stress that party autonomy occupies a prominent position in the Netherlands law of property. Although the starting point still is that the law of property is governed by mandatory law, there is no reason to minimise party autonomy when it comes to any area of property law. Thus it is generally accepted that, within the closed system of property rights in the Netherlands, the contracting parties enjoy a considerable degree of freedom when it comes to determining the substance of restricted proprietary rights. Not only does the Netherlands civil code provide considerable scope for arrangements which depart from the norm – it is, in addition, generally accepted that transactions which are not are not explicitly regulated by the statute law may be arranged between the parties themselves and be enforceable against third parties, provided that there is a sufficient link between the relevant arrangements and the definition of the relevant restrictive property right. Rules which makes no provision for the possibility of concluding varying agreements are, in property law terms, mandatory. They nevertheless leave the parties concerned the freedom to determine their legal relations by varying stipulations agreed by contract – and therefore without being enforceable against third parties – unless such varying clauses are rendered null and void by law. In joint ownership arrangements party autonomy also has an important part to play. By using the management opportunities provided by Article 3:168 of the Civil Code, the joint owners are given ample opportunity to conclude arrangements between themselves regarding their (exclusive) powers, including their enforceability against third parties.

Party autonomy can also play a part outside the context of determining the substance of property rights. Given that property rights do not, in principle, have a scope which is exclusive, or excludes each other or any alternatives from the law of obligations, the parties are able to choose which legal mechanism they will use in order to regulate their legal relations. Thus agreeing to building and planting rights can constitute an alternative to conversion into a condominium of flats, and an overhang situation can be legalised in a variety of ways. Thus the choice made by the parties of whatever legal mechanism they favour helps to define the property law relationships between all the parties concerned.

There are also aspects of the law of property where party autonomy appears to have a more limited scope. Concluding agreements which are also binding on third parties regarding the (exclusive) right of disposal held by a non-title holder is viewed with a certain degree of reticence. The influence brought to bear by the parties when applying rules such as those governing accession or conversion appears to be minimal. However, there is a knock at this particular door as well, taking into account the demands made by the circular economy.

The reversals experienced by the case law of the Belgian Supreme Court are a well-known but rarely studied phenomenon. On the basis of qualitative empirical research, this contribution brings a different perspective to the existing theories regarding this phenomenon. Twenty judgments, issued in the period between 2002 and 2017, and which, according to the Court’s annual report, constitute a change in its case law, are examined. The emphasis of the analysis is placed on the manner in which these changes were announced and on their given or underlying reasons.

This analysis shows that the Court relies to a large extent on the by-products of its decisions in order to make it known that they have been overruled, such as the annual report, a footnote to the judgment as published, or the opinion of the Advocate General. The annotations in legal journals are, in practice, likely to constitute the most important source of information here. Only twice did the Court expressly announce the overruling of a decision. The grounds for the reversal are only rarely discussed by the Court. If we bring together several sources, it would seem that the overruling of a decision is often the result of external events, such as a judgment of the Constitutional Court. Other justifications include the absence of judicial peace, a change in the social context or the correction of an earlier error.

This method of announcement is flawed because the overruling of a decision is being publicized through a non-authentic source, and often with considerable delay. Openly admitting the reversal in the judgement itself constitutes a better modus operandi. The European Court of Human Rights requires that reversals in case law be explicitly reasoned and announced. The French and Dutch Supreme Courts have set an example here. In both countries, the Court reverses its case law through ample reasoning and references to the earlier decision(s) that it abandons. Customizing the retroactivity of the reversal is not unusual in this context. The difference between the practice developed by these countries and Belgium must be viewed within a broader context of the overt recognition of the law-making effect of the Supreme Court’s case law. The examples set by its neighbouring countries are a point of reference for Belgium and should be followed. However, as long as the Belgian Supreme Court continues to portray, in its judgments, the fiction that all that has occurred is a mere application of the law, a change in the way the Court reverses its case law cannot be expected any time soon.

The circular economy is currently one of the most promising pathways for rendering our economy more sustainable. One of its effects is known as the “service model” – rather than selling goods to the consumer, the producer offers the consumer the possibility of using them without any transfer of ownership taking place. In the field of real estate, an increasing number of circular initiatives are being developed; however, such attempts come up against certain obstacles presented by the existing law on real estate. This is the case both in Belgium and in the Netherlands.

First of all there is the law on accession in real estate, which is the result of the notion of “componenting”, which in turn is an application of the unity principle. This forms an obstacle to the renting of moveable objects (goods or items) which are incorporated into real estate. In principle, the lessor of such moveable property will lose his right of ownership to the object in question to the real estate owner as a result of real estate accession. However, this contribution shows how this problem can be overcome by means of a broader interpretation of the old-established exception to real estate accession, i.e. the rules on building rights. Such a broader interpretation is necessary because, under its current interpretation, the buildings in question must display a certain degree of individual separateness (separateness requirement), whereas in a circular economy the idea is precisely to be able to accommodate all the components of a real estate in the hire in question. Actually, this broader interpretation of the rules on building rights amounts to a less strict and more modern interpretation of the unity principle which is justified because in a circular economy, the rationes underlying that principle, i.e. legal certainty and value protection, are pursued more effectively using a different method than by imposing restrictions on the property that is the subject-matter of the building right. This article extensively elaborates such a solution under Belgian and Dutch law.

The second consideration here is the question whether the various parties involved in the renting of moveable objects which are not incorporated into the real estate are sufficiently protected against the various risks with which they are faced, such as a lessor who then sells, the other party’s insolvency, etc. For these risks as well this contribution elaborates a number of solutions.

Thus it is that the author of this article hopes to have contributed towards the future development of the Belgian and Dutch law governing the circular real estate economy.

In this contribution, the author makes five recommendations with regard to future research on the “ownership” of data.

The first three of these recommendations relate to the central planks of this research, to wit the notions of “ownership” and “data”. In the course of his analysis, the author starts from the conclusion that, frequently, the scope of these notions has not been staked out – or if it has been, only in a limited way – in relation to (closely) related, but not identical, concepts. The author then proceeds to demonstrate that it is definitely necessary to demarcate (a) the first of these notions in relation to the various rights and powers which are frequently referred to in legal literature as “ownership” or “property”, and (b) the concept of “data” in relation to information, digital data, databases and data carriers, given that the answer to the question whether “data” are capable of “ownership” can differ depending on their actual meaning. This is why the author’s first and third recommendations are that it is necessary to be very precise when it comes to defining the exact scope of the notion of “ownership”, and as to what exactly can be regarded as subject-matter of “ownership”. As regards the latter, the second recommendation advocates close co-operation with information technology specialists.

The fourth and fifth recommendations concern the approach and focus to be adopted when researching the “ownership” of data. An examination of the legal literature on this issue reveals that the notion of “data ownership” – and more particularly its possible implications – is approached from an economic angle, and that, when it comes to charting the scope of these implications, the focus is invariably on the industrial players (on the data market), on the buyers of digital products, and on data subjects. However, as the author states in the fourth recommendation made in this paper, the law, including the law of property, must also be taken into consideration and be a relevant factor in this debate. The law of property itself can also feature arguments for and against the introduction of the notion of “data ownership” – such as the fact that the law of property provides a “complete package” for the regulation of data control. The author continues to pursue this legal angle in his fifth recommendation, which calls for consideration to be given to creditors to whom data owners are debtors, as an additional category of interested parties in the debate. In support of this argument, the author examines the question of liens relating to data, and of the possibility of their attachment (seizure) – and more particularly the difficulties and imperfections in this regard presented by the law in its current form. He shows that recognition of data ownership would improve this state of affairs – if only partially.

In a small jurisdiction such as ours, comparative law has an important part to play. Although this is taken for granted in the fields of law teaching, legal research and legislation, there are many who regard this as a problematic factor when it comes to the courts and their rulings. Is it legitimate to impose on our litigants solutions inspired by information gleaned from foreign jurisdictions? Nevertheless, it does appear that, in Europe, the higher courts are increasingly taking account of the rulings made by their counterparts. In this contribution, the author seeks an explanation for this development. He also examines the case law of the Belgian Hof van Cassatie for evidence thereof. On the basis of the Court’s case law during the 2002-2017 period, he also attempts to provide a picture of the legal areas, the types of cases, and the legal systems involved in this development, and assesses the significance that this represents for legal scholarship. This contribution has also been incorporated into the Court’s Annual Report for 2018.

From this analysis, it appears that the Court does not insulate itself from legal information which foreign legal systems are capable of providing. In practice, however, arguments based on foreign law only appear in a handful of its decisions. This is because the majority of legal issues which arise before the Court are perfectly capable of being solved without the need to resort to foreign legal sources. In addition, most of the Court’s members tend to be hesitant about venturing into foreign legal systems – they are clearly no champions of “legal tourism”.

Viewed against the total number of decisions made, the part played by comparative law is a minor one. Where, however, account is taken only of those decisions in which the Court has a creative part to play, the number of cases thus affected is a respectable 3.66 per cent. In practice, however, it would appear that this tally is actually a few percentage points higher, given that any consultation of foreign sources by the members of the Court does not invariably reveal itself openly.

It also would seem that the Court only involves foreign legal sources in its decision-making where this is justified. From the Advocate-Generals’ submissions, it appears that the Court does so for certain types of legal issues – types which can also be found in the decisions of other higher courts. The cases in question concern mainly (1) issues relating to legal rules which are common to other jurisdictions, (2) issues where the court enjoys a considerable degree of discretion and/or which are not purely legal, but are also subject to underlying social and moral considerations, and (3) issues which are highly technical in legal terms and for which a harmonised solution is appropriate.

As for the legal systems opted for, the comparisons made are mainly with sources from similar rule-making systems. It will therefore cause no surprise to learn that pride of place is given to French law, followed by that of The Netherlands. The cases in question relate mainly to the private law, although no legal area is excluded.

Where the Court does take account of foreign precedents, these only have a persuasive or inspiring effect – so in so doing, the Court is not imposing such precedents on the litigant. In many of the cases mentioned above, moreover, these precedents were not actually followed. The influence exercised by foreign precedents on the outcome of the case is at its most pronounced in relation to legal issues which concern the interpretation of common legal rules, such as those contained in treaties, and where it is indeed appropriate to seek harmonised solutions. This influence is less pronounced where we are dealing with issues over which the court enjoys a substantial measure of discretion, or which are decided on the basis of social and moral considerations. In such cases, the part played by foreign precedents is that of adding new areas to the legal imagination. The added value here is that a broader range of potential solutions and arguments is made available. This wider range of arguments and counter-arguments invites a stronger basis for justifying the solution opted for – which is, however, vindicated exclusively within the parameters of the national law.

The object of this contribution is to examine the essential principles of law governing legal persons. A legal person is defined as a bearer of rights and obligations which is not a living being, and which was created in order actually to achieve a specific objective set by its creators. As a legal entity, a legal person enjoys an existence equal to that of a human being – in the sense that it enjoys equality when it comes to exercising and enforcing its legal rights. Because of its very nature – the legal person not being a human in flesh and blood – there are a number of personal rights it is unable to exercise, not being a human having body and feelings; nor can it enjoy any rights under family law, deprived as it is of any family. A legal person is, however, capable of having or acquiring other rights such as ownership, intellectual property rights and fundamental rights.

Legal personality is a legal instrument which the law makes available to humans. Recognising an association of persons or an asset as a legal person can only be justified where the association or the separate asset have acquired their own interest which displays a degree of durability as distinct from the interests of other parties, and are provided with a degree of organisation which is capable of defending their own interests. Its legal recognition has a specific objective. Legal personality can only be used for the purpose defined by law – i.e. the “legal specificity” principle. That purpose defines the limits of the legal person’s capacity to exercise and enforce its legal rights. In this, the legal person differs from a human being, who experiences no such restrictions. As a result of the new description of the legal objective of companies which may also include a non-profit making objective in their articles of association, as well as removal of all restrictions on the activities of non-profit making associations, the legal specificity principle has been weakened in so far as it has hardly any impact on the leal person’s ability to exercise and enforce its legal rights. As and when it is created, a certain legal format must be opted for – this can be accompanied by additional restrictions imposed by statute which are capable of limiting the person’s legal capacity. The legal person in question shall be regarded as a business, regardless of whether it has a profit-making objective or not. As such it will be subject to the provisions of the Business Law Code.

To be able to function, legal persons need human beings. As matters stand at present, only humans are capable of taking independent decisions. For this purpose, the law has developed the “organic capacity” doctrine, under which human beings who are part of the organ may enter into obligations for and on behalf of the legal person in question. The organ does not act as an agent for the legal person, but is an integral part of the latter.

The objective pursued by the legal person, as specified in the articles of association, defines its interests. It is in the furtherance of these interests that the legal person acquires assets in order to achieve this objective. The legal person’s organs are required to act in furtherance of these interests.

The legal person has its own identity which distinguishes it from other legal entities. This identity consists of its name, registered office, legal form, nationality and business number (awarded as a result of its compulsory entry in the Crossroads Bank for Enterprises. As is the case with human beings, legal persons also have a status which determines its position in society.

Depending on their legal form, legal persons are divided into (a) associations, companies and foundations, (b) profit-making, non-profit making and public interest legal persons, and (c) legal persons with, and legal persons without, personal liability conferred on their partners or members.

This contribution finally discusses a number of issues which are specific to legal personality. The author examines the legal relationship between the legal person on the one hand, and its founders, members or partners on the other hand. This relationship creates a contractual space in which the legal person and its members or partners relate to each other and in which their actions in relation to each other have certain legal implications. The decisions made by the legal person’s organs also serve to define this contractual space. The author further examines the issue of management in the legal person’s interest and concludes with a discussion on abuse of legal personality.

The effect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the private law of acquiring property continues to grow. Unlike the older decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the latter’s recent case law on this subject continues to receive relatively little attention – a least in the Belgian legal literature. This contribution discusses the case law developed in this area during the 2010-2020 period, and its effect. The author has analysed the recent ECtHR decisions in the light of two questions.

The first concerns the various legal grounds on which the national rules on discharge by limitation are capable of being challenged before the Court. For these legal grounds, the question arises as to what is the relationship – i.e. what are the similarities and/or differences – between these grounds. Specifically, the relevant provisions here are Articles 2 and 6 ECHR and Article 1 of its First Protocol. These legal grounds differ as to their scope, but the criteria by which the rules on limitation are assessed against these legal grounds are the same. Article 6 ECHR has the broadest scope, and is the legal ground which is used the most frequently by the Court.

The second question examines what are the minimum standards applied by the Court when assessing the various aspects of the (Belgian) rules on discharge by limitation. These aspects are those which have arisen in the Court’s recent decisions. Here, we are dealing with the starting point of the limitation period, the effect produced by the parties’ actions and behaviour on the rules on limitation, and the parties’ inability to act during the limitation period. From the discussion on the second question it emerges that it is the ECtHR decisions regarding the starting point of the limitation period which have produced the greatest impact. Subjective limitation periods pass the test set by the ECtHR more easily than those based on objective criteria. This appears to be narrowly linked with the notion that subjective limitation periods tend to give more weight to the creditor’s interests than they do to those of the debtor. This is why the Court considers an objective starting point for the consolidation of damage to be compatible with the ECHR, since this starting point also gives extensive protection to the creditor. The national rules on limitation also need to take into account situations where it is impossible for the creditor to act. This again works to the creditor’s advantage. On the other hand, the Court does impose a considerable degree of responsibility on the creditor when it comes to instituting his/her action.

In its case law, the ECtHR increasingly restricts the member states’ discretion when it comes to the rules on limitation in the private law on acquiring property. On the other hand, the Court does take account of the concrete circ*mstances of the case when assessing the rules on discharge by limitation. This reveals a somewhat restrictive approach on the Court’s part. The rules on discharge by limitation should only be sidelined where it clearly emerges from the concrete circ*mstances of the case that the protection given to the creditor’s interests is disproportionate to those of the debtor. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the extent of the Court’s intervention in this area is very much on the increase.

Here, it is significant that the Court has formulated in general terms how best to frame the rules on discharge by limitation, without any regard whatsoever for the relevant concrete circ*mstances.

As a result of the Law of 20/2/2019, the law of property as contained in the Belgian Civil Code was fundamentally revised and renamed (from “zakenrecht” to “goederenrecht” – both of which, in Anglo-Saxon legal parlance, would translate as “property law”). Since the last few years of the 19th century there has been a debate in Belgium on the possible revision of the Civil Code. Under the Michel-led government (2014- 2019) this was actually carried into practical effect. There are mainly two factors which explain why it took so long to revise a private law code. Private law rules are to a large extent “nomocratic” and have no specific political objectives. This bestows on them and their contents a considerable degree of timelessness. Also, in most cases private law rules are concerned with the proper functioning of civil society and of the marketplace, and are not aimed at conferring any advantage on a specific group. This is why the politicians are less inclined to expend their political energies on their reform.

A set of property rights which are clearly articulated and easily enforced is crucial for the prosperity and well-being of society. It ensures social peace, an efficient marketplace and enables the internalisation of negative externalities. In these terms, this places the nations of Europe and North America in a privileged position. In the less developed countries, and particularly in the rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa, the protection and formalisation of property rights remain at a low level, which is not conducive to economic advancement.

The new law of property did not involve any revolutionary reforms. In fact there was no need for this, given that political experiments which abolish or undermine property rights have proved to be far from successful. However, the new legislation did integrate a number of rules developed by the courts. Generally speaking, these changes have proved to be efficient. This can to a certain extent be explained by Richard Posner’s theory concerning the efficiency of the common law as driven by the law of precedents. Examples of this are the rules on cross-boundary conflicts and neighbourly nuisance. At the same time, under the new rules real property is defined in three-dimensional terms, and has used a specific rule on the right of superficies to confer property rights on above-ground or subterranean structures which are unconnected to the surface area. These changes made it possible to confer what are known in Anglo-Saxon law as air rights and subsurface rights.

In relation to cross-boundary building, the courts may decide not to issue a demolition order, but to restrict themselves to compensation. This is economically efficient. In many cases the cost of demolition and rebuilding exceeds the value of that portion of land which was infringed. Demolition orders are therefore inefficient in terms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Normally, any parties thinking rationally would come to some agreement. Since the parties in question are mutually in a bilateral monopoly situation, no such agreement can be guaranteed and, were compensation to prove impossible to achieve, demolition could still be the outcome. This is why it is efficient also to provide for the possibility of compensation.

As regards neighbourly nuisance, rules on excessive nuisance based on no-fault liability were included in the Code. From an economic point of view, there is efficiency in legally penalising nuisance, given that this enables the internalisation of negative externalities. Non-excessive – and therefore bearable – nuisance may, from an economic point of view, concern (a) trivial nuisance, because litigation and court administration costs may exceed any gains made from such internalisation, and (b) cases of mutual nuisance because here, the possible legal measures not only cancel each other out, but result in a “negative sum game” because of the litigation and court administration costs involved. The courts have been given a broad range of penalties to apply (compensation, injunction, preventive measures). When opting for any of these measures, the courts should take into account the transaction costs as between the parties involved, and the nature of the loss caused. Where the transaction costs are low and the loss is considerable, they should opt for an injunction. Because, should the value of the enjoined activity exceed that of the damage caused, the parties could come to an agreement, given that the transaction costs here are low. Where the transaction costs and the value attached to the disputed activity are high, however, it would be preferable to order compensation. Where an injunction is granted, it cannot, because of the high transaction costs, be guaranteed that the injunction could not be bought off by means of an agreement between the perpetrator and the victims.

Although most of the changes in the law of property – the majority of which are based on developments in the case law – are deserving of support in economic terms, this reform has forfeited a number of opportunities for change and for the removal of a number of outdated rules. For acquisitive prescription, the 30-year period requirement has been maintained. In present-day society this can no longer be justified. The actual content of the property right could have been modernised by replacing the ‘three sticks’- approach devised by Bartolus (utendi, fruendi, abutendi) by a definition that diversifies further into more components of the right. An opportunity for such reforms could perhaps arise in the context of any European Restatement.

Although most of the changes in the law of property are deserving of support in economic terms, there remain a number missed opportunities to bring this law of property in line with current ways of thinking. The systematic involvement of economy-based considerations could have played a useful part here. These could have been integrated into the regulatory impact assessment, which is part of the preparatory work which precedes the legislation, but which appears to have been of no account in this case.

The key issue in this contribution is – how should the Belgian law-making authority adjust its current legislation when incorporating the Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services in its legal order? The effect of the Directive on which this paper is based is overwhelmingly positive, in terms of the improved guarantees with which the consumer is provided when purchasing digital contents and services – in the shape of enhanced information requirements, clearer compliance criteria, reversal of the burden of proof, as well as enabling businesses that engage in cross-frontier trade to enjoy a greater degree of legal certainty (lower costs for SMEs). The Belgian authorities being obliged to take the necessary measures in order to implement the Directive before 1/7/2021, this contribution will examine its implications under Belgian law.

Essentially, the Directive seeks a maximum degree of harmonisation for a limited number of issues arising under consumer agreements involving digital products and services. When implementing this rule, the law-making authorities should also take into account those legislative instruments which have already achieved a maximum degree of harmonisation, such as the amended Consumer Rights Directive and the General Regulation on Data Protection. In the absence of a specific legislative framework, any analysis of the legislation to be adopted will need to find some inspiration in existing legal rules on purchase and sale, services, licensing agreements, etc. Given the trend towards servitisation, which represents a trend away from sale/ purchase towards product user rights, care must be taken that these amendments are for the most part applied uniformly when it comes to digital products and services.

In addition to the new terminology to be introduced by the Belgian authorities, the Directive makes provision for a number of important extensions. In the first place, there will henceforth be provided a legislative framework for both the paying and the non-paying consumer (i.e. those “free” digital services in return for which the consumer provides his/her personal details). In terms of the persons affected, the Directive gives the member state a broad measure of discretion when it comes to extending the protection given to those described as “consumers” and “traders” to categories which previously enjoyed no protection whatsoever. In order to provide a measure of future durability, various forms of digital content and services will come within the scope of this legislation. Another issue to be faced is that of interpretation, i.e. who and what qualifies under this legislation – and here, it is recommended to follow the trend which is noticeable at the European level, viz. to apply the law at the level of the general principles of the law of contracts.

This contribution also examines the compliance requirements which must be met by the digital contents and services in question. In terms of the legislation to be adopted, this takes the form of a combined compliance test, to which should be added those specific features which are relevant to their digital context. The legal difficulty arises in the shape of the compliance test – in contrast to the Belgian rules under which this takes the form of a separate guarantee (i.e. the rules on hidden effects). The Directive also to a considerable extent reflects the hierarchy among legal remedies imposed by the rules on consumer sales, which will probably present few problems when it comes to its implementation. The implementing legislation to be adopted will, for the consumer of digital content, take on a slightly different complexion when it comes to seeking legal redress, given that it will now be for the trader to decide which legal remedy he/she considers to be the most appropriate.

The Law of 4/2/2020 has comprehensively and substantially reformed the Belgian law of property. The previous legislation remained largely that which dated from 1804 and was hopelessly outdated. The Belgian law of property had to a large extent become court-based, given that the case law had become its main legal source. This did not serve the cause of durability, legal certainty or equity.

The said Law introduces Book 3 of the new Civil Code and will automatically enter into effect on 1/9/2021 – with the exception of the provisions governing public access to land charges, which will enter into force by 1/7/2022 at the latest. This Book contains new provisions regarding ownership, joint ownership, land leases, building rights, usufruct, servitudes, public access to land charges, etc. Book II of the previous Civil Code, as well as legislation such as the Laws governing land leases and building rights (both dated 10/1/1824) will be repealed. This paper examines this reform in the light of the differences it presents with the previous law, and taking into account the relevant legal practice. It also has a comparative element in the shape of the legal position in the Netherlands, France and Québec – and to a lesser extant that of Germany and Switzerland.

The reform as adopted is based on the following tenets; (1) an integrated approach towards the law of property, (2) its instrumentalisation, (3) its modernisation, (4) rendering it more flexible and (5) an extensive comparative approach. The reform also serves to make the law of property more durable. As regards the latter, attention should be drawn to, inter alia, the additional opportunities for the multiple use of the land, the extension to 99 years of the maximum duration of a building right; in addition, under certain exceptional conditions the duration of a building right may even stretch to eternity. Where such exceptional conditions apply, they may give rise to some type of “volume ownership”. Of this aspect, the notion that jointly-owned items of property should be used taking account of the general interest – including that of future generations – is a significant example.

A novel feature of the reform is the appearance of a general section containing provisions which are common to all property rights. These determine in the first instance what are the existing property rights as well as the extent to which freedom of action applies – the law or property is permissive law, with the exception of the applicable definitions and those provisions which expressly lay down that they are incapable of derogation. This Title also contains general provisions governing the creation, extinction and transfer of property rights, their nature (property substitution, confusion of property, property adjustment, unity principle) – as well as public access to property rights, a significant aspect of which is the opportunity to enter additional deeds, such as land purchasing options, pre-emption rights, and deeds of succession, in the registers of land charges.

When it comes to the practical application of the law, the reforming legislation has extended the range of options. Thus there is a reduction, to 15 years, of the maximum duration of a land lease, the extension, to 99 years, of the maximum duration of the right to usufruct by legal persons, and a set of generally applicable rules governing personal and property rights in relation to public property, as well as legislation governing consensual joint ownership and its termination.

In structural terms there is also a new feature in the shape of a separate Title governing neighbourly relations, in which the rules regarding excessive neighbourly nuisance have been codified for the first time; however, this Title also contains provisions simplifying the rules on common fencing and servitudes. Thus, acquisitive prescription and owner designation have been made an option for all visible servitudes.

During the past few decades, the Belgian regions have introduced a number of information requirements which need to be complied with by the seller of real estate. Failure to comply is frequently and expressly penalised with the voidability of the underlying sale. For other information requirements, the penalty merely consists in an administrative fine. However, the relationship between these penalties and the ordinary law of obligations is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, a closer association with these ordinary rules could be of considerable benefit to all concerned. Thus it is that, on the one hand, an administrative fine gives but inadequate protection to the purchaser. On the other hand, to render the sale in question voidable as a penalty for non-compliance with these information requirements is in many cases a disproportionate measure which unnecessarily affects the seller as to his legal certainty. It is precisely by viewing these measures in the light of the ordinary law of obligations that this contribution examines whether the resulting penalty could not be applied in a more proportionate manner.

In the first instance, the author examines the effect of these penalties on the conclusion of real estate sales. Experience reveals this effect to be minimal. Given the importance which the relevant law-making authorities have attributed to the underlying elements of the sale on the basis of these information requirements, it appears to us appropriate to draw the conclusion that the assumption can be made that these elements are essential to the purchaser. This can even be assumed on the basis that it is merely in certain exceptional circ*mstances that this will not be the case. The author argues that the effectiveness of such qualifying considerations is ensured because of the broad scope of the ordinary rules of obligations, which acts as a threshold for the system that enables these transactions to be made. A non-existent agreement cannot be unlawful.

The author further examines the relationship between these information requirements and the ordinary rules on the conclusion of agreements. It is frequently the case that voidability as a penalty for non-compliance with an information requirement exceeds the scope of the same type of penalty as applied under the ordinary laws on this subject. Thus, unlike the validity-affecting factors mistake and misrepresentation, there is no requirement that the purchaser was drawn into error on a fundamental aspect of the agreement. This ensures that this penalty is applied too drastically and too automatically. A restriction is therefore necessary. Here, the prohibition of abuse of law can be invoked. The innovative application of the partial voidance theory could also provide a solution.

The author also examines the impact produced by the regional pre-contractual information requirements on the obligations of the parties when it comes to the performance of the contract. Here, it becomes clear that the information exchanged definitely influences the seller’s obligations. These information requirements also appear to ensure that the seller will find it more difficult to invoke an exemption clause.

This contribution analyses the relevant Belgian procedures governing financial conflicts of interest affecting company directors (Article 7:96 of the Belgian Companies and Associations Code) and transactions with related parties (Article 7:97 of the Belgian Companies and Associations Code). The focus here is on the recent changes caused by the introduction of the Companies and Associations Code and the Law implementing the Shareholder Rights Directive II (“SRD II”). The paper analyses the rationale and history underlying these conflict of interest procedures and assesses how these procedures reconcile the protection of shareholders with the flexibility to manage the company in question.

The author concludes that the recent changes have rightly increased shareholder protection. For example, the rule prohibiting conflicted directors from voting has been extended to unlisted companies under Article 7:96. In addition, the scope of article 7:97 has been greatly extended by the new definition of what constitutes a related party; also, the relevant procedure has been strengthened considerably by the rule that (a) the company directors involved in the transaction are no longer allowed to vote on it, and (b) the information pertaining to the transaction must now be published immediately, and not merely in the annual report.

Nevertheless, the author makes a number of proposals for improvement. For example, the scope of the conflict of interest procedure in article 7:96 continues to include a number of gaps with regard to affective and functional conflicts of interest. However, this is already partially solved by the fact that Article 7:97, which lays down a stricter procedure, will often also apply to financial conflicts of interest affecting directors.

A second issue is that no general procedure governing conflicts of interest procedure has been formulated for transactions which come within the jurisdiction of the General Meeting. The Belgian lawmaker would be well advised either to give the Board of Directors a veto over transactions with related parties – and to apply the conflict of interest procedure to that decision – or to introduce a rule prohibiting conflicted shareholders from voting on transactions with related parties.

Thirdly, the rule exempting subsidiaries contained in Article 7:97 is formulated very broadly. The only case where the exemption does not apply arises where a controlling shareholder has a holding of 25 per cent or more in the subsidiary. It does apply where a different category of related party (such as a director or a shareholder with significant influence) has such a holding. The author takes the view that this constitutes an infringement of the Shareholders Rights Directive II, because the procedure does not, in certain cases, provide adequate protection against conflicts of interest involving transactions with subsidiaries. The author therefore proposes that the law be amended in such a way that the exemption relating to subsidiaries does not apply where a party related to the listed company has an interest in the subsidiary which conflicts significantly with that of the listed company.

Fourthly, the lawmaker could still adopt measures making the independent directors even more independent from the primary shareholders – for example by protecting them against dismissal by the primary shareholder or by having directors appointed and dismissed by minority shareholders. In addition, the role of these independent directors should also be expanded: instead of giving non-binding advice when the transaction ends, they should be involved in the negotiation of transactions with related parties from the outset and be granted a right of veto.

A rental option agreement is an agreement under which at least one of the parties (“the option provider”) gives its beneficiary (“the option taker”) the right to decide to conclude with the latter a rental agreement, the creation of which subsequently merely lacks the option taker’s consent. The option taker may decide independently whether to exercise – or not – his right of option. Thus option rights become an interesting instrument in situations where the parties need a degree of flexibility and certainty with a view to concluding the contract envisaged. Contracts of sale are an example of this, but the inclusion of option rights can also be useful when it comes to rental agreements. When seeking out a suitable property for rent prospective lessees do not act with ill-considered haste. Because a waiting period is capable of causing uncertainty, the renters will seek to consolidate their chances of securing the property in question. A right of option can be a useful mechanism here. Conversely, rental options can also benefit the lessor. By acquiring several rental options the latter can make a better considered choice before committing himself to a rental agreement.

This contribution examines option agreements, focusing specifically on their use in rental agreements. This is because rental option agreements only represents a useful mechanism for achieving certainty and flexibility if the parties have themselves ensured certainty concerning the option agreement – and possibly also its scope and implications.

For this purpose, the author examines in the first instance the legal characterisation of option agreements and of option rights. Thus a distinction is drawn between option agreements applied to rental agreements and other pre-contractual rental arrangements (such as rental offers and preference agreements) which may be concluded during the negotiations – which can occur within a tight timeframe. The author also examines the divergences in the way the expression rental option can be understood – rental options are not all the same. Thus, a distinction can be drawn between rental options, options to renew commercial leases, and options to extend rentals. In all these cases the rights will be different as to their scope.

The paper then discusses the lawfulness, creation and terms and conditions of rental option agreements.

The lawfulness of rental option agreements between two private parties is accepted in principle. However, where the option taker is a business, and the option provider is a consumer or another business, its lawfulness in principle comes under challenge in the light of the rules concerning unlawful terms and conditions [Article VI.83 (1) and VI.91/4 (1) of the Business Law Code (WER)]. This is because rental agreements cause an asymmetric situation to arise as regards the consent of both parties to the rental agreement. However, the automatic voidance of the rental option agreement is not a desirable outcome, because this would render the option impossible to be exercised where the agreement in question has a lawful purpose.

As regards the actual conclusion of the agreement, the author considers the form – whether compulsory or not – assumed by the rental option agreement. The latter is free-standing innominate agreement which is not in itself subject to statutory requirements as regards its form. Whether the written agreement requirement to which a rental agreement itself is subject also applies to the right of option relating to it needs to be determined by means of a purposive interpretation.

Finally, the author briefly examines the price, duration and lifting of the option.

The parties are free to agree to a price by way of consideration for the awarding of an option right. Although some are of the opposite view, a substantial price cannot be automatically equated with a situation whereby the option taker had already committed himself to a rental agreement. The parties are in principle free to fix the duration of the rental option agreement. If the latter has been concluded for an indeterminate period, the option provider may free himself from it by cancelling it subject to a period of notice.

Acquisitive prescription is frequently regarded as raising ethical problems, entailing as it does that the owner loses his ownership rights against his will and without any compensation. Such acquisition could be tolerated where the beneficiary of this type of prescription possesses the property in question on a bona fide basis, and cannot be faulted, given that here, we have a conflict between two parties who are deserving of protection. However, acquisitive prescription by someone who does not possess property on a bona fide basis (or possesses it mala fide under Belgian law) gives rise to a higher level of objection. This is because the latter merely deserves very limited protection, so that his dominant position should not be an automatic given.

Traditionally, Belgian law has allowed the non-bona fide possessor to obtain property through acquisitive prescription, subject to the proviso that he cannot claim any reduced prescription periods. It is certainly the case that the courts frequently adopt a reluctant attitude towards non-bona fide possessors of property, and the rules that prevent possession provide several openings for such reluctance. For many years, Dutch law refused to recognise acquisitive prescription by the non-bona fide possessor.

This was changed in 1992. However, the Netherlands Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) places possessors who can be seriously faulted at a great disadvantage, given that they remain capable of being held liable in tort. South African law, on the other hand, adopts an indifferent position when it comes to bona fide, and merely applies a uniform 30-year prescription period.

Acquisitive prescription by a non-bona fide possessor can be justified by a number of decisive arguments: (a) possession for a sufficiently long term brings about a reversal in legitimate title, i.e. in the legitimacy of the parties’ position, (b) it serves the interest of legal certainty – including that enjoyed by third parties – given that acquisitive prescription forms the basis of secure property rights; (c) possession by prescription puts the former owner in the wrong and serves to penalise him for an idleness on his part which is socially undesirable, (d) it also serves to protect bona fide possessors, given that can be difficult to prove at what precise time the possessor ceased acting in good faith, and the lack of bona fide was established.

The counter-arguments are based on the moral repugnance attaching to the non-bona fide possessor’s position. As far as Dutch law is concerned, an additional objection is that insufficient attention is given to the requirement that the non-bona fide possessor should justify his position, which serves to undermine this legal concept.

In practice, the law has succeeded in managing these “for and against” arguments in several ways. The most significant factor here is that the non-bona fide possessor is required to complete a longer term of prescription, i.e. 30 years in Belgium and 20 years in the Netherlands. In addition, a great deal of attention is given to the notion of possession itself, being one of the essential requirements for obtaining acquisitive prescription. More particularly the various rules preventing possession are capable of keeping non-bona fide possessors in check. Consideration is also given to the various types of compensation which are chargeable to the non-bona fide possessor – and here, Dutch law has been in the vanguard. The new Belgian property legislation has also taken a big step in this direction, but its implementation leaves a great deal to be desired. It also needs to be said that there are considerable differences among the legal systems in question as regards the protection of public property. Belgian legislation provides a high degree of protection, whereas this is not the case when it comes to The Netherlands – which may explain why the Dutch authorities tend to frown on non-bona fide possessors given that, in the Netherlands, it is possible to acquire major items of public property from the authorities).

When it comes to legal reform, two solutions suggest themselves. In the first instance, one could subscribe to the Dyal Chand theory, and emphasise the importance of all such legitimate interests as are involved. As a result, applying the requirements for prescription is no longer and black-and-white issue, but is subject to various nuances.

For example, the possessor could be awarded a right of use.

However, a more attractive proposition would be to oblige the mala fide possessor to pay compensation, as is currently the case in The Netherlands and Belgium.

This makes it possible to enhance the legitimacy of acquisitive prescription and to protect the interests of all those involved, including third parties. This also serves to discourage taking possession on a non-bona fide basis. However, it is important to ensure that the former owners are protected against the non-bona fide possessor, which is not the case in Belgium. It is also necessary to take into account the relevant circ*mstances, but even the existing mechanisms pay but little heed to this requirement.

Payment issues have always been with us. Where a debtor is no longer able to pay the sums owed under his financial obligations, the latter may resort to pleading force majeure. However, this will only be possible in exceptional circ*mstances, given that money is a replaceable item, and only seldom is there a transfer of risk for the actual payment of the sum in question.

Nevertheless, there are a number of exceptional circ*mstances which may give rise to force majeure. In the first instance there are the faits du prince, i.e. measures taken by the public authorities, such as restrictions on bills of exchange, or embargos.

Secondly, insolvency on the part of the debtor could also give rise to force majeure in relation to obligations to pay the sum owed. This is because there is trend among the courts to interpret the impossibility requirement for force majeure in a more qualified and humane manner. Thus the difficulties experienced by the debtor in meeting his obligations could sometimes be qualified as force majeure, regardless of the replaceable nature of money. However, the Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie) has consistently held that a debtor’s insolvency cannot release him from his obligation, but can only give rise to its suspension. Thirdly, force majeure could also apply where meeting the obligation in question would place the debtor in an intolerable position – if only in respect of future transactions. Fourthly, the seller of a specific coin or banknote could plead force majeure if they are destroyed.

However, in all these circ*mstances the other requirements for force majeure will need to be met, to wit (i) that the debtor cannot be held responsible for his failure to meet his obligations, (ii) the fact that the debtor had not assumed the risk of the circ*mstances in question arising, and (iii) that these circ*mstances arose after the contract was concluded. In the light of these requirements, there are a number of obstacles which the debtor will need to overcome before being able to rely on force majeure. Thus, for example the debtor will need to demonstrate that he managed his financial affairs competently and that he had taken adequate financial precautions before entering into the obligation to pay the sum in question.

Force majeure can either temporarily suspend performance of the obligation – where the impossibility to perform is only temporary, or it can release the debtor from further performance where the impossibility is permanent. The courts have at times been inconsistent when applying these principles.

However, where the requirements for force majeure have not been met, the debtor can rely on a number of alternatives, including unforeseeability, the mitigating effect of having acted bona fide, periods of grace, and certain measures of support taken in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. These legal concepts are speedier to invoke than force majeure, but their consequences are frequently less effective.

Finally, where the Vienna Convention on the Sale of Goods applies to the agreement in question, the debtor may rely on Article 79 thereof. The Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie) interprets this provision in such a flexible way that payment issues based on this rule can prompt the renegotiation of the said agreement.

Because of the far-reaching digitalisation of our lives, personal data are having an increasingly important role in society. During the Covid-19 crisis, it has emerged that personal data can be used effectively in combating a global health crisis. It is expected that, in future, the use of personal data will have a crucial role in managing health crises such as this one. This increasingly creates a field of tension between free movement and the use of personal data on the one hand, and the protection of such data on the other hand. This paper attempts to formulate a response to the question whether the law-making frameworks that currently apply in Europe, China and the US provide adequate protection for personal data during a global health crisis, and whether the currently applicable legislation does not obstruct the effective use of such data. In this contribution, the proportionality principle is used as a criterion for assessing the balance between the right to the protection of personal data on the one hand, and the right to life and health on the other, where personal data are used in combating a global health crisis.

Under the legislations in question, personal data are subject to a sliding scale of protection from weak to strong. With its GDPR, Europe can be found at one extreme end of the scale, providing as it does a high level of protection for personal data. However, this does render more problematic the effective use of personal data in combating a global health crisis. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) finds itself at the other end of the scale, given the weak protection it gives to personal data. However, it does enable the effective use of such personal data. The position of Hong Kong, on the other hand, has shifted towards European standards – influenced by English law, Hong Kong definitely has provided stronger protection of its citizens’ personal data. However, where emergencies arise the PRC can impose its legislation on Hong Kong, and thus nullify such protection. On the said scale, the US finds itself between China and Hong Kong, with its fragmented and incoherent federal legislation on data protection on the one hand, and the ever-stronger rule-making powers wielded by the state authorities on the other.

From an examination of the relevant legislative frameworks, and the use of personal data via contacttracing-apps, one can conclude that the circ*mstance that the existing legislation was not designed for use in crisis times represents the biggest problem for the effective use and re-use of these personal data during a global health crisis. To be able, in future, to make proportional use of personal data in combating a global health crisis, whilst at the same time protecting such data as strongly as possible, there is a need for national legislation specifically regulating the use of or personal data during a global health crisis. In order to avoid yet another patchwork of legislation on the subject, the author takes the view that international guidelines should be adopted and/or an international organisation be created that allows the various national databases to be accessed quickly and effectively, or that enables data to be analysed quickly and efficiently using a specific database at the supranational level during a global health crisis. In addition, the individuals affected should be given the opportunity, acting within the constraints of the law, to relinquish their data in the public interest.

The question whether the ex ante ranking order enjoyed by the various rightful claimants to the assets of a company should be respected where the latter has been restructured is an issue which has hardly ever been tackled in the Belgian – and European – legal literature. In Belgium, however, the position has assumed relatively extreme proportions. Where a company has been re-organised by court order as a result of a collective agreement, the disfavoured shareholders can, almost structurally, retain their position in the company capital, whereas the unsecured creditors are invariably subjected to reductions. The systematic failure to observe a previously-agreed ranking order in the event of a company restructuring is not only anomalous in the strictly legal sense, but also has far-reaching financial implications. It is extremely doubtful whether a set of insolvency rules that enables the shareholder – or any other rightful claimant – to bypass the ex ante ranking order by starting a re-organisation procedure can be regarded as the ultimate in effectiveness.

In this regard, the US courts and legal literature have enjoyed a much longer tradition which can be traced back to the mid-19th century. When a number of large railway companies became insolvent during this period, the secured creditors and shareholders joined forces against the unsecured creditors. When a restructuring took place, the latter found themselves, as it were, booted off the liabilities side of the balance sheet, whilst the secured creditors and the shareholders split the value resulting from the re-organisation amongst themselves. These practices were, however, halted by the Supreme Court in a number of renowned decisions. At first, this was done on a somewhat pragmatic basis – where all the rightful claimants had been treated in a reasonably “honest” and “fair” manner, the Supreme Court allowed the ranking order to be disregarded. This “doctrine” was later described in the legal literature as an extrapolation of the “relative priority” rule (RPR). In its Los Angeles Lumber decision (1939), the Supreme Court changed tack and introduced a strict application of the “absolute priority” rule (APR) – no longer was it permissible to depart from a pre-existing ranking order where a re-organisation had occurred. Thus any dissenting creditor whose claim was not entirely met was able to scupper a re-organisation plan if a party that came lower down in the priority ranking – e.g. a shareholder – retained a share in the assets under the plan. As the years went by, this application of the APR was made more flexible by the courts and the legal literature. At present, no single creditor may, on his own, (where the category to which he belongs votes in favour of the plan) veto an entire re-organisation plan by enforcing the APR. In addition, the US courts accept that, in the event that not every creditor is paid, the shareholders – for example – retain their claim if they make a new contribution, or where they receive these claims from creditors placed higher in the ranking order. Another alternative, in certain cases, is for the company in to meet the claims of creditors of lower rank during the restructuring procedure if to do so plays a useful part in keeping the company alive. Finally, on a more structural level, the APR may be departed from in the case of certain smaller businesses, where the shareholders frequently play a crucial part.

When contemplating the manner in which the APR has developed in the US, one notes that the applicable rules have become increasingly sophisticated. In this regard it becomes clear that the US version of the APR in its current form complies to a large extent with the financial model which we have outlined in this paper. To put it briefly, a sound and effective system of rules governing company re-organisation respects the previously-agreed ranking orders, except where the parties involved have agreed to depart from it in certain specific and well-defined cases. Where the relevant insolvency rules fail to do so, the company will – in most cases imperceptibly – experience a rise in its capital costs as a whole, and a number of profitable projects will be abandoned.

When considering the Belgian rules on judicial re-organisation by collective agreement (JRCA), it is clear that these are out of kilter with existing financial models. Moreover, the JRCA system could be described as remaining impaled on a point which had already been passed by the US in 1864, given that the JRCA enables the shareholders and a group of creditors – mostly secured – to connive in compelling another category of creditors – mostly unsecured – to incur sizeable reductions without the shareholders contributing a single penny. It is difficult to imagine a more frontal assault on ex ante agreements (known as the “creditors’ bargain”).

This anomalous Belgian system of granting structural advantage to the shareholders will change once the Belgian parliament implements the EU Restructuring Directive. This provides the opportunity to opt for the introduction of some form of RPR or APR. Although in principle we favour a relatively strict, but qualified, APR even the introduction of a European RPR will represent a considerable advance for the relevant Belgian law. This is because the European RPR, however vague and ineffectively worded, prevents the disproportionate dispossession of the higher ranked categories by those lower down the order.

Nevertheless, subject to empirically-tested evidence to the contrary or in the absence of abstract arguments which are hard to refute, we believe that APR should be the fundamental rule. This is because it ensures that, in the event of a cross-class “cram down”, each category may claim its share in the restructuring value. However, in full consistency with our economic approach, we can also consider a number of “effective” qualifications of the APR.

In the first instance, secured creditors only have a preferential claim on the liquidation value of their security (valued on the basis of a sale in “piecemeal liquidation” or in “going concern”) and not on the restructuring value (i.e. valued if the agreement is concluded, e.g. using a “discounted cash flow” method). This is because no security interest can be placed on the earning capacity of the business, i.e. the “going concern surplus”. In this allocation we can therefore identify a bifurcation: on the one hand there is the allocation of the liquidation value (on which the secured creditor has a preferential claim); on the other hand there is the allocation of the “going concern surplus” (on which the secured creditor has, in principle, a concurrent claim in relation to his share which is in negative equity).

Secondly, the shareholders can retain their interest (or part of it) where, in exchange, they contribute a new value to the business. Although this is known as the “new value exception”, it does not in fact represent an exception – the shareholders retain their interest in exchange for fresh financing. Crucial shareholders may also retain an interest, even without making a financial contribution which is valued by the market. We are dealing here with a contribution in kind, more particularly one made by shareholders without whom the continuity of the business is imperilled. Similar considerations apply when it comes to certain strategic creditors. Here also, there is no question of an exception to the APR: the restructuring value which is protected by the APR represents the value of the business without any further involvement by the “insiders” (strategic creditors). This is because the latter cannot be compelled to remain involved in the business against their will and without receiving adequate compensation. Here, accordingly, the shareholders retain their share interest, precisely because they remain involved in the business through their contribution in kind. The practice of “gifting” is no exception to the APR either – in this case also each of the parties receives the share in the restructuring value to which they are entitled in accordance with the statutory or contractually-agreed ranking order.

Thirdly, the “20 per cent rule” which currently applies under Belgian law amounts, in fact, to no more than a system of allocation which departs significantly from the statutory or contractually-agreed ranking order. (APR) and collides with our approach to law and economics, which includes the “creditors’ bargain” theory. The continuation of the 20 per cent rule can only be justified where the need is felt to increase the recovery potential of unsecured creditors and to reduce that of the secured creditors. Although this may be a noble objective, it is out view that allocation of value is an issue which is best dealt with outside the scope of insolvency law. The question arises, moreover, whether in fact that 20 per cent rule cannot be replaced by something better. A “carve-out” or “prescribed part” system – as it applies in the United Kingdom – produces an entirely different effect.

In principle, a contract of sale is created by the mere meeting of minds between the parties regarding the item sold and the price (Art. 1583 Old Civil Code). However, where the item in question is real estate, such immediacy is not invariably desirable. By using the De Decker model, conveyancing practitioners have attempted to mitigate the practical drawbacks of this rule. This model makes provision for three stages. Under the first, there are consecutive options which give the parties involved the time definitely to commit themselves so as to enable them to discover the necessary information. Once this option has been exercised, a sui generis agreement is created whereby the parties commit themselves to buying/selling the real estate in question. Contrary to what happens with an ordinary purchase option, in the case of real estate the sale will not be created with the exercising of the option. This is because the De Decker model contains a subjective formal agreement clause, by which the sale is created only where the formal requirement has been met, in this case the execution of a notarial deed.

The use of this model has given rise to a number of questions as to its operation and validity. In this paper, the author examines the various stages of the model, and assesses it in the light of the ban on fraudulent evasion of legal rules. Given that this prohibition does not exist as a legal concept in its own right, it is used here as a general term covering a type of issue – to wit whether it is lawful or not to circumvent the drawbacks attached to an ordinary sale with a suspensive condition by using a clause requiring a subjective formal contract.

The inclusion of a formal requirement is nothing new. It is perfectly possible to postulate that the creation of an agreement will only be considered – and that the meeting of minds between the parties will only deemed to have taken place at that moment – with the fulfilment of such a requirement. Under the De Decker model, the parties, by exercising the option, make it known that they already have a fully- fledged agreement as to the purchase/sale (i.e. the legal requirements have been met) but that they only envisage its completion once the conveyancer (Notary Public) has succeeded in fully informing the parties, and is in a position to state that there are no legal objections to it. However, where the parties have already committed themselves to the purchase/sale when exercising the option, and intervention by the Notary Public becomes a formality requirement or a suspensive condition, it is certain that a truly subjective formal agreement will not have taken place, which will, inter alia, have implications for the extent to which the parties are bound by the arrangement. Where the parties fail to meet the registration requirement which results from the existence of the agreement – even if it is an invalid one – they evade this requirement.

Depending on the parties’ objectives, therefore, the following distinction must be made. Either they already wish to be committed to the purchase when exercising their option (which can itself be modified), or they are merely stating that they will only agree to the lawful parts of the sale when exercising their option, but only wish to express their will immediately after having informed the Notary Public – and therefore when signing the notarial deed. In so doing, the parties merely need to meet the general due diligence requirement.

A criminal act does not necessarily produce consequences under criminal law. The possibility of heir forfeiture confirms that a criminal conviction can impact succession as well. The key idea behind this extension is that criminal acts should not yield any advantage. However, lately, the notion that the undeserving heir should forfeit any succession right lost its categoricalness. For some time now, laws of succession in Italy, France, the Netherlands and Germany bestow the testator the right to lift this forfeiture. This right of the testator confirms the trend whereby the law of succession is increasingly becoming an area that the testator governs by independent decisions rather than one which needs to be directed entirely by the public authorities. Since the enactment of the Law of 10 December 2012, the Belgian succession law has joined this trend.

A remarkable feature of this (legal) current, found in the relevant legislation or other sources of law, is its reference to the concept of forgiveness. This concept is the vehicle that allows the testator to cancel the heir’s forfeiture. However, not all the legal orders in question approach the right to such cancellation in the same manner. There are at least two different approaches to be considered – the formal and the informal.

The Belgian rule, laid down in Article 728 of the (previous) Civil Code (Article 4.7 of the new Belgian Civil Code), is marked by a high degree of formality. Any forgiveness must meet several conditions as to form – i.e. such forgiveness must be contained in any one of the three formats a last will can take – and must be given in writing. Under Belgian law, forgiveness is a legal act that has strong similarities with the formation of a will. This approach is advantageous because it has the potential to rule out any scope for discussion. At this level, accordingly, the Belgian system is undoubtedly conducive to legal certainty. However, it also enables forgiveness to be used for estate planning. The Dutch system, on the other hand, is less formal. Here, forgiveness does not take the form of a legal transaction. It treats forgiveness as a fact to which the relevant legislation attaches legal consequences. In the Netherlands, the specific facts and circ*mstances help determine whether forgiveness has taken place. Under this approach, legal forgiveness closely dovetails with actual forgiveness. In the Netherlands, the testator is not obliged to take any further steps – whether legal or not – to ensure that his forgiveness benefits the undeserving heir. On the other hand, forgiveness may become hard to discern from associated concepts such as justification, reconciliation and forgetting.

The formal and informal systems each have their advantages and disadvantages. The varying methods to establish forgiveness within each system do not imply that insight gained from one approach cannot be of benefit to the other. Although the relevant Belgian law legally corsets the entire issue, it will remain necessary to use facts and circ*mstances of each case when interpreting the unilateral legal act of forgiveness. The Dutch case law on this subject, and the Belgian and Dutch case law on reconciliation in divorce law (which has, in Belgium, lost its importance due to the legal reforms of 2007), provide useful pointers to identify forgiveness.

In addition, the abundant literature concerning forgiveness also plays a significant part. Philosophical insights on this subject enable us to define and refine this concept even further.

Although forgiveness in the law of succession appears, at first glance, to be merely a private affair, it also has a broader social function. By excluding attempts to particular criminal offences from forgiveness’ ambit, the Belgian legislation delineated the, at least in the legal sense of the term unforgivable. Not only unforgiveability in a personal sense but also in principal sense is defined. Some particular actions are so improper that they exclude the undeserving heir to benefit from the succession, even if the testator is not personally impaired to forgive them.

The relevant Dutch law, on the other hand, has refrained from restricting the scope for forgiveness. It even recognises the possibility of anticipative forgiveness, which can help overcome the personal impossibility to forgive. The future testator can forgive a future heir for particular future actions. For instance, the testator who wishes assistance when terminating his own life can anticipatively provide the heir with the necessary protection under the law of succession. This possibility nuances the presumption of wrongdoing which is firmly associated with forgiveness. Here too, forgiveness transcends the purely private sphere, since the other heirs, the public authorities, and, even in a broader sense, society as a whole, will be compelled to accept the authorisation given by the testator as actual forgiveness.

Moreover, the impact of forgiveness on third parties is not restricted to cases where it is anticipative. As forgiveness can free heirs of their forfeiture status, it changes the norms of interaction between the victim and the perpetrator and the perpetrator and the wider community. Due to the testator’s forgiveness the comunity can no longer deny the perpetrator’s status as heir. Furthermore, forgiveness given in the context of forfeiture may also modify the outcome of the criminal proceedings which attend the offence. The introduction of forgiveness in the rules governing forfeiture allows it to exert influence on the individual and the societal level.

The task allocation as between the courts and the parties in adversarial civil proceedings is governed by the “party sovereignty” principle on the one hand, and the general rule on supplementary legal grounds on the other hand. Where it is incumbent on the parties to present the facts to the court, the latter is bound to examine and assess these facts, and to apply the correct legal rules accordingly. In so doing, the court (a) may not raise any objection which the parties had excluded in their submissions (b) may not change the subject-matter of the action, (c) must base its decision on such facts as have been lawfully presented to it and (d) must also respect the parties’ procedural rights. Although the court has broad powers to raise legal rules ex officio – albeit within the limits referred to above – it is only under an obligation to do so where to apply them is required by those facts which have been specifically presented by the parties in support of their claims.

Traditionally, this task allocation has been interpreted strictly. In recent times, however, it has become accepted that the role of the courts is in no way a passive one. Moreover, the parties are also expected to act as responsibly as is required. Thus the parties determine the limits of the dispute by presenting their facts; in addition; however, they are also bound to co-operate in good faith when it comes to such issues as the production of evidence. For its part, the court is obliged not only to examine and assess the facts presented by the parties, but also to apply the correct legal rules accordingly. In addition, the court must direct the conduct of the trial in a proactive manner. Moreover, this trend to require a more pro-active role on the part of the courts can also be identified in the French and Dutch legal systems.

It is also – and maybe even especially – in the field of evidence that the task allocation between the courts and the parties has a significant part to play. It is certainly incumbent on the parties to provide and substantiate their evidence, as well as to co-operate in good faith when it comes to producing all the available evidence. The court, on the other hand, has the power to order investigations into various aspects of the case, is obliged to assess the evidence provided and, under the new rules on evidence, even has the power to reverse the burden of proof. Therefore, the court no longer has a passive role when it comes to assessing the evidence.

Even though, as a result of the case law of the Supreme Court, the general principles governing the task allocation between the courts and the parties have now become clearly formulated, legal scholars are currently divided on the question whether these very principles governing the courts’ power to present additional legal grounds also entail that the courts are also empowered to apply ex officio the relevant substantive as well as procedural rules of evidence. The decisions of the Supreme Court on this subject are subject to widely differing interpretations in the available legal literature.

Starting from the traditional approach towards the role of the courts, and based on the case law developed by the Supreme Court, some authors cleave to the view that the Supreme Court decisions regarding this general principle are inconsistent with the prevailing rules on evidence. In their view, it is for the party on whom the burden of proof rests, and therefore not for the court, to substantiate the evidence submitted by them. Against this approach there is a more updated one which holds that the general principle regarding the provision of additional legal grounds also applies when it comes to evidence – subject, however, to the court observing the relevant procedural rights of defence and to the condition that the issues relating to the evidence had already been featured in the legal proceedings to date.

In the light of the general principles governing the task allocation between the court and the parties, it is this updated approach which, for a variety of reasons, should be adopted. In the first instance, there is no valid reason why the general principles regarding additional legal grounds should not be applied to the rules of evidence also. The latter are also legal rules – the fact that they are permissive law is irrelevant. Moreover, the court being empowered, even ex officio, to apply rules of evidence can be justified – albeit to a large extent implicitly – by the existing case law of the Supreme Court (1). Secondly, the party sovereignty principle does not prevent the court from applying the relevant rules of evidence – given that these rules can be applied regardless of the parties’ freedom to act (2). In addition, the legal system of France and of the Netherlands, which are closely related to those of Belgium, apply similar principles and have the same approach as regards the task allocation between the courts and the parties (3), the ex officio application of the rules on evidence by the courts is consistent not only with the object of these rules per se (4) but also, in a broader perspective, with the expectations which society currently has of the role of the courts (5). Finally, the new rules on evidence also tend to favour a more pro-active role on the part of the courts (6) – a role which at least entails that the courts are actually empowered to apply the relevant legal rules, including those governing evidence.

Prior to the 19th century codifications, the law of both the Netherlands and Italy made provision for the compensation of immaterial damages. This represented a departure from the Roman law principle that the body of a free citizen could not be valued in money terms. In Italy, this rule appears to have more weight on the eve of the codification era. Both the Netherlands (following independence in 1838) and Italy (in 1865, following unification) had their law codified based on the French Code civil, containing broadly worded provisions regarding tort liability. However, the Code civil contained no provisions regulating compensation for immaterial damages. The 1865 Italian Codice Civile provided no basis for immaterial damages, whereas the Burgerlijk Wetboek of the Netherlands only contained rules providing a right to compensation for immaterial damages in the event of (intentional) defamation. Although the issue of providing compensation for immaterial damages was initially a controversial one in the Netherlands, and prompted mutually contradictory solutions by the courts, it would seem that the Italian courts decidedly leaned towards the victims’ cause, whereas in the Netherlands matters only changed in this regard during the Second World War when the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) made a ruling in favour of compensation for pain and loss of quality of life. This decision was in line with the traditional law which had previously governed the country, and was also based on, inter alia, comparisons with other countries (including France and Belgium). There appeared to be no issue with placing immaterial damages within the scope of the term “harm” as featured in Article 1401 et seq of the Civil Code. Subsequently, the notion of “moral harm”, derived from the French legal literature, was introduced in the Italian legal literature, for which compensation had initially been awarded in 19th century court decisions. Thereafter, however, stricter criteria were applied by both the courts and the legal literature, whereby compensation was only awarded for harm which resulted from a criminal act. In this regard, only the indirect financial loss (indirect moral harm) suffered by the victim was capable of compensation, which in practice led to differential levels of compensation for equal levels of harm.

Both countries subsequently were given a new Code – Italy in 1942 and the Netherlands in 1992. The Italian version codified the existing legal literature and case law, drawing a distinction between economic harm (il danno patrimoniale) and immaterial damages (il danno non patrimoniale). This distinction is comparable to that which is made between property harm and “other loss” in the Netherlands (Article 6:95 Civil Code). Under both systems governing compensation, the second category is only eligible for compensation where the law so allows. In Italy it was the medical/legal literature and the courts, rather than the legislators, which gave a prominent place to personality rights during the second half of the 20th century. Here, qualifying health as a constitutionally protected subjective right played a major part, health being deemed to include not only physical injury but also its psychological implications. However, the notion of danno biologico, originally a constitutional right to health, subsequently became a general clause capable of accommodating various types of claims. Over and above this, an additional opportunity is created to bring a claim in the event that the victim’s everyday life deteriorates (danno esistenziale). Pain and suffering came to fall within the scope of a separate form of immaterial damages, i.e. moral harm.

In the Netherlands, compared to the Italian legislation, compensation for harm to property is capable of accommodating more compensatable expenses, such as travelling costs and expenses related to replacement household help. Article 6:106 of the Civil Code also provides more opportunities for the compensation of immaterial damages than was initially the case in Italy, because of the criminal act requirement. Although the Italian system sets standards for compensation in the shape of tables, in the Netherlands standardisation is attempted through case-by-case comparisons. By using this method, the Italian system promotes equality of treatment. However, as time passed personal circ*mstances surrounding the case were also taken into account, which served to weaken equality of treatment created by the tabling method. However, in so doing the Italian system comes closer to that of the Netherlands.

The association of joint owners (AJO) is responsible for the management of a specific apartment building, or group of buildings, the ownership of which is held its members – i.e., the joint owners. Thus they manage third-party property, and in addition represent the joint owners in this context. For the avoidance of abuses, the legislation in question has restricted the AJO’s objectives “exclusively (to) […] the maintenance and management of the building or group of buildings”. Restrictions are also placed on its assets, which are namely confined to such moveable property as is necessary for the achievement of this objective. The last-named rule is intended to avoid a situation under which the AJO could become a civil real estate company, whereby the joint owners would cede their property rights to the AJO.

Some types of joint ownership, however, have specific needs. For example, there may be a desire to provide the joint owners, users or certain third parties (e.g., parking facilities or promotion events in a shopping centre, restoration and security services in assisted residential living spaces, neighbourhood parties, or the renting of a room in a co-housing community …). Other types of joint ownership can also, in the light of the trend towards servitisation, and the transition towards a circular real estate economy, give rise to the need for other types of service – e.g., car-sharing, energy audits, sponsoring events for renovation, repairs to privately-owned property, etc.). Nevertheless, the existing law relating to apartments does not invariably provide adequate levels of legal certainty or flexibility in order to meet the specific needs of a particular property in joint ownership. More particularly there is uncertainty concerning the acceptability of services which benefit the joint owners and users rather than the actual properties that form part of the building. Whilst the traditional literature on this subject has raised no objections to this, recent court decisions and legal writing have challenged the acceptability of such services by reference to the restricted objectives set by the AJO legislation.

Two recent legislative reforms outside the law governing apartments have served to increase doubts concerning the limits to which the AJO’s activities are subject. In the first instance, the distinction between civil and commercial acts was abolished, and the enterprise principle replaced the trader principle. So, what are now the implications of the circ*mstance that the AJO can no longer become a “civil” real estate company? Secondly, the specialism principle governing the status of the ordinary association was given a new scope in the Companies and Associations Code. The former prohibition of any profit motive has been replaced by the prohibition of any profit payment motive. Given that, traditionally, AJOs were banned from having a profit motive, the same reaction now arises in relation to the prohibition of any profit payment motive.

The provision of services can be organised in three possible ways – by integration (in the form of a public utility, or of self-management within the AJO), by contract (via a service provider outside the AJO) or through membership of an associated legal person (which is a variant of the previous regime). This paper examines each of these methods more closely.

Especially the integration method has given rise to legal uncertainty. However, the fact that the legislation in question has assigned specific tasks to a legal person does not mean that its statutorily-determined objectives need to be regarded as strictly circ*mscribed – on the contrary, this paper highlights that the AJO’s objectives are broad in scope. Moreover, it is clear from the legislation governing apartments that the AJO’s powers transcend the distinction between the privately-owned properties and the common areas. Accordingly, a more suitable test resides in maintaining a balance between the joint owners’ individual and common interests as seen from the point of view of the purpose of the building. From a thorough analysis of the AJO’s distinguishing features, and from a comparative study of the relevant law in other countries, it emerges that the provision of services to the joint owners, users and third parties within certain limits is perfectly compatible with the AJO’s objectives. However, the factor that creates legal uncertainty is the absence of legislation that expressly regulates the allocation of the cost – or profits – resulting from the provision of services in a jointly-owned property.

Based on precedents established under French law, the question also arises in a Belgian context whether the integration model does not give rise to some awkward conflicts of interest issues in relation to the joint property’s managers, and whether the services in question should not therefore be exclusively provided contractually by outside providers. The author of this contribution argues that less far-reaching measures than the prohibition of integrated service provision can be perfectly adequate for the purpose of giving suitable protection to the owners’ and users’ interests. Moreover, this enables the General Meeting to retain the right to choose the method of organising the provision of services.

In order to resolve the prevailing uncertainty on this issue, the current legal literature proposes the creation of a separate legal person, membership of which could be open to the joint owners, as well as to any users or third parties. Such membership could, whether mandatorily or by choice, be linked to the status of joint owner or the holder of a usership. Although this organisational method definitely has its advantages, it is also subject to certain limitations imposed by the law of property, the law of obligations and the right not to be a member of an association. Particularly the last-named principle appears to be an insurmountable obstacle when it comes to the ordinary association with legal personality, because the law relating to apartments provides no legal basis which meets the requirements of the legality principle.

Viewed from a broader perspective, the provision of services in a jointly-owned property comes with certain opportunities and risks. The close proximity of this provision to the property is particularly suitable for the realisation of economies of scale, risk spreading and the local sharing economy. This enables joint owner communities to apply, for example, certain technological innovations in a fast-developing economy. However, the value of the property could be reduced where the costs involved are so high that they could cause the building to become unsaleable. However, a more significant factor here is the extent to which the collective added value can be leveraged. Joint ownership influences the broader economic, social and political environment of a country – but the reverse also applies. Added value can only flourish by opening up the law relating to apartments and by creating of a framework in which the public law and the private law are tuned to each other. This is why the author concludes by pinpointing various opportunities for the law governing apartments to grow as derived from a comparative study on the subject.

Rights and powers can be exercised in such a way as to be harmful to others. Thus the law of property finds its limit in the rights of others. The notion of abuse of rights can serve to limit the rights and powers conferred by national lawmakers more restrictively. It can also serve as an instrument for shaping a less individualistic and socially concerned society. Abuse of rights as a notion is capable of converting moral rules into positive law. Both the courts and the legal authors can play an important part here.

Under Belgian law, abuse of rights is only held to apply where someone acted with a view to harming another. This was subsequently given a more objective basis in the shape of a requirement that the person acted without a reasonable interest. This criterion was subsequently in turn broadened towards the requirement of a disproportionate balance of interests. In most cases, the courts have applied this criterion. A key decision made in 1971 provided a general formulation of abuse of rights – the latter consists in the exercising of a right which clearly exceeds the way a diligent and careful person would normally have exercised it. This rule has been applied not only under the law of property; since 1983 it has also found application in the law of contracts, based on the moderating effect of the bona fide principle. The general formulation of abuse of rights as a concept was incorporated in the Civil Code in 2022. For the purpose of giving further substance to this general and generic criterion, several specific criteria are available. These to a large extent hark back to those which had already been developed before 1971. Abuse of process can cover both the fact of bringing proceedings and the manner in which they are brought. Traditionally, abuse of process has been regarded as a key application of the abuse of rights principle, although it has been argued that it constitutes a separate type of abuse of rights, given that there are other interests at stake than those of the parties involved in the proceedings only. Abuse of process applies where one of the parties involved in the action starts it without a reasonable or conclusive interest on the one hand, or in a way which clearly exceeds the limits of the manner in which a diligent and careful person would normally have exercised it on the other hand. Where abuse of process is established, not only compensation, but also a fine may be imposed in order to penalise those who disrupt the proper functioning of this public service.

In the Netherlands, at first bringing proceedings without a reasonable interest also represented the applicable criterion for abuse of rights. Later the relevant criterion became the exclusive intention to cause harm to others, and later still – in line with the Meijers philosophy – a considerable degree of inequality between the interests of those who bring proceedings and those of other persons to whom harm has been caused. The criteria developed by the courts were incorporated in the Civil Code of 1992 – here, however, bringing proceedings without a reasonable interest was not included as a separate criterion. Those criteria which have been developed in the field of the law of property are not being applied to the law of contracts because of the limited part played by the principles of reasonableness and fairness in that field. Abuse of process can be established where not only the right to bring court proceedings, but also the relevant procedural remedies in the narrow sense are being abused. According to the prevailing legal literature, we are dealing here not only with the three types of abuse of rights specified in Article 3:13 of the Civil Code, but also with the absence of a reasonable interest, the circ*mstance where the plaintiff bases his action on (a) facts and circ*mstances of which he knew, or should have known, (b) the fact that they were wrong, and (c) where the action is based on grounds which should have been understood beforehand as having no chance of success. In practice, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) decision of 29/6/2007 appears to provide the leading guidance here, and prompts the conclusion that abuse of process can only be established where, in view of its obvious inadmissibility given the other party’s relevant interests, the proceedings in question should never have been commenced. This can be the case where the plaintiff bases his action on facts and circ*mstances which he knew to be wrong – or of which he should have been aware to be wrong – or on claims of which he should have known that they had no chance of succeeding. However, the normally relevant criteria are, in practice, but seldom applied.

Since the entry into effect of the 2006 Law on Filiation, the Constitutional Court has ruled that a number of provisions contained in our paternity legislation are unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court clearly has abandoned the abstract notion of legislative balance and introduced a new concrete-based approach. This contribution examines the existing key issues and attempts to formulate a how these issues can be tackled by means of a reformed paternity law.

To this end, Part One provides an overview of the current law governing paternity. Following a brief introduction setting out the object and purpose of this branch of the law, as well as a short aperçu regarding awareness of biological derivation, the author analyses the rules concerning confirmation and contestation of paternity as they currently stand, representing as they do a complex interaction between the relevant legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court. This serves to bring to light the main issues involved – i.e. possession of status and the time limit for the child’s claim.

The author concludes that, in the light of the case law of the Constitutional Court, more scope should be given to a concrete-based assessment of paternity issues, rather than merely applying the abstract rules contained in the relevant legislation, and that greater importance should be given to the interests of the child. All this points to an increasingly individualised approach, whereby the general and abstract interests, as worded in the relevant legislation, increasingly yield to a judicial approach based on considerations of context and interests. Thus the law of paternity becomes increasingly “customised”.

In order to integrate this recent development into the framework of proposed legislative reform, it is vital to take sufficient account of a number of substantive and procedural guarantees – which represent the subject-matter of Part Two of this contribution. These guarantees are crucial, both for the law-making authority and for the courts.

In Part Three, the author makes a number of concrete proposals in order to tackle the issues highlighted in Part One, taking into account the conclusions reached under Part Two.

In the first instance, the author highlights the importance of achieving a balance between biological and affective reality – giving priority to neither. Given the desirability of stable bonds of filiation, and of responsibility for procreation, the author advocates adhering to the principle that the bond of paternity should coincide with biological reality. In order to protect existing bonds of socially-related bonding in the event of a paternity-challenging legal action, the author also advocates that the existing notion of possession of status be abandoned. Instead, the emphasis should be on integrating those factors which, when weighing up the interest involved, fundamentally indicate the existence of a socially-based bonding relationship. This makes it possible to assess biological and socially-based bonding against each other. It is also proposed to introduce the new option of an action, unlimited in time, for the determination of biological filiation. Thus both the child and the person who procreated him/her will be in a position to discover his/her identity without undermining any of the existing filiation relationships.

Next, this paper examines the interests of the child, which, for new legislation, is an important factor when weighing up the relevant interests in the event of an action in confirmation or contestation. The better to formulate the substance of such legislation, the author proposes a checklist featuring the most important issues involved.

When it comes to the relevant time limits, it is proposed, in the interests of legal certainty, largely to retain the existing legislation – given a few exceptions when it comes to the child’s interests. For the latter, the time limit will only start to apply as from the moment at which its biological authenticity becomes established. In the light of the judicial decisions on the constitutional invalidity of various provisions, preference is given to enabling the courts exceptionally to waive inadmissibility on grounds exceeding the time limit, and to introduce the possibility of an action, unlimited in time, aimed at establishing his or her biological filiation.

Finally, this contribution makes a number of proposals for modernising the law relating to paternity, mainly in the child’s interest. Here, the author draws inspiration from the Dutch and German proposals on a number of issues. Thus it is proposed that the incest prohibition and the plea of rape be abandoned and that application of the paternity rule be further extended. The author also proposes the administrative removal of the automatic assumption of paternity, coupled with acknowledgement by a third party, as well as enabling a child having reached the age of majority to contest, in certain exceptional cases, to contest his or her legally-established paternity.

Given the theory that the consensualist principle entails that agreements are created when there is a meeting of intentions between the parties, Belgian law is frequently said to be based on a corrected form of consensualism. This view sees the binding force of an agreement as based on the true intention of the parties to be bound by the agreement. In exceptional cases this is corrected by the trust theory, which protects legitimately-held trust. This is more particularly the case where one of the parties makes a statement without actually intending to do so.

Given the crucial part played by the parties’ true intention, it seems perfectly logical to protect it by applying the contractual concept of mistake. Where one of the parties concluded an agreement based on a mistaken apprehension of the truth, his/her true intention needs to be protected. However, closer scrutiny of the notion of “mistake” indicates that this notion attaches but scant importance to the true intention of the party making the mistake. This should not cause any major surprise – the subjective apprehension on the part of a contracting party cannot constitute a suitable legal basis, given that it cannot be known to either the other party or to the court. Moreover, the travaux préparatoires to the Civil Code of 1804 do not appear to provide many indications of support given to the true intention of a contracting party. In addition, any reference to the notion of “true intention” has an extremely contrived ring to it, given that it is corrected only where it is actually relevant, i.e. where there is a discrepancy between intention and statement. It is therefore legitimate trust, rather than actual intention, which will be the decisive factor here. This does not detract from the principle of consensualism, given that its implication is that no formal requirements are needed of a statement of intent, rather than that a subjective meeting of intentions suffices.

The findings above provide us with a simpler way of removing a number of uncertainties regarding the notion of “mistake”. It would seem that the notion of “mistake” protects the mistaken party’s legitimate trust rather than that party’s true intention. Accordingly, the decisive factor here is not that which the mistaken party desires, but whether that party had legitimately trusted a different representation of the truth, and therefore committed an excusable mistake. This also makes it clear that the question whether or not a mistake – as a factor affecting consent – has occurred should not be assessed exclusively at the subjective level of a party’s true intention. Mistake will also apply where the meaning of a statement of intent has been falsely represented.

Moreover, by according a more central role to protecting legitimate trust, our law of obligations is in a better position to face a number of present-day challenges. Thus it would be difficult to describe the current rules concerning the acceptance of general terms and conditions as an application of the consensualist principle, albeit a corrected one. Where the question arises as to whether the general terms and conditions of an agreement have been accepted, Belgian law does not require the accepting party to have actual knowledge of these terms and conditions, and therefore to have actually intended to comply with them. On the other hand, it suffices that these terms and conditions were reasonably accessible, which would make it acceptable to the party stipulating these terms and conditions that the accepting party truly intended to agree to them. Seen in this light, it is much more natural to acknowledge that this amounts to a type of protection of legitimately-held trust.

The same considerations apply where autonomous processes are involved. Artificial intelligence can induce from computerised systems results which are unforeseeable by humans using this system. Where a contracting party operates such a mechanism in order to conclude an agreement, the resulting agreement could be regarded as unforeseeable. In order to assert that the user of the system truly intended to conclude the resulting agreement, the “general intention” theory is sometimes advanced – whereby the user had “truly” intended to agree to all such results of applying the system as were reasonably foreseeable. Here too, linking this to the true intention of the user comes across as contrived. In this context also it is appropriate to give pride of place to the protection of legitimate trust. In these conditions, logic dictates that the user is bound by the statements of intent which emanate from the mechanism in question, provided that third parties legitimately believed that the user intended to make that statement.

Due to climate change, which is causing in a rise in sea levels, it is not unlikely that that in the coming decades floating accommodation will no longer be a luxury, but will instead become a dire necessity. In addition, the existing building space is becoming gradually saturated as a result of a vast increase in population growth. Multiple use of the available space in the shape of floating homes, apartment blocks and even cities could become a new and sustainable project. However, the question arises as to the extent to which this issue can be given an appropriate legal framework – in other words, accommodated in the legal architecture – under the current Belgian and Dutch law.

In the first instance, the question whether floating homes are to be regarded as movable or immovable property is a crucial one when it comes to defining their legal nature. Unlike the prevailing Dutch law, under which the courts qualify water-based homes as movable objects, Belgian law seems to make it possible to regard floating homes as real property through incorporation. The subjective requirement for incorporation is sufficiently broad to accommodate water-based homes, in spite of their fluctuating nature.

In addition, given the uniformity between the criteria for incorporation on the one hand, and those for accession on the other hand, in relation to real property, floating homes are deemed to be part of the underlying soil by accession. Both the rules on immovables by incorporation and on accession represent under Belgian law an application of component formation (‘bestanddeelvorming) and, in a broader sense, of the principle of unity. Under Dutch law, on the other hand, there is some doubt as to the applicability of the uniform incorporation requirement – and therefore also as to the applicability of or accession and component formation principles to water-based homes.

However, both the accession and component formation principles could give rise to problems, given that, under both Belgian and Dutch law, the underlying bottom area is part of the public domain. This would mean that the public authorities would acquire ownership of all floating constructions attached to the ground, which is not a desirable outcome. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to split ownership between the floating home and the water section along horizontal lines. In this contribution, the author examines the possibility of effecting such a split by applying the rules on building rights, apartment rights and volume ownership (as yet to be introduced). Under Belgian law, attributing building rights to a water-based home could provide a possible solution. If the conditions for the applicability of such rules were met, this could even create a permanent system of split ownership. Under Dutch law it would also appear possible to attribute permanent building rights to floating homes, in addition to creating an extended form of tri-dimensional ownership.

It would therefore appear that, subject to a broad interpretation of the incorporation requirement, the Belgian law of property is sufficiently flexible to create this type of “legal architecture”. Under Dutch law, on the other hand, in spite of the many proposals made by a number of authors, and given that the courts qualify floating homes as movables, there has yet to appear a coherent legal framework under the law of property for floating homes. The reformed Belgian law of property provides a more solid legal basis for water-based homes. With this paper, the author hopes to be able to contribute towards a set of legal and practical solutions to the issues under discussion here.

In 1986, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) recognised the public interest action as part of the Dutch private law. Less than a decade later this type of action was codified in the Civil Code. The public interest action has in the meantime become a permanent fixture in Dutch law. The recent Urgenda decision, in which the court ordered the State to be more active when it came to reducing CO2 emissions, as well as a recent judgment in which the Hague Court issued Shell with a similar order, are telling examples of this.

Public interest actions have an interest which is not only social, but also scientific. These actions represent a break with the traditional allocation of roles between the citizen and the authorities in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and blurs the age-old dividing line between the public and the private law. Public interest actions provide legal persons governed by the private law the opportunity to award themselves, through their internal constitutions, the right to defend the public interest before the civil courts without having any democratic sanction or statutorily conferred powers, and regardless of whether their own rights – economic or other – are thereby affected. Moreover, having their action awarded is also capable of directly affecting their fellow citizens’ legal position.

At the same time, public interest actions meet an understandable social need. Legal rules are only capable of exercising their regulatory function if they are observed. For many years this objective was guaranteed by civil actions brought by individuals. In our view there are at least two interrelated reasons for this. Firstly, the law now protects a much broader range of interests as a result of, inter alia, recently-acquired scientific knowledge of various dangers. In addition, following World War II the interests of minorities have attracted increasing attention, and the realisation has dawned that the authorities should endeavour to improve their lot. Both these developments prompted an increase in rules, the violation of which does not invariably involve the infringement of the rights of individuals. Secondly, these rules frequently have long-term objectives. It is precisely such rules that confront the directly-elected, democratically-legitimised, public offices with challenges at a time when the latter frequently seek short-term solutions. Public interest actions provide a means by which compliance with these rules by the authorities can be improved. Our conclusion is that public interest actions contribute towards maintaining the prevailing legal order, that they provide an additions layer of checks and balances among the institutions of the state, and they represent an effective modus operandi.

Nevertheless we take the view that there is some scope for enabling public interest actions to sit more comfortably with some of the principles governing the democratic state governed by the rule of law.

In the first instance, public interest actions carry the danger of creating layer upon layer of similar actions. The fact that anyone is free to create a legal person attracting some kind of public interest, the number of defendants capable of being faced with a public interest action brought by any legal person for whatever reason is in principle unlimited. This is why we feel that peace in the legal order would be best maintained by enabling similar public interest actions brought against the same defendant to be bundled, so that the latter merely has to defend himself once. It should subsequently only be under the rarest of circ*mstances that a new action could be brought on the same issue. In our view, current legislation provides us with sufficient openings to draw up rules which take this notion further.

Secondly, the procedural law that applies to public interest actions is insufficiently tuned to dealing with such actions, the consequences of which frequently affect society as a whole. This is because such actions are conducted in accordance with the ordinary laws of civil procedure, a central feature of which is two-party proceedings. It is our view that to introduce an amicus curiae procedure to public interest actions could provide a solution to this problem. A broad interpretation of the scope covered by the current amicus curiae legislation could be the appropriate remedy here.

Thirdly, we are of the opinion that assessing the merits of a public interest action requires a certain degree of navigational skill on the part of the courts. The latter should not only ensure that the authorities observe the law, but also be aware that in so doing they should avoid unnecessarily encroaching on the territory occupied by the political offices. The extent to which the currently applicable law contains adequate opportunities for awarding such actions is an important factor here. We take the view that the courts will find an adequate compromise between these two positions by making it their guiding rule to award public interest actions which are based on sufficiently clear and concrete legal rules – unless the defendants rely on a rule which gives them the required freedom of action. What this entails is, inter alia, that the courts should be extremely reluctant to award actions which are based on openly-stated duties of care where their fulfilment is subject to a considerable degree of social division.

Finally, the wording of any court order in this field also requires a good deal of navigational skill on the part of the courts. In so doing, the courts will need to respect such freedom of action and judgment as the defendant is entitled to. Where the defendant is a public authority such reluctance will also find justification in the separation of powers principle. Such reluctance should also be desirable when deciding the amount of any financial penalty which the court may attach to its order – at least where the public authorities are concerned. It is not only the Civil Code, but also the existing public law which compels this. This is because one of the basic principles of a system based on the rule of law is that the citizen should, by exercising his right to vote, have some control over the way in which public money is spent. Awarding astronomical amounts by way of financial penalties could render such control – and with it this fundamental principle – merely illusory.

The citizen is increasingly inclined to challenge politically motivated decisions by the authorities before the civil courts – as witness the many civil actions brought against the so-called Covid measures. The absence of any action by the public authorities in sensitive social areas such as climate change also increasingly calls for attention by the civil courts. Where, in such cases, the courts conclude that the authorities had acted unlawfully or negligently, and in so doing order reparation, they are somewhat gratuitously dismissed as “activist”. In legal terms, this would imply that the courts in such cases are blatantly infringing the separation of powers principle, which represents one of the basic foundations of our legal system.

The central issue underlying this contribution is the question whether this separation of powers principle prompts a degree of reluctance on the part of the courts when required to pronounce judgment on the actions performed by the authorities and, where they do so, to what extent. The object of this contribution is to obtain a clear picture as to how the courts have hitherto approached the separation of powers principle – i.e. which forms of judicial control are exercised over the law-making and executive authority, how far-reaching is such control, and to what extent is judicial control allowed to intervene in the public authorities’ actions? To what extent does judicial control comply with the separation of powers principle? Are the civil courts giving themselves too much power and are they undermining the separation of powers principle? Alternatively, could the courts be expected to go further in its invigilation, thus providing the citizen with greater levels of protection?

To be able to give the civil courts their appropriate role as part of the trias politica, this contribution first of all outlines the manner in which the separation of powers principle is approached under the Belgian constitutional system. The author subsequently examines which forms of judicial control are exercised over the other constitutional authorities. In so doing, the author also describes the way in which this issue has developed in the existing case law, and to what extent this complies with the separation of powers principle. Closely related to this, the author examines how far-reaching is the judicial control exercised over the other constitutional authorities, and what are the limits the civil courts, in compliance with the separation of powers principle, should observe when passing judgment on action taken by the public authorities.

Together with Aube Wirtgen’s paper featured elsewhere in this issue, this contribution represents the Belgian preliminary report for the annual meeting of the Association for Belgian/Dutch Comparative Law Research (Vereniging voor de Vergelijkende Studie van het Recht in België en Nederland) on the subject of public interest actions brought before the civil courts.

In the first instance, the author examines the notion of “interest”, which occupies a central position, both in the doctrine which could form the basis of a public interest action, and in the doctrine on the admissibility of such actions before the civil courts. It is in the light of this approach that the notions of collective and public interest are defined in this paper.

Here, it is emphasised that there is an essential difference between a public interest and the public interest. This is because the latter does not constitute an interest, but represents the outcome of the weighing of various interests, a criterion which, where conflicting interests are involved, enables one to decide which of these deserves precedence. Accordingly, the substantive law on that subject can be regarded as a reflection of the way in which the relevant authority – implicitly or explicitly – substantiates the public interest.

This means that public interest actions as such can cover two fields.

On the one hand, there are public interest actions in the broad sense of the term. Here, we are dealing with actions which are brought for the protection of a particular public interest. This action seeks to obtain that the court protects the public interest the claimant seeks to defend in a way that can be justified on the basis of the existing substantive law, i.e. to the extent that, given the prevailing circ*mstances, the intervention sought serves the public interest as determined and made operational under the existing law. The main difference between these public interest actions and “ordinary” actions is the relationship between the claimant and the interest for which protection is sought. Whereas under an “ordinary” action the claimant only

seeks to protect his own interest or that of the person he represents, the claimant bringing this type of public interest action seeks to defend an interest common to all. The crucial question surrounding such actions is whether, and to what extent, this particular claimant is entitled – has standing – to bring this action, and thus to influence other people’s – and even everyone’s – interests.

On the other hand there are the public interest actions in the strict sense of the term. Here, the claimant seeks to obtain protection of a particular public interest which, in the prevailing circ*mstances, has yet to be provided by the substantive law which expresses the manner in which the public interest in general is approached and interpreted. Essentially, this means that the claimant disagrees with the outcome of a weighing up of interests which is implicitly contained in a certain rule or a decision by the authorities. With this type of action, therefore, the courts are requested to compel the relevant public authority to approach the public interest – in the legal sense – differently, i.e. in the manner sought by the claimant. For this type of public interest action there arises – in addition to the question which applies to all public interest actions in the broad sense – the delicate question as to whether the courts, whilst remaining within the terms of the constitutional order, are entitled to make the choices that are necessary in order to adjudicate in this type of action.

As for the said constitutional issues surrounding public interest actions, these are dealt with in the preliminary report on the public law aspects of this issue by Aube Wirtgen, which is contained elsewhere in this issue. The contribution featured here examines de most fundamental private law issues or obstacles surrounding public interest actions from a doctrinal point of view.

In the first instance, the author examines whether the infringement of a collective or public interest causes loss, in such a way that an action can be brought based on the law of torts.

The second issue concerns the basis which the substantive law provides for public interest actions which seek an outcome other than reparation of the loss caused. On the basis of an analysis of the currently prevailing doctrine, assessed in the light of the existing case law, the author examines whether the existing law provides for the possibility of a court order prohibiting a person – e.g. the authorities – from taking certain measures purely on the basis that these are wrongful in the prevailing circ*mstances, or which orders a person to take certain measures purely on the basis that they are reasonable in the prevailing circ*mstances.

The third question examined in this paper concerns who is entitled to bring a public interest action. To answer this question, the author examines who has the procedural capacity and interest required in order to bring this type of action.

Under Belgian private law as it currently stands, animals are quasi-objects lacking the capacity to bear rights (articles 1.3, 3.38 and 3.39 Civil Code). On the other hand, some authors are of the opinion that, under the prevailing public law, they are already legal subjects, deriving their rights from animal welfare legislation. According to the author, this perspective gives rise to an undesirable discontinuity between the spheres of private and public law. Also, such “implicit” animal rights are, in practical terms, valueless so long as no-one has the explicit legal power to exercise these rights, given that animals, by definition, are legally incapable of so doing and they lack a legal representative. When the law puts in place such a representative, it would, at the same time, make the “implicit” rights of animals explicit.

Clearly, if lawmakers had intended to grant animals rights with the conception of animal welfare legislation, they would have provided a solution for the legal incapacity of animals to exercise those rights.

Is it best then to seek a constitutional or legal amendment which explicitly upgrades animals to legal subjects? This contribution recognises the need for stricter legal protection of animals, but questions whether legal subjectivity for animals is the most suitable instrument. As a legal instrument, the status of legal subject is entirely tailored to humans, not animals. Obviously, animals ‘deserve’ rights as much as humans, but the core question is whether these rights would be of any use to them. Animals themselves attach no value whatsoever to rights. What matters to them is their welfare, for which – rights or not – they are inevitably dependent on humans. There is no reason to believe that animal welfare will be better protected in the form of rights than in the form of welfare legislation. Also, whether deliberately or not, even in the animal rights discourse human preferences – and therefore inequalities between animals – seem to seep in.

Animal rights are not necessary for better enforcement – private or not – of animal welfare safeguards. This can be achieved just as effectively by giving animal welfare organisations the broadest possible access to courts. Likewise, lawmakers cannot wait for animal rights in order to give heavier legal weight to the animal interest or improve the scientific quality of animal welfare law. Under the current legal framework already, lawmakers are under the obligation to better protect animals.

The author accordingly concludes with a plea for a sharper legal focus on what it is already possible without granting animals rights: the (enforcement) of higher quality animal welfare regulations in accordance with higher norms such as article 13 TFEU and the principles of proper regulation.

By enacting the Law of 4/4/2019, Parliament has inserted general legislation governing B2B unfair terms and conditions into the Belgian legal order. The legal literature has subjected this B2B set of rules, to an extensive critique, advocating its review, nay total abolition, even before the reform of the law of obligations. This reform now raises the specific question as to whether the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions retain their reason for existence. This is because Book 5 of the Civil Code (CC) contains a general rule governing unfair terms and conditions (Article 5.52) as well as expressly regulating a number of clauses featured on B2B lists, such as escape clauses (Article 5.89) and compensation clauses (Article 5.88). In order to find an answer to this question, the author subjects the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions to a systematic comparison with the protection afforded by Book 5 of the Civil Code – buttressed by a comparative analysis of the rules applying under the laws of France, The Netherlands and Germany.

From an analysis and comparative study of the legal area in question, it emerges in the first instance that virtually all situations protected under the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions also come within the scope of the general rules governing this field. The main area where the general rules actually have a narrower scope – to wit, a restriction covering terms and conditions which are incapable of negotiation, is precisely the area where the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions are deemed to be too broad. All this leads the author to conclude that, at least when it comes to the scope of the legislation in question, there is no need to retain a separate set of rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions.

When comparing the general rule contained in Article 5.52 CC and Article VI.91/3 of the Business Law Code, it emerges that the general rules contained in the legislation on B2B unfair terms and conditions add but little value to the general rules. Both sets of rules apply the same criteria, in both cases the same type of marginal assessment applies, and the assessment criteria are also largely the same. Accordingly, the general B2B rules does not appear to justify their continued existence following the reformed law of obligations.

This is followed by an analysis and assessment of the list system – resulting in a plea for its abolition in a B2B context. At the same time, this analysis recognises that the question whether the list system should be retained or not is essentially a political one. That is why the second part of the author’s analysis starts from the notion that, should the ultimate decision – politically-motivated or not – be that the list system is to be retained, it would nevertheless remain necessary to review the current lists in order to remove its shortcomings from a technical legal point of view, and to bring these lists in line with the reformed law of obligations. To this end, the author systematically assesses the lists on the basis of three cumulative criteria for the justified retention of any of the terms in question – or any part of them. This assessment prompts a proposal for a unitary blacklist – in the event of the list system being retained.

Finally, from an analysis of the various remedy mechanisms, it would appear that, whilst the voidance penalty is similar to that applying under the general rules, the legislation on B2B unfair terms and conditions provides a number of additional possible remedies. These accommodate the “fear factor”, i.e. the reluctance on the part of weaker businesses to challenge unfair terms and conditions for fear of endangering the business relationship in question. This is why, even if the rules on B2B unfair terms and conditions were to be abolished, these additional remedies should be retained – applying the general rules on unfair terms and conditions for B2B transactions. This could be achieved by a process of cross-referencing contained in the relevant provisions of the Business Law Code.

Over the past half century, the expression ‘common core’ has undoubtedly been a pole of attraction for lawyers – at least for academic lawyers. As is frequently the case with attractive figures of speech, this one has several layers to it. In this contribution, I endeavour to bring a typology and classification to this concept, and in so doing to examine the most interesting developments which have occurred around this concept, especially in comparative law. At the same time, this is a timely opportunity for airing a number of observations on comparative law method, and on the relationship between comparative law and legal harmonisation.

In Part II I discuss the early exponents of the common core project method, and more particularly four exceptional 20th century legal scholars. Section A starts with examining the origin of the ‘common core’ concept, with particular regard to the French authors around the turn of that century, and further especially to Rudolf Schlesinger, then analyses the factual method of comparative law as developed by the latter. Section B focuses on Ernst Rabel, together with the early history of the functional comparative law method, and its relationship with private international law. Section C discusses the contribution made by Gino Gorla, and, briefly, already touches on Rodolfo Sacco, whose work is discussed more extensively later. The context in which this concept was developed further, i.e. the period following World War II, is discussed in Section D.

In Parts III and IV, I discuss the various types of Common Core projects, attempting to draw comparisons between them in the light of the relationship between comparative law and legal harmonisation. In Part III, I identify four types. Section A features the search for functional equivalents. Section B features the quest to discover a jus commune in the current case law. Section C features the quest to discover common principles based on a ‘better law’ approach, and Section D the endeavours to identify a common tradition. In Section E I add a number of critical observations with regard to the results of the various endeavours described in previous sections. The object here is not to discuss the issues surrounding legal harmonisation as such, or the question whether such a harmonisation is desirable, or to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the various methods involved, or to provide an assessment of various harmonisation projects from this point of view. Nonetheless, this contribution does contain a number of critical observations regarding the claims made in certain projects concerning the existence of a common core. In fact, Section E examines the question whether it makes sense to consider a restatement of the private law in Europe – or at least within the European Union. My conclusion is that the authors who have examined the notion of a common core have ultimately failed to create a common core in the true sense, but in the course of their endeavours have certainly enhanced and enriched comparative law methods.

In Part IV I discuss the comparative law projects which do not seek to achieve harmonisation, or at least do endeavour to acquire a better understanding of both the differences and the similarities between the various European legal systems – more particularly the Trento common core project (A). Following a brief overview of other current work in this field in Section B, Section C attempts to understand the particular significance and the additional value of comparative law based on the Trento common core model, as it could emerge from studying a broader spectrum of sources and factors (the ‘legal formants’ – including a number of somewhat cryptic elements (the ‘cryptotypes’).

In the course of our research, we encountered two approaches to a common core, on one hand the traditional harmonising common core approach, which in the first place seeks to find solutions to similar problems which are essentially regarded as similar, as expressing the same principles. The common core method embedded in the Sacco doctrine, on the other hand, led to the revision of the theories concerning legal sources as well as to other ways of identifying similarities and differences. Here, we encountered an alternative approach of the common core concept – an approach which also does attach importance to subtle technicalities, peripheral considerations and cryptotypes in order thus to be able to comprehend the long-term underlying structures which on the one hand can reveal greater differences than current concrete solutions to individual cases, but which, on the other hand, bring to light less obvious similarities by taking into account not only the dominant, but also the non-dominant formants.

I can conclude that, where comparative law merely attempts to provide a true picture of the currently applicable law under the reviewed systems, in most cases a factual method provides one of the most suitable instruments, whereas reducing the law to bare principles provides nothing like a true picture. However, if it is also important to discover what could be the answer provided by these systems in the future, all legal formants play an important part here – and not only the actual concrete solutions to the practical cases involved. They teach us how legal systems develop, and how the relevant solutions, which are discovered at different stages and in different places, are frequently functional equivalents in relation to the same problem, which do not represent the sole possible solution, but on the other hand are frequently associated with the legal system as a whole.

Together with some 150 Master students of family property law at the KU Leuven, we analysed 778 recent court decisions on the economic implications of de facto cohabitation. By assembling various empirical data on the litigation between (former) de facto partners we intended to highlight the legal interests and requirements of this group of people, and thus at the same time to indicate the direction which legislation in the Civil Code could take. The relevant set of data contains information on the de facto partners’ profiles, the type of conflict that leads them to litigate, and the facts which serve as a basis for the courts in reaching their decisions. This investigation yielded a number of remarkable results.

The first one to note was that the courts do not apply a standard terminology when ruling on de facto cohabitation. This is especially the case for the Frenchspeaking lower courts, which appear to use a wide variety when it comes to the terms used. Nevertheless, the dominant terminology applied by the courts appears to be “feitelijke samenwoning” (Dutch) or “cohabitation de fait” (French) – these terms having been used in almost 70 per cent of the relevant decisions. This is why the relevant lawmakers would be best advised to use these terms when drafting legislation on this subject.

The second noteworthy aspect is that hardly any of the parties’ specific details, such as their age, income, whether or not there were any children, were featured in these decisions – whereas one would have thought that such details would play a prominent part in this context. Indeed, in the absence of any specific legislation on the subject of de facto cohabitation, the courts apply the ordinary rules in this area.

Thirdly, the investigation highlighted the key role played by the family home. In the vast majority of cases, any litigation regarding property rights between (former) de facto partners follows the same pattern – two de facto partners who jointly bought a residence and fell into dispute on its allocation following the break-up of their relationship. Any other legal issues have but a secondary role here. This is why any future legislation governing de facto cohabitation should contain rules on the protection and allocation of the family home following a break-up in their relationship. It does however appear that the case law on dissolving joint ownership provides a workable basis for solving this issue based on the applicable ordinary rules.

Finally, the issue on which the ordinary law appears to be at its most deficient is when it comes to conflicts regarding compensation for any investment in the (former) partner’s property. Barring disputes on allocation of property, these conflicts represent the most common cause of litigation, but only rarely reach a satisfactory outcome. The relevant legal grounds – unjustified enrichment and contribution to the expenses of the household – are the least successful among the grounds relied upon. These legal grounds are, therefore, relied upon quite frequently, but in most cases unsuccessfully, at least at first instance. The success rate based on these legal grounds is higher on appeal – nevertheless the success ratio achieved for such legal action remains small. It would therefore appear that the lawmakers should regard an adequate system of rules governing compensation for any investment made in the other partner’s property as a priority area.

The modernised set of rules relating to rights of superficies under Belgian law creates several opportunities for the advancement of space efficiency. Making it possible to accumulate eternal rights of superficies provides the opportunity to combine various spatial functions within the same building and to approach the property in question from a tri-dimensional perspective. Thus, eternal rights of superficies provide a possible solution for the problem of land scarcity and for the durability challenges currently facing society. In this contribution, the authors discuss the opportunities and restrictions involved in using eternal rights of superficies as an instrument for ensuring the durable use of land. The analysis consists of two parts – one dealing with the contractual aspects, the other with the environmental law dimension.

If eternal rights of superficies are to become an effective instrument for the durable use of land, it is appropriate, when it comes to the creation of such a right, to approach its constituent elements using the purposive method of interpretation. Any over-rigid interpretation of the requirements concerning heterogeneity, complexity, self-standing elements, or the absence of common areas should be avoided. By adopting this approach, eternal rights of superficies, being the de facto volume ownership, can reach their full potential and the durability objective becomes capable of realisation.

In terms of the relevant environmental law, a pragmatic approach is also desirable when it comes to tri-dimensional accumulation of ownership – more particularly in relation to the question whether an allotment permit is required for the creation of volume ownership. In keeping with recent decisions by the Board for Planning Permit Disputes (Raad voor Vergunningsbetwistingen) the authors conclude that there is no allotment licence requirement for the erection of residential volumes – at least where the splitting up occurs at the purely horizontal level. Nevertheless, they have several observations to make in the light of the rationale behind the allotment licence legislation. This is because, even when it comes to the horizontal splitting up of property, quality control as overseen by the public authorities needs to be ensured, as does the ability on the part of the owner of the allotted part or volume to actually build on it.

This contribution is focused on compensation rights as part of the enforcement, at the private law level, of EU competition law as contained in Articles 101-102 TFEU. The traditional starting point here is that the right to compensation in this area is based on the applicable law of torts at the national level. The fault/unlawfulness requirement, for example, is interpreted in the light of the infringement of competition law committed. However, in the light of the relevant Court of Justice decisions, the author argues that the basis for such right to compensation is directly contained in Articles 101-102 TFEU.

Thus, it can be seen from the landmark decisions on the private law enforcement of EU competition law, i.e. the judgments in Courage v Crehan (2001) and Manfredi (2006) that there is definitely an autonomous European set of rules governing compensation. However, this does not necessarily mean that what we are dealing with here is a fully elaborated European system of compensation rules – which is why the national laws must supplement EU law on this subject. However, the precise interaction between European and domestic law is a matter which has given rise to much debate. Based on an extensive comparative study involving the tort laws of the EU member states on the one hand, and that of the EU institutions on the other, this paper argues that what we are dealing with here is a one-dimensional, rather than a two-dimensional, system of compensation laws.

This entails that components of a right to compensation law, both as to substance and procedure, are essentially EU law components, but only to the extent that EU rules on the subject are actually available. Such rules can be found directly in Articles 101-102 TFEU – as can be seen from the Skanska (2019) and Sumal (2021) decisions. As is the case with the tort laws of the EU member states and institutions, these rules can also be gauged from the general principles which are common to the legal systems of the EU member states.

In the absence of a – complete – set of EU laws, it is the applicable domestic law of torts which, in accordance with the principle of national autonomy enjoyed by the EU member states, will regulate the essential components of the European right to compensation. Here, however, it is a requirement that the domestic rules meet the equivalence and effectiveness criteria.

The Directive on the rules governing actions for damages (2014/194/EU) takes no specific position on what should be the basis for the right to compensation. Given that to a large extent the Directive has adopted the reasoning followed by the Court of Justice, it implicitly recognises that there is an autonomous basis for this in EU law.

Over the past half century, the expression ‘common core’ has undoubtedly been a pole of attraction for lawyers – at least for academic lawyers. As is frequently the case with attractive figures of speech, this one has several layers to it. In this contribution, I endeavour to bring a typology and classification to this concept, and in so doing to examine the most interesting developments which have occurred around this concept, especially in comparative law. At the same time, this is a timely opportunity for airing a number of observations on comparative law method, and on the relationship between comparative law and legal harmonisation.

In Part II I discuss the early exponents of the common core project method, and more particularly four exceptional 20th century legal scholars. Section A starts with examining the origin of the ‘common core’ concept, with particular regard to the French authors around the turn of that century, and further especially to Rudolf Schlesinger, then analyses the factual method of comparative law as developed by the latter. Section B focuses on Ernst Rabel, together with the early history of the functional comparative law method, and its relationship with private international law. Section C discusses the contribution made by Gino Gorla, and, briefly, already touches on Rodolfo Sacco, whose work is discussed more extensively later. The context in which this concept was developed further, i.e. the period following World War II, is discussed in Section D.

In 2022 zijn de termen duurzaamheid en duurzame ontwikkeling niet meer weg te denken uit het brede maatschappelijke en het academische debat. Er is zeer veel voor te zeggen om ook het privaatrecht te betrekken bij dit debat. Het privaatrecht is namelijk een rechtsgebied dat kan helpen bij het behalen van de duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen. Door niet alleen publiekrechtelijk af te dwingen of prikkels te scheppen, maar vooral ook privaatrechtelijk te faciliteren, kan het recht burgers en bedrijven ertoe aanzetten om zelf actie ondernemen. Nu zijn er verschillende manieren om duurzaamheid in het privaatrecht te benaderen. Afhankelijk van de definitie van duurzaamheid en het deelgebied van het privaatrecht leidt dat tot verschillende uitkomsten. In deze bijdrage trachten wij beide elementen te benoemen en onder een gezamenlijke begripsvorming en methodologie te brengen. Zo creëren wij een basisonderzoeksagenda voor de subdiscipline Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid.

In een eerste beweging gaat onze aandacht uit naar de betekenis van het concept ‘duurzaamheid’. Daarbij zoeken wij aansluiting bij de algemeen bekende en aanvaarde omschrijving die de Verenigde Naties hanteren. Die omschrijving concretiseren wij vervolgens met het oog op privaatrechtelijk onderzoek.

In een tweede beweging ontwikkelen wij een normatieve en proactieve methodologie voor Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid. Daarbij bouwen wij in sterke mate voort op de normatieve methode van Joseph Singer, om deze vervolgens in een zeer concrete tweestapsmethode te gieten die rechtstreeks kan worden toegepast door elke onderzoeker binnen Privaatrecht en Duurzaamheid. Deze methode wordt vervolgens in verband gebracht met de rechtstheoretische traditie van de Interessenjurisprudenz. Ten slotte illustreren wij onze methode aan de hand van een aantal concrete toepassingsgevallen.

Binnen het Belgische recht wordt vaak de rol van de werkelijke wil van de contractpartijen benadrukt. Zo zou de bindende kracht van de overeenkomst voortkomen uit de werkelijke wil van de partijen. Zo ook wordt het consensualisme ingevuld door te stellen dat overeenkomsten ontstaan door de subjectieve wilsovereenstemming tussen partijen.

In deze bijdrage proberen we deze stellingen te ontkrachten. Eerder dan door de werkelijke wil, menen we dat partijen worden verbonden door het rechtmatige vertrouwen dat anderen stellen in hun wilsverklaringen. We illustreren dit uitgebreid aan de hand van de dwalingsfiguur, en ook beknopter aan de hand van enkele moderne uitdagingen van het verbintenissenrecht, zoals de aanvaarding van algemene voorwaarden en de inzet van autonome computersystemen.

De idee dat de wettelijke en contractuele rangorde bij insolventieprocedures wordt gerespecteerd, is bij de huidige Belgische reorganisatieprocedure door collectief akkoord eerder een mythe dan realiteit. De achtergestelde aandeelhouders behouden structureel hun positie in het kapitaal terwijl de niet-gesecureerde schuldeisers afschrijvingen ondergaan. Het systematisch niet-respecteren van een ex ante overeengekomen rang bij een herstructurering is niet alleen vreemd vanuit juridisch oogpunt, maar heeft ook verstrekkende economische implicaties die inefficiënt zijn.

De implementatie van de Europese Herstructureringsrichtlijn, die de lidstaten oplegt om bij de richtlijnconforme herstructureringsprocedures de relative priority rule (RPR) of de absolute priority rule (APR) te introduceren, stemt tot nadenken. Op basis van rechtsvergelijkende en rechtseconomische inzichten bepleiten we de introductie van een gerelativeerde APR. De gerelativeerde APR heeft, net zoals de (gewone) APR, als uitgangspunt de wettelijke en contractuele rangorde bij faillissem*nt. Afwijken kan enkel mits de klasse wiens pre-akkoordrechten niet worden gerespecteerd daarmee instemt. De gerelativeerde APR verduidelijkt dat (i) de gesecureerde schuldeisers enkel een bevoorrechte aanspraak hebben op de liquidatiewaarde van hun onderpand (gewaardeerd in een stuksgewijze verkoop of in een verkoop in continuïteit), en niet op de reorganisatiewaarde (d.i. gewaardeerd in de situatie dat het akkoord tot stand komt, bv. via een discounted cash flow methode) (bifurcatie), en dat (ii) aandeelhouders (een deel van) hun belang kunnen aanhouden als zij in ruil nieuwe waarde (financiering) inbrengen in de onderneming of als zij daadwerkelijk cruciaal zijn voor de onderneming en gedurende een redelijke termijn verbonden blijven met de onderneming (te vergelijken met een inbreng in geld of in natura) – een gelijkaardige redenering kan worden gemaakt voor strategische schuldeisers. Tot slot argumenteren we dat de 20%-regel die we vandaag naar Belgisch recht kennen eigenlijk niets meer is dan een verdelingsregel die resoluut afwijkt van de door ons verdedigde (gerelativeerde) APR en botst met de gekende rechtseconomisch inzichten.

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt of en hoe Belgische rechters toepassing kunnen maken van de hervormingsprojecten van het Burgerlijk Wetboek die zich nog niet in het eindstadium van het wetgevende proces bevinden en daardoor nog niet zijn goedgekeurd door de volksvertegenwoordigers. In welke mate is zo’n voornafname een vorm van normale rechtsontwikkeling door de rechters in hun zoektocht naar maatschappelijke consensus? Verzetten de rechtstatelijke principes van de scheiding der machten en van de rechtszekerheid zich daartegen? Of komt zo’n voorafname de rechtszekerheid net ten goede wanneer het huidige recht onduidelijk of onvolledig is?

Om die vragen te kunnen beantwoorden, neemt de bijdrage het Nederlandse recht onder de loep. Dat rechtsstelsel kent ‘anticipatie’ al beter. Nederlandse rechters anticipeerden met name op de langdurige hervorming van het Nederlandse Burgerlijk Wetboek. Ook het Belgische Burgerlijk Wetboek staat momenteel in de steigers. De hervorming van het buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht biedt daarom een ideale gelegenheid om de mogelijkheden, maar vooral ook de grenzen van Belgische anticipatie concreet af te tasten.

Het moge van meet af aan duidelijk zijn: ik sluit volmondig aan bij de filosofie van de Commissie van experten tot hervorming van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht(1), te weten de verbetering van de situatie van schadelijders.

Dit neemt niet weg dat ik van mening kan verschillen over een aantal opties, die door de Commissie werden weerhouden. Niemand zal het mij ten kwade duiden, aangezien de opzet van dit themanummer erin bestaat de voorliggende hervormingsopties(2) in een open en constructieve geest te bespreken.

Deze bijdrage behandelt daarbij, enerzijds, enkele aspecten rond het begrip “schade” in het Ontwerp en, anderzijds, een aantal causaliteitsvragen bij objectieve aansprakelijkheden.

Deze bijdrage peilt naar de grondslagen van het rechtspersonenrecht. De rechtspersoon is een rechtssubject zoals de mens; hij geniet van dezelfde rechts- en handelingsbekwaamheid. De orgaantheorie laat de rechtspersoon toe in rechte op treden. Het lot van de rechtspersoon wordt bepaald door de oprichtingshandeling die een eenzijdige handeling, een overeenkomst of een overheidsbeslissing kan zijn. Daarin wordt gekozen voor een bepaalde rechtsvorm en identiteit die zijn staat vormt. In de vennootschap en de vereniging zal deze oprichtingshandeling de grondslag zijn van de contractuele ruimte waarin vennoten respectievelijk leden onderling en met de rechtspersoon samenwerken.

De bepaling van de grondslagen van de rechtspersoon maakt het mogelijk het juridische kader waarin de rechtspersoon is ingebed te omschrijven. Het helpt lacunes in bijzondere wetgeving op te vullen en de wetgever aan te zetten tot vervollediging

Deze bijdrage geeft een algemeen overzicht van het nieuwe goederenrecht, zoals goedgekeurd in de Wet van 4 februari 2020. Het goederenrecht was in Boek 2 van het oude Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1804 veruit het meest archaïsche deel van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, dat (op appartementsrecht na) niet hervormd was sinds 1804. Het nieuwe goederenrecht bevat een aantal codificaties, een aantal evoluties en een aantal innovaties. Onder die laatste is bijvoorbeeld te denken aan overkoepelende bepalingen in verband met het goederenrecht, het opvullen van lacunes inzake hypothecaire publiciteit, aandacht voor volume-stapelingen, aandacht voor dieren in het vermogensrecht, een duidelijke articulatie van de wilsautonomie in het goederenrecht.

Dit nieuwe goederenrecht zal ingevoegd worden in Boek 3 van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, waarvan Boek 8 (bewijsrecht) op 1 november 2020 als eerste in werking is treden. Op die datum zal Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1804 afgeschaft worden, zij het dat de nieuwe bepalingen wel in principe eerbiedigende werking hebben.

De verkrijgende verjaring is intrinsiek een ethisch problematische verkrijgingswijze.

Ze ontneemt aan een persoon zonder diens toestemming en (in beginsel) zonder vergoeding diens eigendom. Bij een bezitter te goeder trouw kan men nog begrijpen waarom hij de voorkeur krijgt boven de uittredende eigenaar, maar bij de bezitter niet te goeder trouw (bezitter te kwader trouw) is dit problematisch.

Kan – mag – hij wel aanspraak maken op een zo verregaande bescherming als de verkrijgende verjaring? In België wordt dat traditioneel toegelaten, maar valt op dat de rechtspraak toch vaak erg vijandig staat tegen de bezitter niet te goeder trouw.

Het Nederlandse recht stond lange tijd uitermate vijandig tegen de bezitter niet te goeder trouw, maar laat sinds 1992 toch de verkrijgende verjaring door een bezitter niet te goeder trouw toe. Het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht staat dan weer onverschillig tegenover de goede dan wel kwade trouw, hoewel de rechtspraak hier toch rekening mee durft te houden. De voorliggende bijdrage contrasteert deze oplossingen en probeert tot een evenwichtige oplossing te komen.

Onze economie wordt steeds meer een diensteneconomie. In toenemende mate worden diensten toegevoegd aan de verkoop van goederen aan consumenten en steeds vaker sluiten consumenten overeenkomsten waarbij ze nog slechts een gebruiksrecht verkrijgen over een goed of waarbij hen zelfs enkel een bepaald functioneel resultaat wordt gegarandeerd. De dienstverstrekker blijft eigenaar. Deze bijdrage analyseert de gevolgen van deze evolutie voor de positie van de consument.

De inleiding van deze bijdrage gaat kort in op de verschillende vormen van ‘product- dienst-systeem’ (‘PDS’) en de daaraan verbonden economische voor- en nadelen. Ook de band met de circulaire economie komt aan bod. PDS blijkt immers niet per se duurzamer.

De focus van deze bijdrage ligt echter op de uitdagingen die PDS meebrengt voor de rechtspositie van de consument, zowel bij de totstandkoming als bij de uitvoering van deze overeenkomsten. De rode draad doorheen deze bijdrage is dat de consument bij PDS minder bescherming geniet dan bij een traditioneel koopcontract waarbij hij eigendom verwerft.

Een uitgebreid wettelijk kader voor dienstencontracten ontbreekt immers momenteel, en dwingende bepalingen voor B2C dienstencontracten zijn naar Belgisch recht quasi onbestaand. Een kwalificatie als huur- of aannemingsovereenkomst biedt de consument dan ook weinig bescherming.

De belangrijkste bescherming blijkt uiteindelijk voort te vloeien uit de regeling inzake oneerlijke bedingen. Een kennelijk onevenwichtige contractuele regeling van onder meer de gebruiksrechten, het risico, de opschortingsrechten, enz. kan op deze basis worden aangevochten. Dit beschermingsmechanisme blijft echter in essentie een negatief mechanisme, dat toelaat onevenwichtig clausules nietig te verklaren, maar het garandeert geen minimum aan rechten en remedies voor PDS-consumenten. Deze bijdrage gaat daarom ook in op enkele mogelijke oplossingen voor het gebrek aan bescherming van de consument, zoals standaardisering, standaardcontracten en het ontwikkelen van uitgebreider wettelijk kader voor dienstencontracten.

Deze bijdrage vertrekt vanuit de vaststelling dat het goederenrecht lacunair is en dat verschillende onvolkomenheden kunnen worden opgevangen door een contractuele regeling. Dit wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van kwalitatieve verbintenissen, zoals de onderhoudsplicht opgelegd aan de eigenaar van een lijdend erf in het kader van een erfdienstbaarheid en de canonverplichting van een erfpachter.

Het eerste deel van deze bijdrage analyseert verschillende onvolkomenheden in het goederenrecht die naar Belgisch recht nauwelijks besproken worden, maar waarin het Nederlandse recht al verder ontwikkeld is. De modulering van zakelijke rechten komt aan bod en met name de vraag of en in hoeverre partijen bij de vestiging van een zakelijk recht rechten, verplichtingen en bevoegdheden met zakelijke werking kunnen toevoegen. Ook de juridische gevolgen van de overdracht en afstand van het zakelijk recht zijn niet afdoende geregeld. Zo is het onduidelijk of en in welke mate de overdrager na de overdracht nog gehouden is tot de verplichtingen verbonden aan het zakelijk recht. Naar Nederlands recht zijn voor specifieke zakelijke rechten wel bepalingen die de aansprakelijkheid na overdracht regelen en de Hervorming Goederenrecht voert ook voor het Belgische recht een regeling in, zowel voor de juridische gevolgen na overdracht als na afstand van het zakelijk recht.

In het tweede deel komt aan bod hoe partijen bij de vestiging of overdracht van het zakelijk recht hun rechtspositie zo goed en volledig mogelijk kunnen regelen, de besproken lacunes indachtig. Zelfs als de wet een regeling bevat, willen partijen hier mogelijks van afwijken, in welk geval de suppletieve of dwingende werking van de wettelijke bepalingen moet worden nagegaan. Uit deze bijdrage blijkt dat partijen in grote mate het goederenrecht door middel van een of meerdere contracten naar hun hand kunnen zetten, en in bepaalde gevallen zelfs quasi-zakelijke werking kunnen verlenen aan louter persoonlijke bedingen, zoals een kettingbeding of een beperking van de beschikkingsbevoegdheid.

Deze bijdrage vertrekt vanuit de vaststelling dat het goederenrecht lacunair is en dat verschillende onvolkomenheden kunnen worden opgevangen door een contractuele regeling. Dit wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van kwalitatieve verbintenissen, zoals de onderhoudsplicht opgelegd aan de eigenaar van een lijdend erf in het kader van een erfdienstbaarheid en de canonverplichting van een erfpachter.

Het eerste deel van deze bijdrage analyseert verschillende onvolkomenheden in het goederenrecht die naar Belgisch recht nauwelijks besproken worden, maar waarin het Nederlandse recht al verder ontwikkeld is. De modulering van zakelijke rechten komt aan bod en met name de vraag of en in hoeverre partijen bij de vestiging van een zakelijk recht rechten, verplichtingen en bevoegdheden met zakelijke werking kunnen toevoegen. Ook de juridische gevolgen van de overdracht en afstand van het zakelijk recht zijn niet afdoende geregeld. Zo is het onduidelijk of en in welke mate de overdrager na de overdracht nog gehouden is tot de verplichtingen verbonden aan het zakelijk recht. Naar Nederlands recht zijn voor specifieke zakelijke rechten wel bepalingen die de aansprakelijkheid na overdracht regelen en de Hervorming Goederenrecht voert ook voor het Belgische recht een regeling in, zowel voor de juridische gevolgen na overdracht als na afstand van het zakelijk recht.

In het tweede deel komt aan bod hoe partijen bij de vestiging of overdracht van het zakelijk recht hun rechtspositie zo goed en volledig mogelijk kunnen regelen, de besproken lacunes indachtig. Zelfs als de wet een regeling bevat, willen partijen hier mogelijks van afwijken, in welk geval de suppletieve of dwingende werking van de wettelijke bepalingen moet worden nagegaan. Uit deze bijdrage blijkt dat partijen in grote mate het goederenrecht door middel van een of meerdere contracten naar hun hand kunnen zetten, en in bepaalde gevallen zelfs quasi-zakelijke werking kunnen verlenen aan louter persoonlijke bedingen, zoals een kettingbeding of een beperking van de beschikkingsbevoegdheid.

Het Belgische verbintenissenrecht steunt op het beginsel van de wilsautonomie. Dat behelst de vrijheid voor partijen om de inhoud van hun overeenkomsten zelf te bepalen. De klassieke verantwoording voor dat beginsel luidt dat iedere partij gelijkwaardig is en dus haar eigen belangen kan verdedigen. Blijkt één van de partijen zich in werkelijkheid evenwel in een ondergeschikte onderhandelingspositie te bevinden ten opzichte van de wederpartij, dan zijn correcties wenselijk. De wetgever kan dan tussenkomen om partijen op hetzelfde onderhandelingsniveau te tillen, met name door regels die contractpartijen beschermen tegen onrechtmatige bedingen.

De wet van 4 april 2019 voert voor het eerst in België regels in die ondernemingen moeten beschermen tegen onrechtmatige bedingen. De nieuwe regels flankeren de bestaande bepalingen over onrechtmatige bedingen in overeenkomsten met consumenten, maar wijken daarvan inhoudelijk af. De wetgever verantwoordt de uitbreiding van B2C- naar B2B-verhoudingen met het argument dat ondergeschikte onderhandelingsposities ook voorkomen bij partijen die handelen in het kader van een beroepsactiviteit, zodat ook zij bescherming behoeven.

Deze bijdrage gaat na op welke punten de nieuwe B2B-wet de wilsautonomie kan beperken en in welke mate de toegevoegde bescherming ten koste gaat van de rechtszekerheid. Het onderzoek gaat daarbij in op de motieven van de wetgever en maakt onder meer gebruik van een rechtsvergelijkende analyse waarin Duitsland, Frankrijk, Nederland en Italië zijn betrokken. Het toepassingsgebied, de beschermingstechnieken en de sancties kunnen rekenen op een kritische blik. Het besluit is dat de mogelijke impact op de wilsautonomie en rechtszekerheid aanzienlijk is en dat er voor die impact niet steeds een duidelijke rechtvaardigingsgrond voorhanden is. Het is daarom wenselijk dat de rechtspraak zich terughoudend opstelt bij de interpretatie van de nieuwe regels en dat de wetgever zich beraadt over een aantal aanpassingen.

Deze bijdrage heeft tot doel de verwarring die in de rechtspraak en rechtsleer

bestaat met betrekking tot het lot van lopende overeenkomsten bij faillissem*nt in

kaart te brengen en vervolgens op te helderen. Het uitgangspunt betreft de fundamentele

regel dat het enkele intreden van het faillissem*nt in beginsel geen einde

maakt aan de lopende overeenkomsten waarbij de gefailleerde partij is. Het begrip

‘lopende overeenkomst’ wordt geanalyseerd en gedefinieerd. Vervolgens wordt het

keuzerecht van de curator besproken. De curator kan opteren voor de uitvoering

van een lopende overeenkomst, waardoor de daaruit voortvloeiende verbintenissen

gekwalificeerd worden als boedelschulden. Daarnaast kan de curator beslissen om

de verbintenissen die op het moment van de opening van de faillissem*ntsprocedure

op de gefailleerde rusten niet uit te voeren. Een beslissing tot niet-uitvoering kan niet

meer gevolgen ressorteren dan een wanprestatie van de gefailleerde vóór de opening

van de faillissem*ntsprocedure. Het keuzerecht van de curator wordt uitgesloten

ten aanzien van intuitu personae-overeenkomsten en overeenkomsten die een ipso

facto-clausule bevatten. Onder restrictieve voorwaarden kan de curator een lopende

overeenkomst beëindigen. Deze bevoegdheid geeft de curator de mogelijkheid

om (1) verbintenissen die ongevoelig zijn voor een beslissing tot niet-uitvoering te

frustreren, (2) een goed te zuiveren van tegenwerpelijke persoonlijke rechten en

(3) vermogensvoordelen te verschaffen aan de failliete boedel. De eenzijdige beëindigingsbevoegdheid

betreft een toepassing van het paritas creditorum-beginsel en

verruimt, net als de faillissem*ntspauliana, de verhaalsrechten van de gezamenlijke

schuldeisers.

In die sivielregtelike tradisie word sekere remedies wat gemik is op die restitusie of teruggawe van verryking beskryf as “billik” of “equitable”. Die doel van hierdie bydrae is om hierdie beskrywing van nader te beskou, veral binne die konteks van die ongekodifiseerde Suid-Afrikaanse verrykingsreg, ʼn vertakking van die verbintenisreg, naas die kontraktereg en deliktereg, wat ʼn aantal eise om restitusie onder hierdie banier verenig. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat verwysings na billikheid in die konteks van die verrykingsreg minstens drie funksies kan vervul, naamlik i) om die toestaan van ʼn remedie te regverdig of te legitimeer; ii) om aan te dui dat howe die diskresie geniet om na gelang van die feite of omstandighede ʼn remedie te bied, en iii) om, soos goeie trou in die kontraktereg, as ʼn soort katalisator te dien vir regsontwikkeling. Hierdie drie funksies word krities evalueer en die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat verwysings na billikheid in die verrykingsreg met omsigtigheid hanteer moet word en oor die algemeen ʼn beperkte bydrae kan lewer tot die toepassing van bestaande reg of tot die ontwikkeling van nuwe reg.

In de civielrechtelijke traditie worden bepaalde remedies die de restitutie of teruggave van een verrijking viseren, beschreven als billijk of “equitable”. Het doel van deze bijdrage is om die beschrijving nader te analyseren, vooral binnen de context van het niet-gecodificeerde Zuid-Afrikaanse verrijkingsrecht, dat een tak is van het verbintenissenrecht, naast het contractenrecht en onrechtmatige daadsrecht. Dat stelt een aantal eisen om de restitutie op te leggen. Het zal blijken dat verwijzingen naar billijkheid in de context van het verrijkingsrecht drie functies kan vervullen, namelijk om (1) de toekenning van een remedie te verdedigen of rechtvaardigen, (2) aan te duiden dat gerechtshoven een beoordelingsvrijheid hebben om naargelang van de feiten of omstandigheden een remedie toe te kennen en (3) zoals goede trouw in het contractenrecht, als een soort katalysator te dienen voor de rechtsontwikkeling. Deze drie functies worden kritisch geëvalueerd, waaruit wordt geconcludeerd dat verwijzingen naar de billijkheid in het verrijkingsrecht met omzichtigheid moeten worden gehanteerd en in het algemeen slechts een beperkte bijdrage kan leveren aan de toepassing van het bestaande recht of ontwikkeling van het nieuwe recht.

Wie ‘windturbines’ zegt, denkt vaak aan problemen zoals geluidsoverlast en slagschaduw, of aan te realiseren doelstellingen op vlak van hernieuwbare energie. Nochtans is het niet al administratief recht en energierecht wat de klok slaat in de (juridische) wereld van de windturbines.

In deze bijdrage wordt de niet onbelangrijke rol van het privaatrecht voor de aanleg en exploitatie van onshore windturbines toegelicht. Naast een klassiek juridisch-dogmatisch onderzoek werd een kwalitatieve documentenanalyse verricht en werden interviews afgenomen bij respondenten met uiteenlopende profielen. De inplanting van windturbines vergt een optimale interactie tussen energierecht, administratief recht en privaatrecht. Een analyse van de resultaten van de afgenomen interviews heeft uitgewezen dat de weg naar dergelijke optimale interactie bezaaid ligt met tal van juridische obstakels. Deze bijdrage ambieert geen exhaustief overzicht te bieden van alle mogelijke problemen en oplossingen bij de inplanting van windturbines. Wel worden enkele voor de praktijk relevante juridische obstakels uitgelicht en geanalyseerd.

Met toenemende klimaatverandering, de eindigheid van fossiele brandstoffen en toenemende ongelijkheid in de (westerse) wereld, alsook de verplichtingen die de landen zijn aangegaan in het kader van het bereiken van de 17 VN-duurzaamheidsdoelstellingen, is het nodig om het goederenrecht te herijken, d.w.z. van nieuwe waarden te voorzien.

Het herijken van ons goederenrecht vereist het inzicht dat het goederenrecht gevormd is door liberaal en neoliberaal filosofisch en economisch gedachtegoed. Hierbij valt te denken aan aardbevingen veroorzaakt door gaswinning in Groningen en hypotheken verstrekt aan klanten waarvan bij voorbaat duidelijk is dat zij niet in staat zullen zijn om hun schuld te betalen. Door een andere filosofische grondslag te kiezen, kan het goederenrecht een nieuwe weg inslaan die niet alleen gericht is op groei, maar op het gebruikmaken van onze middelen voor onszelf en voor de generaties die na ons komen.

Er is voor de ontwikkeling van een duurzaam goederenrecht, een set regels nodig op basis waarvan problemen kunnen worden opgelost (een algoritme), waarbij een positieve duurzaamheidsverplichting in het eigendomsrecht wordt gelezen en waarbij publiekrecht en privaatrecht samen bezien worden om het recht verder te ontwikkelen. Op basis van dit algoritme kunnen we besluiten op welke wijze we onze huidige regels interpreteren en besluiten of onze regels nog kunnen blijven bestaan in hun huidige vorm. Ook kan dit algoritme gebruikt worden om nieuwe goederenrechtelijke regels te maken. Ons hele goederenrechtelijk stelsel, het eigendomsrecht én de beperkte rechten, alsook onze procedurele regels, moet daarvoor onder handen genomen worden.

Het idee duurzaamheid te bereiken door alles in de vorm van dienstverleningsovereenkomsten te gieten, is niet de juiste weg. Herijking, dat wil zeggen, het integreren in ons systeem van nieuwe waarden, in dit geval het welzijn, door het conceptualiseren van een overeenkomstige goederenrechtelijke verplichting, brengt het goederenrecht naar de voorgrond. Daarmee leveren we de bouwstenen om samen te werken aan een duurzame economie waarin naast welzijn, economische groei voor iedereen en verdere ontwikkeling van nieuwe initiatieven centraal staan.

In de nasleep van de herdenkingen rond de Eerste Wereldoorlog, hield de rechts- historiografie zich enigszins afzijdig en, in tegenstelling tot het onderzoek in de ons omringende landen, bleven de gevolgen van de oorlog van 1914-1918 op het Belgische privaatrecht onderbelicht. Nochtans rapporteerden juristen toen al over de onmiskenbare impact van de oorlog en de bezetting op verschillende rechtstakken zoals het overeenkomstenrecht of het personen- en familierecht.

Deze bijdrage biedt op basis van wetgevende en parlementaire documenten en doc- trinale werken een overzicht van de veranderingen die het nationale privaatrecht zowel tijdens als na de bezettingsjaren doormaakte. Aldus worden de verschillende lacunes binnen de rechtshistoriografie blootgelegd. Aanvankelijk tijdelijke maat- regelen kregen doorheen de oorlogsjaren een permanent karakter, terwijl andere maatregelen een “loodgieterspolitiek” verraden om de kwalijke gevolgen van de oorlog te milderen. Uiteindelijk beëindigde de Eerste Wereldoorlog de 19de-eeuw- se nachtwakersstaat. Het idee dat in de juridische relaties tussen burgers geen staatsinterventie wenselijk was, bleek in 1918 volledig achterhaald. Solidariteit en “rechtvaardigheid” werden voortaan de norm.

Om niet vertrapt te raken tussen de centrale mogendheden en de geallieerde legers hield het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden gedurende de Eerste Wereldoorlog vast aan zijn neutraliteitspolitiek. Hoewel Nederland er in slaagde om op die wijze buiten de gevechtshandelingen te blijven, liet de oorlog wel sporen na op de Nederlandse sociaal-economische verhoudingen. In deze bijdrage staat centraal wat de directe en indirecte invloed van de Grote Oorlog is geweest op het overeenkomstenrecht. Sinds de invoering in 1838 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek was er nog niet een zo ontwrichtend internationaal conflict uitgebroken als deze oorlog bleek te zijn. In zekere zin was de Grote Oorlog dus ook een ‘stresstest’ van de houdbaarheid van de centrale leerstukken van het overeenkomstenrecht zoals het leerstuk van overmacht en onmogelijkheid.

In de literatuur is wel gesteld dat de Eerste We- reldoorlog wat dit betreft niet heel anders was dan andere, minder verstorende gebeurtenissen. Drie ontwikkelingen spreken dit standpunt schijnbaar tegen. Allereerst zien we dat de neutraliteitspolitiek als het ware doorwerkt in de civiele rechtspraak, met onverbiddelijke gevolgtrekkingen voor partijen die zich via de rechter wensten te bevrijden van hun contractsverplichtingen. In de tweede plaats kan de Eerste Wereldoorlog ook worden gezien als het definitieve einde van de laissez-faire gedachte in de regulering van markten, en dus ook het contracten- recht. Ten derde kan, met de kennis van nu, de Eerste Wereldoorlog ook als een van de factoren worden gezien die de uiteindelijke introductie van de leer van de onvoorziene omstandigheden en de latere opmars van de goede trouw verklaren.

In deze bijdrage wordt het gebruik van het eigendomsrecht in de context van de trust onderzocht. Met het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht als perspectief wordt geargumenteerd dat dit gebruik een zekere soepelheid of pragmatisme vergt. Om dit te illustreren, worden drie voorbeelden aangehaald: in de eerste plaats het eigendomsrecht van de trustee ten behoeve van twee verschillende boedels (de trust-boedel en het persoonlijke vermogen van de trustee). Ten tweede het feit dat in een beheerstrust de inkomsten eigendom zijn van de begunstigde van de trust en niet van de trustee (wat nieuwe mogelijkheden creëert voor de trust). En ten derde de wijze waarop het mede-eigendomsrecht van de verschillende mede-trustees wordt geconcipieerd en hoe dit de eigendomsovergang tussen de trustees bij bv. het overlijden van een trustee verklaart.

Hier wordt betoogd dat die soepelheid of dat pragmatisme ingegeven is door een bijzondere benadering van het eigendomsrecht, die als on-wezenlijk kan worden aangemerkt. Dit kenmerk van het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht houdt verband met de wijze waarop de Engelse trust aanvankelijk wel in het Zuid-Afrikaanse recht is gerecipieerd, maar vervolgens door de rechtspraak op pragmatische wijze met bekende rechtsfiguren in lijn is gebracht.

In hierdie bydrae word die hantering van die eiendomsbegrip in die konteks van die trustreg ondersoek. Spesifiek met die Suid-Afrikaanse reg as uitgangspunt word geargumenteer dat hierdie hantering deur ’n besondere soepelheid of pragmatisme gekenmerk word. Ten einde dít te illustreer, word na drie spesifieke voorbeelde verwys: eerstens die hantering van die trustee se eiendomsreg in bates in twee afsondelike boedels (die trustboedel en die trustee se persoonlike boedel); tweedens die feit dat in die bewind trust nie die trustee nie, maar die trustbegunstigde die eienaar van die trustbates is (en die nuwe aanwendingsmoontlikhede vir die trust wat dit skep); en derdens die wyse waarop mede-trustees se mede-eiendomsreg hanteer word en hoe dit die oorgang van eiendomsreg tussen trustees by byvoorbeeld die dood van een trustee verklaar.

Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat hierdie soepelheid of pragmatisme ingegee word deur ‘n besondere benadering tot eiendomsreg, wat as “anti-konseptueel” (anti-conceptual) of “reël-brekend” (rule-breaking) beskryf kan word. Hierdie kenmerk van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg hou waarskynlik verband met die wyse waarop die Engelse (dus common-law) trust aanvanklik wel in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geresipieer is, maar later op ‘n pragmatiese wyse deur die howe in ooreenstemming met bekende sivielregtelike instellings getransformeer is.

In deze bijdrage wordt de rechtsfiguur van de kredietverzuimswap onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van de vertrouwde leerstukken van het privaatrecht zoals kansovereenkomsten, verzekering, garanties en borgtocht. De auteur concludeert dat voor de kredietverzuimswap in zijn oorspronkelijke vorm er geen behoefte is aan een nieuwe categorie, gezien de overeenkomsten met die bestaande rechtsfiguren. Kredietverzuimswaps word vandaag echter grotendeels niet in hun klassieke vorm gebruikt maar primair voor speculatie. In dat perspectief gaat het duidelijk om een kanscontract dat nietig ware geweest indien de wetgever niet had ingegrepen. Wat de geldigheid van contracten van spel en weddenschap betreft is er evenwel al jaren geen lijn meer te trekken in het beleid, waardoor de situatie toch op gespannen voet staat met de bescherming van de openbare orde.

In die bydrae word die regsfiguur van kredietversuimswaps vanuit die perspektief van bestaande privaatregtelike leerstukke en –konstruksies soos kanskontrakte, versekering, garansies, en borgstelling ondersoek. Die outeur kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat aangesien die kredietversuimswap in beginsel vele ooreenkomste met die genoemde konstruksies vertoon, daar nie werklik ’n behoefte bestaan aan ’n nuwe regsfiguur indien die kredietversuimswap in sy klassieke vorm aangewend word nie. Kredietversuimswaps word egter grotendeels nie in sy klassieke vorm aangewend nie, maar primêr vir spekulasiedoeleindes benut. Vanuit daardie perspektief word bevind dat die regsfiguur niks anders as ’n kanskontrak is nie en met ongeldigheid geraak sou wees as dit nie vir wetgewende ingryping was nie. Die openbare beleid het egter deur die jare reeds wat die geldigheid van weddenskappe- en dobbelooreenkomste betref wipplank gery en die huidige situasie is nie noodwendig meer in ooreenstemming met die openbare beleid nie.

Bedrijven en financiële instellingen zoeken naar alternatieven voor de traditionele (her)verzekering om zich in te dekken voor risico’s die moeilijk of niet kunnen worden verzekerd, zoals bijvoorbeeld extreem weer, natuurrampen of terrorisme. Een van die alternatieven is het overdragen van dit risico naar de kapitaalmarkten door het creëren van effecten die gekoppeld zijn aan deze risico’s. Dit kan onder meer met catastrofe-obligaties (catastrophe bonds, CAT-bonds, CAT’s). Ze worden meestal uitgegeven door een projectvennootschap, en worden slechts aan de investeerders terugbetaald indien de gebeurtenis die ze dekt zich niet voordoet tijdens de looptijd van de obligatie. In het andere geval keert de projectvennootschap de door de uitgifte van obligaties verzamelde gelden uit aan de vennootschap die door de ‘catastrofe’ wordt getroffen.

Deze bijdrage onderzoekt de aard van catastrofe-obligatietransactie als verzekerings- dan wel financieringsproduct. Daartoe wordt een analyse gemaakt van de positie van een basis-catastrofe-obligatie binnen het financieel recht en van de instrumenten waaruit ze bestaat (optie en obligatie). Vervolgens worden de voornaamste kenmerken van een verzekering besproken. Tot slot worden deze kenmerken met elkaar vergeleken.

Catastrofe-obligaties worden ontleed als een driehoeksverhouding, met enerzijds (i) de overeenkomst sponsor-projectvennootschap, die vanuit juridisch perspectief mogelijks als (her)verzekering kan worden beschouwd (doch dat vanuit economisch perspectief niet is) en anderzijds (ii) de overeenkomst projectvennootschapinvesteerder, die als een financiële overeenkomst moet worden gezien. Weliswaar geldt dit enkel voor de basiscase, en kan er door in te werken op de factoren en risicoverdeling in de bijdrage aangehaald – vooral het mutualiteitsbeginsel – relatief eenvoudig een ander statuut worden aangenomen. Cruciaal is echter om dit statuut steeds vanuit een driehoeksverhouding te analyseren, in plaats van vanuit de traditionele holistische aanpak – die door het negeren van de aard van catastrofe-obligaties er immers niet in slaagt tot een eenduidige kwalificatie te leiden.

Er wordt besloten dat het verkeerd is catastrofe-obligaties in hun geheel als het een of het ander te bestempelen, omdat het kredietrisico, het morele risico en de (verdubbeling van) het kanselement beïnvloed worden door (i) de projectvennootschap tussen de sponsor en de investeerders en (ii) het werken met triggers.

Over the past half century, the expression ‘common core’ has undoubtedly been a pole of attraction for lawyers – at least for academic lawyers. As is frequently the case with attractive figures of speech, this one has several layers to it. In this contribution, I endeavour to bring a typology and classification to this concept, and in so doing to examine the most interesting developments which have occurred around this concept, especially in comparative law. At the same time, this is a timely opportunity for airing a number of observations on comparative law method, and on the relationship between comparative law and legal harmonisation.

In Part II I discuss the early exponents of the common core project method, and more particularly four exceptional 20th century legal scholars. Section A starts with examining the origin of the ‘common core’ concept, with particular regard to the French authors around the turn of that century, and further especially to Rudolf Schlesinger, then analyses the factual method of comparative law as developed by the latter. Section B focuses on Ernst Rabel, together with the early history of the functional comparative law method, and its relationship with private international law. Section C discusses the contribution made by Gino Gorla, and, briefly, already touches on Rodolfo Sacco, whose work is discussed more extensively later. The context in which this concept was developed further, i.e. the period following World War II, is discussed in Section D.